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ABSTRACT 
More recent theories of the 'revolutions' of 1989 in 
the societies of Eastern and Central Europe now 
suggest that the underlying dynamic was continuity 
rather than disjuncture in terms of social and 
political relations. Yet such theories fail to explain 
the nature of and the reasons for this continuity in 
terms of gender relations in the public sphere. 
The thesis suggests that the clue to understanding the 
nature of the gendered transformation in Poland's 
public sphere in its mediated aspects between the 
years 1980 and 1994 lies in the role of *-socially 
inherited memory'. Socially inherited memory is the 
dialectical and gendered process by which a given 
society both remembers and forgets past events, 
feelings, thoughts and , 
knowledge through 
representations. The key to Poland"s social memory 
concerns the repressed stories of political right 
developed during the nation's period of identity 
formation in the nineteenth century and interwar 
years. Certain aspects of this social inheritance were 
recalled by the Polish United Workers' Party and then 
by Solidarity to legitimize their power: Because 
Poland's social memory was formed around the public 
exclusion of women and Poland's ethnic minorities this 
resulted in the continuation of exclusionary 
mechanisms and public ghettoization after World War 
Two, and, in the 1980s and 1990s. 
However, the evidence of the thesis also suggests that 
there were sub-plots of women's resistance and 
inclusion within the public sphere from at least the 
nineteenth century onwards. Thus the exclusionary 
impact of socially inherited memory is not an 
inevitable historical process: At particular 
historical moments inclusive representations of women 
and ethnic minorities are recalled or reenacted in the 
fbrm of Public organisations or alternative cultural 
productions. 
Socially inherited memory it is suggested may provide 
a useful concept for examining the (en) gendering of 
the public sphere in other societies. 
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"Clinicians know the privileged moment of insight 
when repressed ideas, feelings and memories 
surface into consciousness. These moments occur 
in the history of societies as well as in the 
history of individuals" (Herman, 1994: 2) 
"Life cannot be separated from knowledge... who 
we are means what we know" (Spender, 1983: 30) 
People often ask me where my interest in Poland comes 
from. The honest reply is that its genesis lies in the 
context of my family upbringing as well as the public 
context of the time. I am, like many, the product of 
a private as well as public Cold War. Embodied within 
me is the 'socially inherited memory' of the 
ideological and military battle between the Eastern 
Bloc and the West; between Communism and capitalism 
and the changes that occurred with Solidarity, 
Glasnost and the fall of the European "communist, ' 
regimes in the 1980s. That battle and that memory 
provided part of the genesis for this thesis on 
Poland. 
At the same time I am the gendered product of a 
private cold war. ostensibly, I was a bright middle- 
class girl brought up in democratic England. But as 
Judith Herman points out: 'A well-established 
democracy in the public sphere could coexist with 
conditions of primitive autocracy or advanced 
dictatorship in the home' (1994: 28). In reality I was 
born into a hidden continent in which the head of 
state, my father, ruled through coercion and 
mystification, abusing family members. Unable to 
change the reality of my f amily, I changed it in my 
mind: I hid subversive thoughts and feelings behind a 
public mask and routinely practised what czeslaw 
Milosc in The Captive Mind (1985) called Iketman' or 
double-think, like the citizen of a totalitarian 
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regime. Trying as a teenager to f ind some sense in 
this private war, ' I turned my attentions outwards to 
the peace movement in the 1970s. Through this public 
and social movement I understood that I was a pacifist 
and, simulataneously, that there could be no real 
peace without equality. Through the peace movement in 
my early teens I learnt that the beliefs that I held 
meant that I was also a communist because I believed 
in equality and in the struggle for a better world for 
all. Later, at the University of York, as an 
undergraduate, I understood that I was also a 
feminist. My involvement with the Greenham Common 
Women's peace camp in the 1980s provided one arena for 
the expression of my beliefs. I, like others, saw the 
razor wire fence at the military base as representing 
the division of Europe, the division between Communism 
and capitalism, as well as the division of common land 
into parcels of private or military property. I also 
felt it to be like the division of my mind. 
Symbolically, we attempted to tear the fence down; to 
clamber over it at night; to sing and dance in the 
presence of weapons that could destroy the entire 
planet. I understood that in both the West and the 
East, pacifists, feminists and communists were 
considered a menace. I also understood that the key 
players in this battle were the media and the 'law. 
Like many others I was arrested and fought through the 
courts to have the international law against genocide 
take precedence over my local breach of the peace. By 
the time I went to Poland in 1988 to take up a post as 
a junior lecturer, after finishing an M. A in Women's 
Studies, I understood that I was against regimes both 
East and West and would do my small part to disrupt 
them. 
my university room in Lodz was on the third floor of 
a block with all the other f oreigners. In it was a 
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radio speaker that I was instructed by the concierge 
to keep switched on continuously, despite the low hum 
it emitted and the sense of invaded privacy that it 
gave. I muf f led mine with cotton wool and a thick 
scarf . Foreigners were also allocated a minder who, in 
the guise of being helpful, latched on to one's daily 
routine with remarkable speed. My minder, Woyciek, had 
limpid blue eyes, a permanent cold, dreadful body 
odour, appalling English and a professed desire to 
emigrate to apartheid South Africa so he could, live in 
luxury with a servant. I loathed him. After a couple 
of weeks he knew that I knew he was following me. I 
deliberately lead him astray, laying false trails to 
distract him. Meanwhile, I quietly got on with 
contacting women in the illegal feminist and peace 
movements. These people kept me sane in an environment 
which was crushing in every aspect. There was the 
daily adjustment to ever changing shortages and 
standing in line for official stamps, authorizations, 
signatures and forms in triplicate to obtain a bus 
pass, ration card or book a room to give a lecture. 
Other queues I Joined voluntarily just in case it 
turned out to be either something useful, such as a 
delivery of tin-openers, or, the gastronomically 
longed for, such as the delivery of crates of ripe 
Brie cheese. The extent to which people were ignorant 
about what was happening in the West, and Britain in 
particular, shocked me. Students would ask about the 
smog in London, based on their reading from books 
dating from the 1950s. When I gave a public lecture in 
Lodz entitled "Thatcher-*s Britain" the majority of the 
audience refused to believe my descriptions of rising 
homelessness, unemployment and political repression in 
Britain in the 1980s; but some did believe me and so 
we met on a regular basis to discuss what could be 
done. 
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At that time in Poland, in the Autumn of 1988, there 
were strikes and periodic food and fuel shortages. 
There were also meetings of the student Solidarity 
movement and a short student occupation of The English 
Department where I taught. Very often, students would 
ask if, instead of our seminar, they could take me to 
a student meeting. It struck me that all the people 
speaking were men; very rarely did one see a woman on 
the platform. In addition when I tried to raise issues 
which I considered essential in any discussion of 
change, such as women's rights, students would respond 
by saying that they were sick of such things since 
they had been drummed into them throughout school. 
In the Spring of 1989,1 returned to Britain and gave 
a paper at the University of York examining the manner 
of the changes in Poland. When I returned to Lodz I 
found that I had been moved to a different flat. The 
flat was wonderful, far more luxurious than that of 
the average Pole. But the downside was the man who sat 
outside my kitchen window in his yellow car all day 
reading a newspaper. My telephone calls were either 
cut-off, or followed with an anonymous call. I came to 
accept that sometimes we would be followed, often in 
the most ridiculous manner, when meeting people in the 
feminist or alternative socialist networks. It was at 
that time that I became involved with a Polish man who 
I was later to marry and divorce. That spring, 1989, 
we saw the beginning of the outward changes in Eastern 
Europe, which the Western Media called "revolutions". 
In Poland, there were the Round Table talks. There 
were also demonstrations, manifestations and riots in 
Gdansk. I remember waking up one morning and seeing 
that all the milicja vehicles had been changed to 
policja. Soon after, there were Solidarity posters on 
billboards and an office for Solidarity in the main 
highstreet in Lodz. Nevertheless, in my heart I felt 
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women were excluded from the political agenda. 
Consequently, I wrote my second play, "Want", based 
on the lives of three Polish women and the effect of 
the changes on their lives in the 1980s. I obtained 
sponsorship from the British Council to tour with it 
around Poland in 1990\1, to provide a focus for 
discussions of the developing women's clubs and 
feminist groups that were being legalised at that 
time. The play also toured the UK in 1991. 
In 1990 1 researched and wrote a book, Polish women. 
Solidarity and Feminism (1992). 1 also married the 
Pole I had met the year before. In 1991,1 worked as 
a freelance journalist during the first 'free' 
elections in Poland, as well as a playwright and 
director. In 1992,1 got divorced. I then began work 
with Dr. Colin Sparks, at the Centre for communication 
and Information Studies at the University of 
Westminster. We worked together on a project entitled 
"The Restructuring of Television in Eastern and 
Central Europe". I did field work in Poland, the Czech 
Republic, the Slovak Republic and Hungary, 
interviewing key people in governments, television 
organizations, universities and the civil services. 
Working with Dr Sparks, I learnt a great deal about 
television systems and the way in which they present 
an opportunity for understanding and theorizing the 
broader changes in Eastern Europe. At the same time, 
I tried to develop my own understanding of gender and 
the media in Poland in relation to the other countries 
I was visiting and with feminists from other countries 
in Eastern Europe. 
Then, in 1994, the British Ministry of Defense 
confirmed that my ex-husband had been working for the 
Polish security Services. This nearly shattered my 
courage and my sense of political being. It felt very 
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difficult to continue with any work connected with 
Poland and I nearly gave up. At the same time, the 
wall in my mind, holding back the private reality of 
my family regime, began to fall. I slowly began to 
realise that it was the amnesia of private experience 
that had started off my political and public journey 
into Eastern Europe in the first place. And, that my 
experiences of political betrayal in Poland had then 
taken me back to the Eastern bloc in my mind. I came 
to the conclusion that what the private and the public 
share are socially inherited memory. Just as some 
parents re-enact their childhoods, subjecting their 
own children to the abuses they suffered, so too do 
societies through socially inherited memory re-enact 
exclusion and political abuse. It is then through 
public spaces, be it the classroom, the street, or, in 
this instance, the public space of the academic 
thesis, in which we can learn to understand experience 
more wholly,, consciously and critically. As Madan 
Sarup points out: "History, literature,, storytelling, 
therefore have important functions because they 
provide discourses and opportunities for dealing with 
experiences by discussing them. " (Sarup, 1988: 151). 
In the following pages I try to come to terms 
emotionally and intellectually with what happened in 
the former Eastern Bloc between 1980-1994.1 develop 
an explanation of these processes through the concept 
of socially inherited memory, examples of which are to 
be found, I argue, in the (en) gendering processes in 
relation to aspects of the media in Poland. I bring 
together my empirical research and modest number of 
publications over a number of years and, I hope, make 
some sense of them in order to theorize on a broader 
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PAULINA You concede something. I concede 
something. Isn't that what this transition is all 
about? Compromise, negotiation. They let us have 
democracy, but they keep control of the economy 
and of the Armed Forces? The Commission can 
investigate the crimes but nobody is punished for 
them? There's freedom to say anything you want as 
long as you don't say everything you want? (From 
Act Two Death and The Maiden Ariel Dorfman) 
Poland never had Communism. We have had 
dictators. (Solidarity chairman, Zbigniew Lis, 
Personal Communication, 1991) 
Preamble 
As a child, the Berlin wall was a fixture of my mind 
as much as it was of Europe. Eastern Europe was the 
place of darkness, chaos, non-being, lack, badness and 
madness, with terms such as iron curtain and satellite 
state serving to construct the feminine other of the 
Eastern Bloc (Reading, 1992: 11-14). Despite all my 
expectations the Berlin Wall came down. And by 1995 it 
seemed that in media discourse at least the former 
Eastern Bloc was no longer our feminine other, as the 
portrayal of the docking between the U. S. space 
shuttle and the Russian space station in 1995 
testified (BBC 1, News, 1995,30 June: 6.00 pm). This, 
explained a leading scientist, was no simple 
technological matter but one of deep ideological and 
symbolic value between the two countries. More than 
two years research had gone into developing a docking 
system in which neither world power was required to be 
the 'female' part, as both countries had refused to be 
'entered'. The solution, said the scientist, was the 
equivalent of a hermaphrodite docking system. Both 
parties effectively had both organs to achieve 
symbolic gender parity up in space. Yet back on Earth 
did (en) gendering mechanisms publicly change? 
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Reasons, objectives and Aims of the Research 
This thesis examines the role of socially inherited 
memory in the gendered transformation of the public 
sphere in Poland, with particular reference to changes 
in aspects of the media, especially television since 
1980. My reasons for choosing to study gender and the 
public sphere in Poland are threefold. First, I may 
claim a modest knowledge of the Polish language and 
the relationship between gender, culture and political 
movements in Poland (Reading, 1992; 1994a; 1994b). 
Secondly, the transformations which have taken place 
in Poland have been gradual, involving protracted 
processes of negotiation and pre-adaptation 
(Jakubowicz, 1990). In this respect, Poland provides 
a more typical example of the processes of transition 
in the countries of the region than in some countries 
in which these processes were overtly violent, as in 
Romania, or the result of an abrupt break, as in 
Czechoslovakia (Sparks and Reading, 1993). Thirdly, 
the revolutions in 1989 in Eastern Europe present key 
problems for social analysis and it seems to me that 
a major part of these revolutions is their gendered 
aspect, particularly in relation to public space and 
the question of representation in the newly developing 
democracies. 
When my interest in gender and Poland began, there was 
only a small body of research from the 1970s and 1980S 
which examined broader aspects of women's lives in 
Central and Eastern Europe (Jancar, 1978; Wolczik, 
1985; Heitlinger, 1979). Since 1989 there have been a 
number of comparative texts and edited collections 
which examine women's place in East European Societies 
(Funk, 1993; Corrin, 1993; Einhorn, 1993). However, 
this thesis takes a slightly different approach in 
that it examines the historically gendered processes 
of exclusion and inclusion springing from Polands 
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national identity formation in the 19th century and 
interwar years and looks at the impact of these on 
changes to public communication in the period of 
recent rapid transition between 1980 and 1994. The 
thesis suggests that essential to our understanding of 
the transitions in Eastern Europe and broader aspects 
of representation and public space is the question of 
what may be conceptualized as socially inherited 
inemory. 
In this sense the thesis theoretically extends and 
builds on my own study of Polish women, Solidarity and 
Feminism (1992) and later articles relating to Poland 
(Reading, 1994; 1995). It also extends this work 
empirically by giving more emphasis to the role of 
different media, especially television, as part of our 
socially inherited memory and the construction of 
Poland's public spaces in the recent transition. The 
reason for focusing on television, in the main part of 
the thesis (Part Three), is because in modern 
industrialized societies to inquire into the nature of 
the transformations in television organizations is to 
inquire into the transformations in societies 
themselves, as Boyle argues (1993: 1). Television 
organizations and television policy also were one of 
the most fought over areas of communication in public 
spaces in Eastern Europe during the transition. This 
spawned a range of studies tackling the democratic 
implications of this (jakubowicz, 1994; Sparks and 
Reading, 1994; Splichal, 1995) but which ignored 
gender. Whilst Einhorn's timely comparative study of 
citizenship, gender and women's movements in Eastern 
and Central Europe does examine aspects of gender, 
literature and women's magazines in the region, it 
does not address gender issues in relation to 
television. Three studies do touch briefly on women 
and the media in Poland (Witkowska, 1990; Siemienska, 
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1982; Sasinska-Klas, 1993), but these are synchronic 
rather than diachronic. one author provides an account 
of women journalists and media practices after 1989 
(Moritz, 1993). Finally, there are Maciej Mrozowskils 
studies in Polish on women's and men's attitudes in 
Polish state television in the 1980s (Mrozowski, 
1989). However, these do not make any connections 
between Poland's gendered social memory and its impact 
on the gendered transitions of television 
representation in Poland's public spaces. Overall it 
is also true to say, as Lisa McLaughlin (1994: 27) 
points out, that there is little which examines gender 
and the structural transformation of the public sphere 
over time with particular reference to the media; and 
none with reference to Poland and television in 
particular. 
Thus one objective of this study is to extend research 
and analyses of the transitions in Eastern Europe by 
examining the (en)gendering processes and mechanisms 
of exclusion and inclusion diachronically with an 
appropriate media aspect. By appropriate media aspect 
I mean the key medium of the particular age and public 
space. Different media at different times have 
different cultural and political power within public 
spaces and this is as true of Poland as anywhere else. 
Whilst it can be argued that television should be the 
logical focus for discussion in the main part of the 
thesis (Part Three), since it was the most contended 
form of communication in the public spaces-of Poland 
between 1980 and 1989, this argument is not tenable 
for the earlier periods under discussion in Parts One 
and Two of the thesis. In these parts I wanted to 
establish the historical processes of the 
(en)gendering of Poland's public sphere, or, the 
formation of particular socially inherited memory in 
Poland. It therefore seemed logical to analyse the 
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media forms appropriate to this period of identity 
formation. Thus I have chosen to focus on other media, 
such as print, literature and underground iconography 
in the nineteenth century, the interwar years and 
under state capitalism'. This, whilst risking the 
problems associated with shifts in media focus, I felt 
would enrich the analysis by providing the possibility 
for intertextual anaylsis of media over time. 
A second objective is to use this country case study 
as a way of testing and developing a gendered theory 
of transformations of the public sphere more generally 
by using the conceptualization of socially inherited 
memory. For example, an aspect of the transition in 
Poland has concerned the shift from state television 
to public service television, with the latter seen as 
restorative for civil society or the public sphere 
(Jakubowicz, 1990: 15; Druck, 1991: 112). However, 
research in the West since the 1970s clearly shows the 
inefficacy of public service broadcasters when it 
comes to the representation of women and ethnic 
minorities (Rowland and Tracey, 1991: 8; Blanchard and 
Morley, 1982: 104; Cockburn and Loach, 1986: 15-16). 
Thus an examination of the indexes of (en)gendering or 
the form that Poland's socially inherited memory takes 
in broadcasting structures and policies enabled me to 
draw conclusions about the nature of the transitions 
more generally as well as how to (re) conceptualize the 
public sphere from a gendered perspective. similar 
work is currently being done on the transitions to 
democracy in the new South Africa by Alison Gilman 
(1995). 
' Radio may also have been a most fruitful area of study, but is one which I do not address due to the 
difficulties of access prior to 1989. Further, according to the Head of Sound Engineering in Polish Radio and 
Television (Personal Communication, 1993) only more recently have early radio broadcasts become more easily 
available for technical reasons. 
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Hypothesis 
The study has a working hypothesis which has guided 
the research and the research design. The starting 
point, based on initial reading and my own 
observations of Polish society, is that what could be 
conceptualized as socially inherited memory played an 
important part in the manner and extent of recent 
transformations in the public sphere in Poland, as 
articulated through its various media aspects. Because 
Poland's social memory of political right was 
inherently gender biased this may have served to 
reproduce patriarchal structures after 1989. This 
would suggest that the theoretical frameworks used for 
the purposes of explaining the revolutions in Eastern 
Europe and transitions in the public sphere are 
inadequate in that they fail to demonstrate how or why 
the (en)gendering mechanisms in Poland remain 
remarkably constant over time, with gender bias in the 
public sphere in post-1989 Poland the same if not 
worse for women. Further, they f ail to show that 
this continuity in the public (en)gendering of 
representation is not only between the Communists and 
Solidarity in Poland but also between the pre- 
Communist and Communist regimes. This continuity 
suggests af law in transition theories which argue 
that the revolutions in Eastern and Central Europe 
mark a break at the economic and social levels of 
society (Fukuyama, 1992; Miliband, 1991) but would 
seem to support gendered theories of the transition 
such as that articulated by Einhorn (1994). My sub 
hypothesis is that socially inherited memory is 
contradictory and dialectical. This would allow for 
different kinds of changes in gender representations 
during particular periods of both stability and rapid 
transition. This is tested by examining the degree to 
which Poland, s (en)gendering mechanisms resulted in 
clashes and fissures within public space and thus 
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limited possibilities for change in gender relations 
and representations during periods of relative social 
stability and confidence by the Communist regime and 
during the period of instability and transition in the 
1980s and 1990s. 
Methods and Sources 
The diachronic and intertextual approach of the study 
required a number of methodologies. The first method 
involved the tracing of primary data from documentary 
sources such as government statistical yearbooks, 
television yearbooks, internal media journals, 
underground or self-published sources, policy-making 
documents and laws. Additional primary sources came 
from personal communications and face-to-face 
interviews with a broad range of women and men 
representative of Polish society, including former 
members of Solidarity, working journalists and 
broadcasters, academics, government ministers, and 
people working in a variety of key decision-making 
professions. A list of interviewees is included in the 
bibliography. Most interviews were between one and two 
hours long and semi-structured. I conducted these 
interviews over several years beginning with my first 
year in Poland in 1988. During that year, whilst I was 
teaching and writing in Lodz, and working with the 
underground feminist movement, I recorded in detail on 
a daily basis meetings and events. The resulting 
journals documented my own observations of the changes 
in Polish society during the revolutions in Eastern 
Europe. I decided to use some documentation from this 
participant observation as background. occasionally, 
I quote from these sources. I have since made eight 
trips to Poland, some for periods of one or two 
months, others for several weeks or just a couple of 
days. I supplemented these with observations and field 
trips to other countries in the region, including the 
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Czech Republic, Slovakia, the former East Germany and 
Hungary. These have proved invaluable in making 
comparisons with the Polish situation. In the main 
part of the thesis I briefly draw attention to 
similarities and differences of other Eastern European 
countries in the Visegrad Group. 
My secondary sources include sociological surveys, 
literature and press cuttings in Polish from the 
Jagiellonian University, Warsaw University and Lodz 
University libraries. The Women's Unit in Gdansk (now 
in Katowice) and the Solidarity archives in Gdansk 
also proved to be invaluable sources of unpublished or 
underground sources. Published secondary sociological 
and theoretical sources in English and Polish have 
provided supplementary and background information as 
well as my theoretical framework. 
As is usual, with gender science, the personal has been 
interwoven with the theoretical, the singular with the 
general, the ', primary' source with the "secondary' 
source, the 'objective' with the 'subjective'. The 
arguments f or the validity of this approach and its 
practice have been well documented since the 1970s 
(Women's Studies Group, 1978; Bowles and Klein, 1983; 
Spender, 1983; Williams, 1993). Griffin argues, for 
example, that the values associated with objectivity 
and subjectivity are tied up with a whole set of 
dichotomies that support the gender-system. 
objectivity is viewed as rational, neutral, 
transcendental and therefore providing the whole 
picture, the facts. Subjectivity is viewed as 
irrational, emotional, biased, imminent and therefore 
providing only a partial picture (Griffin, 1986). 
Often objective sources of knowledge only provide a 
partial picture: government statistics for example may 
be biased or constructed in ways which obscure some 
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people., As Barbera DuBois argues: *Objectivity and 
subjectivity are modes of knowing, analysis, 
interpretation, understanding, they are not 
independent of each other and should not be' (1983: 
111). Ultimately, it is not the pretence of 
objectivity which will produce academic coherence but 
attending to the correspondence and conflicts between 
oneself and one's engagement with the world, whether 
that be reading a book, writing a thesis or sharing 
the nightmares in one's mind and heart. It is this 
that will enrich academic production. 
Questions of Terminology 
The key term I use is socially inherited memory. 
Literally, this means the ability of a society to 
store, repress and recall past events And knowledge, 
as well as shared sensations and thoughts. The term is 
conceptualized in an interdisciplinary manner in 
Chapter 1 by critiquing and building on a range of 
different theories from the political and social 
sciences, linguistics and social psychology. In brief, 
however, I use the term in a way which is similar to 
that of Michael Billig in his anayisis of what he 
terms 'banal nationalism' (1996). Billig in turn has 
drawn on the work of Ernest Renan (1990) who developed 
the idea of the dialect of remembering and forgetting 
which forms the collective memory of a nation. 
Socially inherited memory I suggest constitutes the 
sum of all that is retained by a society (which tends 
towards the fiction of the nation state). The 
retention of a wall pockmarked with bullets from the 
second world War in Poznan is part of Poland's social 
memory. So too are the language and discourses we use 
to describe it. Socially inherited memory is also the 
particular recollection of an event or people by a 
particular group. It is suggested that the way that 
social memory operates is that the individual is 
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socially constructed through language, and discourse, 
which articulates different aspects of social memory. 
Social memory, however, is not simply another word f or 
ideology. If we believe that ideology constitutes a 
system of ideas about human conduct which is 
simplified to underpin the social structure of a 
society, especially that of class society (Watson and 
Hill, 1993: 88) then social memory is different in that 
it is not the twin of some other, as with ideology and 
structure, it is both. Socially inherited memory may 
be understood as more akin to Pierre Bourdieuls 
concept of the habitus (1994). Bourdieu uses the 
concept of the habitus to explain the acquisition and 
expression of social taste in terms of class. I 
suggest that the concept of socially inherited memory 
is not only classed but also raced and gendered. The 
hail of bullets unleashed from the guns that are still 
publicly represented on the wall in Poznan came from 
armies in which men, but not women, officially fought 
on the front lines. Men and women learn to inscribe 
themselves differently within socially inherited 
memory and relate to and rec 
' 
all it differently. This 
is because socially inherited memory operates, as does 
personal memory, through language and myth. Just as 
individual memory may be stored and expressed 
somatically and mentally, so too in a sense is social 
memory. It is stored and expressed in somatic form 
through representation, the public presence or absence 
of men and women in public or private spaces, and, in 
mental form through re-presentation, or through 
collectively recognised symbolic manifestations. 
social memory may serve to operate on or inform the 
present and future in ways in which the society is not 
fully conscious. This is why it is necessary to study 
the role of social memory in order to more fully 
understand the (en)gendering of the public sphere. 
Further, I propose that the social analysis of the 
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public sphere of a given society involves the 
understanding of the identity formation of that 
society and the deconstruction of the society's myths 
to release repressed social memories which may be 
causing social damage such as (en) gendering bias in 
the public sphere. The recollection of social memory 
by a researcher, by the reader, by the participants of 
any academic project is then a political act. Thus I 
suggest in this thesis a particular way of 
understanding transformations of the public sphere 
which is both gendered and historical. The key to 
this, I suggest, is the concept of socially inherited 
memory. 
The second term I use throughout is representation. 
The word itself in terms of its dictionary definition 
may include written images, statistics, photographs or 
cartoons. Representation denotes both resemblance or 
correspondence as well as substitution or replacement. 
The way in which I use this term is that posited by 
Gayatri Spivak (1988). Thus, I use representation in 
two ways. First, there is representation - in terms of 
having a social presence/absence in the public sphere: 
for example, the number of government ministers who 
are women, or the number of women on a broadcasting 
committee. Secondly, there is re-presentation to refer 
to the symbolic manifestations of presence or absence. 
The relationship between these is not one of 
categorical distinction but of organic continuity and 
contradiction, rather like the difference between the 
roots and shoots of a plant which depending on the 
soil level can change from one to the other. The term 
is appropriate to the interdisciplinary nature of this 
study. It bridges what are sometimes seen as different 
aspects of the public sphere, such as the political 
and cultural realms. It allows for a sense of linkage 
rather than disjuncture between the private and public 
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realms, since the distinction between these is 
conceptual rather than actual, as Spivak suggests: 
according to the explanations that constitute (as 
they are effects of) our culture, the political, 
social, professional, economic, intellectual 
arenas belong to the public sector. The 
emotional, sexual, and domestic are the private 
sector ... Feminist practice, at least since the European 18th century, suggests that each 
compartment of the public sector also operates 
emotionally and sexually, that the 'domestic 
sphere is not the emotions only legitimate 
workplace' (1988: 103). 
This is also the sense more recently deployed by Myra 
Macdonald in Representing Women (1995: 2-3). She 
suggests that the concept of representation usefully 
refers to politics and culture and suggests the 
relationship between these spheres. She argues that 
although the concept of representation is outmoded in 
cultural criticism it is still politically important. 
It encapsulates the sense of both political and 
cultural rights within groups marginalized in the 
public sphere and seeking to have a voice and be heard 
(Macdonald, 1992: 3). Like Macdonald, I do not use the 
term representation to indicate that there is 
somewhere somehow something real that the media should 
or could re-present to us. 
Thirdly, I use throughout the thesis the term state 
capitalism to refer to the political and economic 
system of Poland between 1946-1989. Why I use this 
term, rather than the alternatives of state socialism, 
socialism, or communism is indicative of my 
academic/political position. The term seems best to 
describe the system in Poland whereby the ruling 
Party, the Polish United Workers' Party, professed the 
ideals of socialism whilst Poland's economy retained 
the same contradictions as those of economies in the 
capitalist West - competition, accumulation and 
exploitation. The bureaucratic class, the 
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nomenclature, managed the economy but the wage-labour 
relation did not in ef f ect change. I thus use this 
term in preference to others to indicate that there is 
a difference between socialist theory and the practice 
of the political class managing capitalism in the 
regimes in Eastern Europe. 
Structural overview 
The thesis starts from the assumption that the 
revolutions in Eastern Europe in 1989 present 
themselves as important areas for social analysis. 
Further, that the revolutions may have an important 
gender aspect, particularly in relation to the 
(en)gendering of the public sphere. One way of 
understanding and explaining the transformations in 
the region may be the concept of socially inherited 
memory. This is tested by examinining the exclusion of 
women from and inclusion of women in public 
(re) presentations from Poland"s period of identity 
formation through to the the 1990s. 
Structurally, the thesis is divided into three main 
parts. The chapters in Part One of the thesis 
establish the theoretical and empirical framework for 
the concept of socially inherited memory. In Chapter 
One I discuss the theoretical background to the 
subject of the thesis and suggest that these accounts 
are flawed in a number of respects and that there is 
perhaps another way of addressing the problem which 
may involve the concept of socially inherited memory 
in the public sphere. Chapter Two attends to the 
question of the gendering of the Polish language, 
since language, I argue, operating through different 
discourses, is important to our understanding of 
socially inherited memory. Language is the link 
between the public and private, the social and 
individual memory. An analysis of the (en)gendering of 
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language enables an understanding of the gendering of 
the individual, as psychoanalysis and gender 
scientists have long since indicated, but also the 
gendering of a society. In the particular case of the 
Polish language, patterns of gender bias which have 
been noted by feminists studying other languages are 
repeated but with particular manifestations connected 
with Poland's identity formation. Within the Polish 
language resides repressed gendered social relations 
which are then rearticulated in the present. These, 
consequently, may act to inform mechanisms of 
exclusion and inclusion within public spaces. Chapter 
Three attends to the early formation of the public 
sphere in Poland and the particular historical 
circumstances which prevailed to create conceptions of 
female political activity. These conceptions of female 
political activity are part of the repressed story of 
political rights which have formed Poland's socially 
inherited memory. I examine the historical background 
to the place of Polish women and Jewish women and 
their representation in Polish society from the 19th 
century up until the Second World War. The chapter 
introduces and analyses the figure of Mother Poland 
(Matka Polka) and the importance of the nation and the 
Church as on-going aspects of the public (en)gendering 
process. 
Parts Two and Three attempt to demonstrate how this 
gendered socially inherited memory is and is not 
articulated in the public sphere and within different 
media aspects under state capitalism and then in 
Poland's transformation since 1980, with particular 
consequences f or women. Thus in Chapter Four I examine 
how the particular representations of f emale political 
activity developed during Poland's period of national 
identity formation were rearticulated by the 
Communists, although with different inflections at 
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different times in order to follow the Party-led drive 
for economic industrialization. I do this by analysing 
aspects of the public (en)gendering of representation 
under state capitalism, in ruling Party theory, in 
law, in the workplace,, education and politics. In 
Chapter Five I continue to address the impact of 
Poland's socially inherited memory on the gendering of 
the public sphere under state capitalism by examining 
aspects of cultural production and literature in 
particular. Censorship under the Communist regime 
meant that there were limitations on what could be 
said, and particular representations of women were 
used to express that which was censored. These 
representations drew on the literary imagery of 
earlier periods. Nevertheless, it was not the case 
that literary imagery solely rearticulated Poland's 
gendered socially inherited memory. Some 'women 
writers, because of the contradictions of the 
situation under state capitalism, were able to create 
spaces in which they actively deconstruct aspects of 
Poland's socially inherited memory and create 
alternatives. one such writer was Anna Swir who 
through her poetry during the period of confident 
state capitalism in the 1970s was able to write 
fundamental critiques of both the state capitalist and 
gendered system in Poland. Her work stands as an 
example of the best that was possible under Poland's 
old regime. It also provides us with an indication 
that social memory is not inevitably rearticulated 
from generation to generation but contains sufficient 
inconsistencies and contradictions for new 
(re) presentations to re-cover social memories which 
are then gendered more equally within the public 
sphere. 
Chapters 6,7 and 8 in Part Three constitute the key 
part of the thesis. This is an examination of the 
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impact of socially inherited memory on the beginnings 
of the transition in the official and underground 
public spheres. What we see is that, as the regime 
started to break up, there were some contradictions 
but mostly convergences in the representations of 
women by the ruling communist regime in politics, in 
education, in culture and in social policies. What 
this seems to suggest is that, far from the period of 
transition constituting a revolution in terms of 
gender bias and mechanisms of exclusion to women's 
(re)presentation, both sides sought to actively 
recover aspects of Poland's socially inherited memory 
and use them to legitimatize their own power base. 
Because Poland's social memory was inherently gender 
biased this served to reproduce patriarchal structures 
after 1989. Thus the development and triumph of the 
opposition in Poland did not result in any real 
liberation for women. It did mean that certain 
subjects could now be given voice but there were a 
number of crucial retreats in terms of ideology and 
women's social position. This is demonstrated in more 
detail in Chapter Eight. This examines 
(re) presentations of the most fought over medium in 
Eastern Europe - television - in Poland from 1980 to 
1994. With television we see that the roots of gender 
bias, structurally and ideologically, lie in the 
historical formation of Poland's socially inherited 
memory around a contested national identity. This 
struggle meant that concerns relating to gender were 
marginalized because they might threaten the unity of 
the nation. Further, we see from this that in periods 
of rapid transition gender bias may become over- 
articulated because of the struggling elite's reliance 
on its socially inherited memory to offer stability 
and continuity and thus to legitimatize its rule. 
Chapter Nine draws together the evidence on women in 
the public sphere in Poland and indicates how the 
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hypothesis suggested in the introduction and the 
theoretical questions raised in Chapter 1 concerning 
gender, change and the public sphere may be understood 
in the light of empirical evidence from Poland. 
Overall, the thesis attempts to understand and explain 
in Poland the (en)gendering of the public sphere 
through the conceptual i zation of socially inherited 
memory. Neither the concept nor the thesis, however, 
purports to explain all aspects of the changes or 
mediated transitions. It is hoped that any gaps or 
flaws in this approach, and the questions which remain 
unresolved will lead to further research. 
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Chapter One: Theoretical Background 
"I have a memory, which is the memory of Mother's 
memory" (Victoria Glendinning, 1996: 12) 
"Individual consciousness is not the architect of 
the ideological superstructure, but only a tenant 
lodging in the social edifice of ideological 
signs" (V. N. Volosinov, 1973: 13) 
1.1 Introduction 
In the introduction to the thesis it was established 
that the focus of this inquiry concerns the impact of 
socially inherited memory on the gendered mediatic 
transitions in Poland's public sphere between 1980 and 
1994. In this first chapter, I set the scene for Part 
One by establishing a theoretical framework for the 
inquiry. First, I examine explanations of the 
transformations in the societies in East and Central 
Europe. Secondly, I look at theories of the public 
sphere, particularly those by gender scientists that 
point to gendered versions of the concept. Thirdly, 
I find it necessary to draw on different aspects of 
social theory from a gendered perspective to formulate 
the concept of social memory which I propose will 
assist us in understanding the social processes in 
Poland in the late eighties and nineties. 
1.2 Theories on the Revolutions in Eastern Europe 
The changes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
union in the late 1980s have since elicited an 
enormous body of work by scholars both East and West. 
Colin Sparks and I suggested that we can group these 
different accounts of the end of Communism into three 
broad kinds, which can be illustrated by particular 
representative thinkers (1994). We argue that the most 
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well known accounts have been those which make the 
greatest claims for change such as that articulated by 
Fukujama (1992). His view is that what occurred in 
Eastern Europe in 1989 were revolutions which 
radically altered societies at every level, with the 
old Communist elites entirely pushed out. From this 
perspective the 'Communist' order was one which ran 
against natural human needs and its subsequent 
collapse signals the return to market led economies 
with democratic representative political systems. For 
Fukujama the revolutions are complete. Effectively, 
they signal the end of history (Fukuyama, 1992). 
The second main perspective, represented by Miliband 
(1991), also sees the revolutions as signifying 
substantial changes at certain levels. The starting 
point for these, accounts is the understanding that the 
societies of Eastern Europe were essentially socialist 
in terms of their economies, but bureaucratized in the 
political realm. The undemocratic political elites or 
nomenclatures corrupted what was a relatively 
egalitarian social structure. 1989 signalled a turn- 
coat procedure whereby the nomenclature changed from 
political bureaucrats into capitalists of the first 
order, pocketing the wealth of previously state-owned 
enterprises. The revolutions from this perspective are 
thus primarily social, with societies moving from 
socialism to capitalism, with few real changes at the 
political level. 
The third perspective Colin Sparks and I outline is 
that which sees the revolutions as representing little 
change at any level. This perspective, we argue, is 
best articulated by Callinicos (1991). According to 
Callinicos the old regimes were neither socialist nor 
capitalist. They are better described as state 
capitalist and were thus not that different from the 
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private capitalism established in the West. In this 
scheme of things both economic and political power was 
held by the same class who 'ruled societies driven to 
accumulation by the necessity of competition with the 
West, primarily through military rivalry' (Sparks and 
Reading, 1994: 246). Thus the revolutions signified no 
real social change, with the majority of people still 
forced to sell their labour to a relatively small 
number of propertied individuals. Politically, the 
dominance of the Communist Parties was transmuted 
into new democratic forms of government by the same 
class (Sparks and Reading, 1994: 247). 
Whilst these theories on the changes in Eastern Europe 
may be generally useful they entirely neglect the 
question of gender. However, there is by now a 
substantial body of theory which includes gender as an 
aspect of the revolutions in the region. These 
gendered theories share an emphasis on dismantling the 
belief that 1989 marked a breaking point for women in 
terms of real social change. The emphasis in these 
theories is on the continuity of gender relations. 
They argue that the changes that did occur, such as 
growing nationalism and conservatism, restrictions on 
abortion, the growth of new feminist networks, began 
long before 1989. Despite these broad similarities, 
the theories vary according to the country under 
study. Nevertheless, it is still possible to discern 
two broad explanations, to which it is possible to 
assign representative thinkers. 
The first is best represented by Barbara Einhorn 
(1993) who takes the view that the Communist regimes 
were state socialist societies in which women had 
expanded work place rights at the expense of their 
rights as citizens (1993: 257). The revolutions of 1989 
have sent women back into the home whilst providing 
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them with greater rights as citizens. Generally, 
however, neither state socialism nor the new 
'democracies' of Eastern Europe have resulted in 
women's emancipation. What hope there is lies in the 
non-hierarchical forms of public participation which 
women themselves are developing through women's 
networks (1993: 260). 
The second view is one that is fairly close to that of 
Einhorn but dif f erent in terms of its understanding of 
the Communist regimes. This is very much a minority 
view and may be represented by Chanie Rosenburg 
(1989). This perspective builds from the understanding 
that the societies of Eastern Europe were state 
capitalist. It takes the view that the political and 
social systems of the former Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe before 1989 displayed the same contradictions 
of economies in the capitalist West: competition, 
accumulation, and exploitation. The emphasis is on the 
continuity of the systems before and after 1989, with 
few real changes either at the social or political 
levels in terms of gender and class relations. What 
limited changes there have been at the political level 
are seen to have been more benef icial f or men than f or 
women. The social crisis underlying the impetus f or 
glasnost is seen as resulting in women being pushed 
back into the private realm with f ew possibilities for 
their voices to be heard. 
A slightly different version of this I suggested in 
Polish Women Solidarity and Feminism (1992). In this 
I began from an understanding that the Polish regime 
before 1989 was state capitalist: ', There were both 
East and West those who sell their labour to those 
(owners) in control. In Poland the owners were the 
state and top Party officials, and, with increasing 
debts, the banks and international corporations of the 
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West' (Reading, 1992: 6). 1 argued that the changes 
since 1989 have been limited for women. Nevertheless, 
I put forward the belief that the contradictions of 
the gendered capitalist system provided for some 
possibilities in terms of women representing 
themselves through new feminist networks. The 
positions of these different thinkers in relation to 
changes in the public sphere of Poland may be 
summarised in the form of a table : (see over) 
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Table 1. Summary of positions of key theorists on 
transitions in Eastern Europe in relation to women and 
the public sphere. 
Theorist Nature of the Degree Degree 





Fukuyama Revolutionary and Signific - 
rapid changes at ant 
all levels of 
society 
Miliband Gradual change Some - 
Callinicos Marked continuity Very - 
little 










overall, it would seem that the majority of these 
theorists suggest that the changes in Eastern Europe 
have been fairly limited. They are perceived more in 
terms of transitions, with key elements of continuity, 
rather than as abrupt revolutions. This raises a 
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number of, questions for this study. If this was the 
case in Poland, then how and why were the changes so 
limited? Why were , exclusionary aspects of gender 
relations in the public sphere replicated during the 
period of transition? In the next section, therefore, 
I look at different accounts of the public sphere 
which may help to provide a theoretical explanation 
for this aspect of the transition. 
1.3 Accounts of the Public Sphere 
The work of the scholar who influenced our'thinking on 
the concept of the public sphere, Jurgen Habermas, is 
now well known. He argued that the public sphere took 
on a political role initially in 17th century England 
and was later transformed by the industrial 
revolution, the development of the modern state and a 
mass media (Habermas, 1989). Gender scientists, 
however, have since challenged the Habermasian account 
in a variety of ways (see Elstain, 1981; Fraser, 1989, 
1990,1992; Felski, 1989; Landes, 1992; McLaughlin, 
1993, Pateman, 1988; Reading, 1994). The accounts vary 
in their scope and focus of inquiry, but, share three 
bases of contention: the question of androcentrism; 
the question of alternative spheres versus public 
spaces; the question of the legacy of the 
Enlightenment. These three problem areas will now be 
examined in turn. 
1.4 The Public Sphere and Androcentrism 
The first basis of contention from a feminist 
perspective to Habermas's normative account is that it 
is historically idealistic and gender blind. 
Feminist scholars argue that Habermas ignores the 
gender barriers (as well as other barriers such as 
37 
class, race, and age) to the official public sphere in 
the 18th and 19th centuries. Thus, Habermas does not 
account for the formal gender qualifications required 
to enter the public sphere in 19th century European 
society (Reading, 1995: 180-82). The public sphere 
rather than an arena of freely discoursing people was 
rather an arena which, historically, was characterized 
by gender and class barriers and conflicts 
(McLaughlin, 1994). Habermas argues that an embryonic 
'representative' public sphere developed in the 17th 
century out of the feudal authorities of the Church, 
princes and nobility (Mattelart, 1979: 199) yet: 
In the Church only men could become priests, 
bishops, archdeacons or the Pope. Women could not 
lead the rites for marriages, funerals or 
baptisms or the ceremonies for confession or 
communion. Men were depicted in Christian texts 
as the omnipotent creator of the universe and the 
saviour of a once perfect world. Whilst women in 
the Old and New Testaments and particularly the 
epistles of St. Paul were shown as the epitome of 
the Virgin or the Whore. In the nobility, power 
and wealth were patrilineal and female royalty 
who did not produce the required male offspring 
could be and were murdered. (Reading, 1995: 181) 
Habermas argues that the 19th century heralded the 
development of the bourgeois public sphere (Mattelart, 
1979: 199). However, gender scientists such as Fraser 
(1989) argue that this expansion of the public sphere 
did not include all women in the same way as it 
included some men. Lovendowski points to the fact that 
during the French Revolution of 1789 women were 
established as the political equals of men. But, by 
1793 under Robespierre's Revolutionary Assembly the 
existence of women's organizations was made illegal 
and gatherings of more than 5 women banned 
(Lovendowski, 1986: 18). In England women could not 
vote until after World War I and then they had to be 
over the age of 30 when they were deemed to be 
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rational beings. Until the Married Women Property Acts 
in the 1870s women upon marriage underwent the 
equivalent of civil death (Reading, 1995: 181-2). In 
Victorian England women did not have the same freedom 
in public places as men since under the Contagious 
Diseases Act any woman in a public place could be 
detained by the police and forcibly internally 
examined (Reading, 1995: 182). In the 1840s and 1850s 
in the United States women could not preach from the 
pulpit or speak in temperance associations run by 
white men; women had to be accompanied by men to 
administer to patients in hospitals; white women and 
black people were banned from certain academies and 
did not have the right to vote. Black men and women 
were enslaved, with the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 
giving unprecedented powers to slave owners (Russo and 
Kramerae, 1991). 
What this illustrates, argue gender scientists, is 
that, historically, the public sphere has been an 
unmistakably bourgeois male one: 'despite the rhetoric 
of publicity and accessibility the very meaning of 
'civil society' was constructed through the 
significant exclusion of women, the proletariat and 
popular culture' (McLaughlin, 1993: 603). As Pateman 
argues in Tne sexuai contract: 
Political theorists present the familiar account 
of the creation of civil society as a universal 
realm that (at least potentially) includes 
everyone and of the origins of the political 
right in the sense of the authority of government 
in the liberal state, or Rousseau's participatory 
polity. But this is not the 'original' political 
right. There is silence about the part of the 
story which relates that the social contract is 
a fraternal pact that constitutes civil society 
as a patriarchal or masculine order. To uncover 
the latter it is necessary to begin to tell the 
repressed story of the genesis of patriarchal 
political right which men exercise over women. 
(1981: 101) (My emphasis) 
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The key to this passage and f or us in relation to 
gendered explanations of the public sphere in Poland 
is the phrase "the repressed story". What is the 
repressed story of the genesis of political right in 
Poland? Does this repressed story explain how the 
public sphere continues to be (en)gendered? How far 
does this repressed story impact on the more recent 
transformations in Poland since 1980 particularly in 
relation to television? And, finally, what indeed is 
meant by the phrase "repressed story"12' 
These questions I follow up in the formation of the 
concept of socially inherited memory (Section 1.7) 
after I examine the second and third major objections 
by feminists to Habermas's account of the public 
sphere. 
1.5 The Public Sphere v Public Spaces 
The second objection that gender scientists have to 
Habermas's account of the public sphere concerns the 
assumption that the public sphere is singular and 
homogeneous. 
Thus Ryan (1992) argues that although there were major 
barriers to women entering the official public sphere, 
by the middle of the 19th century in the United States 
middle class white women did take an active part in 
public life through women-run clubs and campaigns. 
Russo and Kramarae (1991) show in their collection 
Radical Women's Press of the 1850s the growth of 
women's newspapers and magazines addressing public 
issues of the day in the United States. Joan Landes 
(1988) provides us with a similar case for France in 
the 19th century. 
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The central implication of this is that gender 
scientists have shown that counter-publics "always 
contested the exclusionary notion of the public sphere 
and its rules, elaborating alternative notions of 
appropriate political behaviour and public 
participation' (McLaughlin, 1993: 615). 
Does the evidence f rom Poland support these arguments? 
If it does then this suggests an understanding of the 
public sphere that allows for alternative spaces or 
spheres. It also suggests that 'the repressed story' 
of the genesis of political right in Poland may be 
better understood as contradictory and multiple rather 
than singular and homogeneous. Could then the idea of 
this contradictory 'repressed story' better explain 
the ongoing presence of these alternatives spaces or 
spheres? Would this explain, for example, why the 
development of women's own representative political 
spaces in the interwar years continued, despite 
efforts by the Polish United Workers' Party under the 
state capitalist regime to repress anything other than 
Party-led organisations? 
These questions, as with the previous ones, I follow 
up in a formulation of the concept of socially 
inherited memory (Section 1.7) af ter I examine the 
third major objection by feminists to Habermas's 
account of the public sphere. 
1.6 The Public Sphere and the Legacy of the 
Enlightenment 
The third area of contention suggested in accounts by 
gender scholars concerns their critique of the 
concept of the public sphere, particularly the 
Habermasian version, in terms of its underlying 
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Enlightenment assumptions. 
Gender theorists argue that Habermas's public sphere 
is based on the assumed neutrality, validity and 
centrality of the ideas of the political thinkers of 
the Enlightenment, ideas such as the importance and 
effectiveness of the rational discussion ýof public 
issues to solve society"s problems (Pateman, 
1988: 101). This includes political thinkers not just 
within the modern patriarchal tradition, ýsuch as 
Rousseau, but, also early gender scientists such as 
Mary Wollstonecraft (Wollstonecraft, 1792,, 1985). 
Indeed some feminists now argue that the problem with 
earlier structuralist feminist analysis was its 
luntempered belief in rationality and progress and 
their 'Enlightenment' conception of, a universal, 
unified human subject' (Van Zoonen, 1994: 3). Why is 
it, asks Fraser - (1990), that - rational discourse is 
privileged over emotional discourse and public issues 
privileged overýprivate ones? Anne Phillips adds that 
it is not simply the 'relentless privileging' of real 
living men which feminists have critiqued but the way 
in which 'the category of the male itself has formed 
and deformed political theory and practice' (1991: 2). 
This division between public and private is seen by 
some more recent gender scientists as part of a 
broader discourse that serves to uphold and maintain 
gendered power structures in society by equating 





= Masculine = Feminine 
= Male = female 
= citizen = mother wife 
of Nation State of family 
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I would add that this conceptual dichotomy is also 
related to the social construction of class 
differences: the objective, the public, the cognitive 
are equated with those with capital, both material and 
cultural. In contrast, the private, the subjective, 
the emotive are usually equated with the mass, the 
uneducated, the crowd - the rebellious mob against the 
(rational) forces of law and order. ' 
The implication of this aspect of feminist critiques 
is that hierarchically dichotomous concepts f orming 
the basis of political theory and used as a framework 
to inf orm our ideas about the public sphere may not be 
able to explain the (en)gendering of the public sphere 
because the dichotomous concepts used hitherto are 
themselves part of the problem. Indeed, implicit is 
the suggestion that what is required is a level of 
abstraction that is neither dichotomous nor 
hierarchical in the post-Enlightenment sense, but 
which challenges our usual conceptual boundaries. 
This aspect of feminist critiques of the normative 
public sphere raises several questions. The first 
question it raises for us is what if 'the repressed 
story', as Pateman called it, of the genesis of 
political right in Poland is formed and operates 
across what has been traditionally conceived of and 
understood as separate private/public realms? What if, 
historically, the mechanisms and processes of 
exclusion to the public sphere operate through the 
emotional, the sexual, the familial as well as the 
' There is not the scope within this study but it should be noted that this gendered dichotomy goes back 
earlier than the Enlightenment which reworked certain aspects of early Western political thought as Okin 
testifies (Okin 1980). Okin's analysis of the political writings of Plato and Aristotle in relation to Rousseau and 
Mill show striking parallels between early political thought and ideas about women and femininity. Only Plato's 
Book V of The RUMblic, she argues, provides us with an exceptional instance where the biological 
implications of women are separated from conventional political matrices. The abolition of the family (as a 
form of property) in The Rep-ubli led Plato to consider women as citizens in their own right (Okin, 1980: 26- 
8). 
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political, the cultural and the economic? What if to 
understand and explain the social processes of the 
transformations in Poland's public sphere it is 
necessary to formulate an abstraction that enables us 
to stretch the conceptual boundaries of the public 
sphere? 
These questions and the questions raised f rom the 
other two aspects of the feminist critiques of the 
public sphere are brought together in the next section 
to formulate the final step in constructing the 
theoretical framework for the thesis. 
1.7 Towards a formulation of 'Socially Inherited 
Memory4f 
We have seen how gendered explanations of the public 
sphere raise a number of questions in which there are 
implicit suggestions to how theoretical abstractions 
could best be applied to the study of the 
transformation in Poland. These questions emerged 
from the phrase used by Pateman 'the repressed story' 
and may be summarized as follows. What constitutes the 
repressed story of the genesis of political right in 
Poland? How far does this repressed story impact on 
the more recent transformations in Poland since 1980, 
particularly in relation to television? What is meant 
by the phrase the "repressed story'? Would the 
repressed story be better understood as contradictory 
and multiple? Could the idea of this repressed but 
contradictory story better explain the ongoing 
presence of alternative spaces or spheres? Does the 
repressed story of the genesis of political right in 
Poland form and operate across what has been 
traditionally conceived of and understood in terms of 
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the separate realms of the private (emotional, sexual, 
familial) and public (political, cultural, economic). 
Implicit in critiques by feminist scholars of the 
normative public sphere, I argued, is the suggestion 
that to answer these questions it is necessary to 
formulate a concept which enables us to understand and 
explain the genesis and logic of these aspects of the 
repressed story of political right in Poland. This 
concept I would like to propose we call socially 
inherited memory. 
The role of social memory in the construction of the 
nation was suggested by Ernest Renan, more than a 
hundred years ago. Renan argued that national identity 
was created through a dialectic of both remembering 
and forgetting aspects of its history and the events 
which made it (1990,11). The concept also finds an 
early precursor in the ideas of Paul Federn, a student 
of Freud and a socialist, who in 1919 attempted to 
provide a psychoanalytical interpretation of the 
contemporary German revolution. He suggested that some 
form of patriarchal 'socially inherited feeling' may 
prevent the complete victory of what he called a 
2 'fatherless society', a society of equal councils. 
The concept of socially inherited memory that I wish 
to propose should not be mistaken for "a collective 
soul" or "collective inner psyche" or "the spirit of 
the people". As Mikhail Bakhtin, writing under the 
name of Volosinov in Marxism and the Philosophy of 
Language, indicates such concepts as these imply that 
they operate within us, when in fact they are better 
understood as operating without - in the word, the 
' According to Russell Jacoby, Federn's analysis was not pursued at the time. Instead, however, the 
emphasis in the work of Reich, Fromm and the Frankfurt School was on how psychological mechanisms 
sustained the capitalist system and blocked class consciousness. This, Reich, for example, in his earlier work, 
formulated in the idea of the authoritarian relationship of father and son which he then generalized into the 
notion of character (Jacoby, 1973: 85). , 
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gesture, the act (Volosinov, 1973: 22). 
For the purpose of this thesis I would suggest that 
socially inherited memory may be conceived of as an 
abstract concept to encapsulate the capacity for 
society, in this case Polish society, to store, 
repress, recall, add to and change the story of 
political right of its citizens. The social 
inheritance or memory of this story of the genesis of 
the political right of citizens may be seen to operate 
not simply in institutional structures or ideological 
representations but through the sum of these social 
relations. Further, unlike Federn, I would not explain 
the gendering of this in Freudian terms. I have 
strong reservations about the validity of Freud's 
theory of infant sexuality because of his suppression 
of the seduction theory. So too do a number of other 
scholars, including those attempting to explain 
cultural production. ' Thus, although I would endorse 
the suggestion by Federn that this social inheritance 
is gendered I would argue that this may be better 
understood as being recalled or repressed through 
language, over a range of discourses. But, further, 
that my understanding of the gendering of language is 
not in the traditional Lacanian feminist manner nor 
that of object-relations theorists such as Nancy 
Chodorow for the same reason that I reject Freud, but 
rather extends Volosinov's idea of language as 
embodying in some way the memory of social relations. 
To Volosinov this meant class relations in the sense 
' The most well known critique of this aspect of Freud is of course Jeffrey Masson's Freud: the Assault 
on Truth(I 984). Various arguments by object-relations theorists and Lacanian feminists have been put forward 
for situating women differently within Freud's general arguments. However, as Madelon Sprengnether 
suggests, these still do not challenge the basic paradigm of the Oedipus complex itself. Consequently, *as long 
as the father (or his function) remains identified with the achievement of language and culture, the position of 
women will be marginal to both. The Oedipus complex guarantees the perpetuation of this system (in theory 
at least) by requiring the submission of both men and women to its patriarchal logic (1995: 148). 
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that different classes use language which results in 
the sign embodying class struggle., The ruling class 
seeks to extinguish the struggle and make each sign 
uniaccentual, but each sign contains its inner 
dialectic. Further, Volosinov too had the sense of the 
social inheritance of these relations through signs 
and language in particular: 
This inner dialectic quality of the sign comes 
out fully in the open only in times of social 
crises or revolutionary changes. In the ordinary 
conditions of life the contradictions embedded in 
every ideological sign cannot emerge fully 
because the ideological sign in an established 
dominant ideology is always somewhat reactionary 
and tries as it were to stabilize the preceding 
factor in the dialectical flux of the social 
generative process, so accentuating yesterday's 
truth as to make it appear today's. (Volosinov, 
1973: 23) (My emphasis) 
To Volosinov the inheritance of particular social 
relations in language meant class relations. To recent 
scholars in the U. S, social inheritance is understood 
primarily in terms of race (Morrison, 1992). However, 
as Michael Billig recently points out, within our 
collective 
, 
remembering and forgetting 'the issue of 
gender cannot be ignored' (1996: 124). Thus, to 
Volosinov's class I would add the social inheritance 
of gender relations, in which the dialectic of gender 
would operate within and through class relations. 
Socially inherited memory then can be understood as an 
abstract concept for the 
, 
sum of the dialectical 
struggle in both class and gender terms embodied in 
language which may be used to explain continuity (and 
disjuncture) in the gendered construction and 
transformation, i. e. (en)gendering, of the public 
sphere, and, which bridges the usual conceptual gap 
between the public and private realms. 
This conceptual i zation of socially inherited memory 
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may provide a useful theoretical addition to our 
understanding the (en)gendering of the public sphere. 
This I propose to explore through an examination of 
historical processes in the public sphere in Poland. 
1.8 Conclusions: A Theoretical Framework 
What was discussed at the beginning of this chapter 
was that gendered explanations of the changes in 
Eastern Europe were not to be found in general social 
theories of the transformations in Eastern Europe. 
Instead such explanations may be found in feminist 
interpretations of the transitions. What many 
explanations of the changes in Eastern Europe do 
share, however, is a sense of the underlying 
continuity of the systems as opposed to radical 
disjuncture. Nevertheless, gendered theories fall into 
two types. In some there is a distinction drawn 
between what is termed the pre-1989 state socialist 
regimes and the newly developing capitalist regimes. 
This is best articulated by Barbara Einhorn (1994). 
The second type is that which provides for an 
understanding of the regimes prior to 1989 as 
constituting state capitalist regimes (Reading, 1992; 
Rosenberg, 1989). This would suggest greater 
continuity both in class and gender terms in the 
public spheres of the region between the pre- 
communist, Communist and post-Communist regimes. What 
we are therefore seeking to explore in the rest of the 
thesis is the degree of disjuncture/continuity in 
gendered representations in the public sphere under 
these different regimes and the possible reason(s) for 
this. 
To find a critical tool for the latter I then 
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discussed the implications of feminist critiques of 
the public sphere. Out of the questions raised by 
these came the suggestion for an additional concept to 
assist explanations of (en)gendering processes. 
Drawing on earlier ideas by Federn and Renan, in 
relation to more recent suggestions by Billig and 
Morrison, I have suggested we conceptualize this in 
terms of 'socially inherited memory, '. It is this 
theoretical framework and conceptualization of 
socially inherited memory which I will use in relation 
to Poland"s recent mediatic transformations in the 
public sphere. Finally, I suggested that socially 
inherited memory is in some way embodied in language. 
Consequently, the ways in which the Polish language in 
particular embodies socially inherited memory is the 
subject of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 2: 
Social Memory, Language and Public Change 
"The woman say,, the language you speak poisons 
your glotti tongue palate lips. They say, the 
language you speak is made up of words that are 
killing you. 11 (Monique Wittig. Les Guerilleres) 
"The language is the homeland" (Julian Tuwim) 
2.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter a theoretical framework for 
the thesis was established and the concept of socially 
inherited memory formulated as a critical tool for 
understanding the (en) gendering of the public sphere 
in Poland. I suggested that language is an important 
part of the process by which gender biased mechanisms 
of exclusion are socially inherited. It is thus to 
language that we turn in this chapter. I begin by 
establishing just why it is that language should be 
given special consideration in a study of the public 
sphere. Then, I attend to the particularities of the 
gendered mechanisms within the Polish language. 
Finally, the implications of this in terms of socially 
inherited memory in the public sphere are explored. 
2.2 Why is Language Important in Relation to the 
Public Sphere? 
Scholars have moved on a great deal in their 
understanding of language since Saint Augustine's 
description of language as a neutral system of words, 
transparent and true, which express and communicate 
our various thoughts and desires unambiguously (Saint 
Augustine cited in Wittgenstein, 1974: 1). For at 
least 25 years, language has been understood by 
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feminists as crucial to an understanding of gendered 
hegemonic processes, yet, as Myra Macdonald notes, in 
discussions of the media language is often obscured: 
Living as we do in a predominantly visual 
culture, the significance of words can often be 
overlooked. For many women, at the same time, 
being able to speak out, and be listened to, 
remains an important political objective (1996, 
41). 
In the 1990s, gender scholars certainly agree that 
language is a site of representational struggle in 
some f orm. But the ways in which this is seen to 
operate in terms of the public sphere varies, as 
Deborah Cameron (1985) illustrates. The first 
approach, according to Cameron, which is grounded in 
sociolinguistics, centres on the question of sex 
differences in language use which are said to 
distinguish men and women publicly. Work by Robin 
Lakoff on women's use of tag questions would fit into 
this category (Lakoff cited in Miller and Swift, 1976: 
125). The second approach, which Deborah Cameron calls 
the reformist position, is that which focuses on the 
sexist structures and content of language, which are 
seen to classify women in a derogatory manner. Work in 
the 1970s by Miller and Swift (1976) takes this 
approach. The third approach, taken by radical 
feminists such as Spender (1980) and Daly (1979), 
views language as man-made; from this perspective men 
control the production of meaning in language and 
access to language; women, meanwhile, remain a muted 
group alienated from language. The fourth approach 
concerns those theories of gender and language related 
to psychoanalysis. These theories such as those 
articulated by Cixous (1981), Irigaray (1981) and 
Kristeva (1986) rework in different ways the Lacanian 
v iew of language which stresses that male and female 
children enter and have a different relationship with 
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the symbolic order, developing a gendered subjectivity 
through the acquisition of language. 
What is important is that, despite their differences, 
these different approaches support the view that 
language is crucial to our understanding of gendered 
hegemonic processes within societies, and is therefore 
important to an understanding of representation in the 
public sphere, as indeed Spivak (1995) recommends. At 
the same time, there is a significant problem 
' 
which 
these approaches share: this is the absence of an 
historical and contextual dimension to language and 
gender. Dale Spender, for example, argues that women 
are denied access to the most concentrated and 
powerful forms of the symbolic, such as 1drama and 
poetry. Yet in India and Brazil poetry is considered 
the proper medium for women (see Schipper, 1985: 163). 
The status of poetry is also dif f erent in Poland, with 
the circumstances of censorship providing women with 
a particular kind of cultural space within this 
concentrated symbolic (Reading, 1992: Chapter 17). 
Thus it is not simply the case that women are denied 
voice in the concentrated symbolic but that there may 
be historically produced mechanisms which may make it 
more likely for some women to have representation in 
particular public territories but not others. In other 
words, women are denied representation in different 
media in different places; in Latin America it may be 
literary criticism, in India political essays 
(Schipper, 1985: 13); in Poland, as we will see, the 
news room. 
This neglect of the contextual and historical 
dimensions of language in many, feminist approaches is, 
according to Madan Sarup, particularly apparent in 
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post-Lacanian accounts of language gendering. The 
essential problem is Lacan's reliance on Levi- 
Strauss's thesis that the incest taboo underlies all 
human societies. Sarup argues: 
The use of Levi-Strauss's thesis means that the 
terms of the debate are fixed around 'the law of 
the Father'. Because Levi-Strauss's theory is a 
universalist one Lacan's account tends to 
collapse into an account of a universal subject 
who is not situated historically. (Sarup, 
1988: 31) 
Toril Moi has also criticized Cixous and Irigaray for 
their ahistoricism (Moi, 1995: 112-119). Whilst 
Kristeva's approach avoids the essentialism that 
Cixous and Irigaray slip into, as well as providing a 
sense of public (en)gendering that would not be 
monolithic or universal, she does not indicate how the 
dominant symbolic order and feminine marginality 
connect with public structures. 
In short, whilst these perspectives agree that 
language is somehow part of the (en)gendering process 
in society, which may be formulated in terms of a 
concept of ideology (Spender) or in terms of the 
development of subjectivity (Lacan), they lack a sense 
of the historical materiality of language. They do not 
attend to the part language plays in the social 
inheritance of gendered (re)presentations in the 
public realm. 
This is, however, suggested by Marxist theorists such 
as Judith Williamson who argues that rather than 
timeless psychoanalytical universals we should look at 
the 'particular historical structures' which have 
produced the language of our present culture. She 
proposes a form of "concrete semiotics" (1996: 30) in 
which we stop talking simply about masculinity and 
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femininity but 'what differences are expressed by the 
m/f divide'. She sees: 
A Marxist semiotics as an enterprise that tries 
to understand both structure and its content - 
concerned with a system of meaning, but one whose 
meanings function within actual historical 
systems. (1996: 30) 
Since it is the historical reproduction of gender in 
the public sphere which is the concern of this thesis 
I try to take this approach in examining the ways in 
which gender operates in the Polish language. I then 
relate this to the concept of socially inherited 
memory in the (en)gendering of representation in 
Poland's public sphere. 
2.3 Why The Polish Language? 
First, though, how should we define language in 
Poland? As Billig points out, what we mean by language 
in relation to nation-states is usually thought of as 
'common-sense'. In the case of Poland, as well as 
speakers of Polish (90 per cent) there are also 
speakers of German and Russian (Plakwicz: 1992: 76). 
Historically, from the early middle-ages onwards, 
Jews, fleeing from Western Europe, who settled in 
Poland, would have spoken Yiddish and Hebrew' 
(Richmond: 1995: 76); before the second world war there 
were 3.5 million Jews in Poland, by the 1980s there 
were just 12,000 (Plakwicz: 1992: 76): 
The net result for historic times was a 
magnificent patchwork of peoples speaking a 
babble of languages and professing a profusion of 
f aiths. Ethnic variety must be seen as one of the 
hallmarks of Poland's population until very 
recent times (Davies, 1990: 282). 
' In the Yavne network of schools in Poland, under the control of the Mizrachi Party, Hebrew was 
approved of for conversation, as well as instruction (Richmond, 1996: 481). 
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In pre-partition Poland the official languages were 
Polish and Latin in the kingdom and Ruski and Polish 
in the Grand Duchy. But as well as the f our main 
Polish dialects in vernacular speech, there was also 
Kashub, Goraksi (highland brogue), Ruthenian, 
Bylorrussian, Lithuanian, Latvian, Platdeutsch, Tartar 
and Armenian. A variety of written alphabets including 
Roman, Cyrillic, Hebrew and Arabic were used. It was 
only over a long period of time that Polish came to be 
the language spoken by the majority in the region. 
(Davies, 1990: 317) and became in Julian Tuwim"s 
famous phrase the homeland, the touchstone of Polish 
national identity (Davies, 1990: 329). The emergence of 
Polish as the official language of the Polish state is 
thus, as Billig (1996) suggests in relation to the 
formations of nations more generally, inextricably 
tied up with its struggle for identity and 
sovereignty. It is for this reason, as well as the 
fact that Polish is now the official state language, 
that I focus on the Polish language. 
2.4 Gender and the Polish Language 
As we shall see in Chapter 3, the partitions in Poland 
in the 19th century meant that f or more than one 
hundred years the Polish language was taught only in 
the private sphere - in the home and in underground 
schools. This teaching of Polish culture and language 
served to assist in the basis of Polish cultural 
identity. Material circumstances engineered the 
situation so that women were vested with the major 
part of this task (Siemienska, 1986). The 
circumstances of linguistic transmission and 
production were thus privatized and woman-centred. 
But, the Polish language was in itself the vehicle for 
the absent and divided nation. Therefore, it may be 
the case that in particular respects the gendered 
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mechanisms of exclusion and inclusion in Polish are 
different from those suggested by feminist scholars of 
the English language. In other words contemporary 
Polish embodies a social memory of its gendered 
historical transmission and struggle for dominance. 
To assess this I now turn to particular aspects of 
contemporary Polish in comparison with English. 
2.5 Exclusion and Inclusion in Polish 
A number of feminist academics (Spender, 1980; Daly, 
1979) have argued that the English use of man to refer 
to generic human beings and men in particular serves 
to publicly exclude women in discourse. Since the word 
man is not a homonym its meaning cannot easily be 
worked out from the context. The result is that man is 
understood as the norm and woman the derivative. This 
point is made clearer if one considers the analogy 
that if one had a group A's and a group of B's and 
called the two groups together A, the status of the 
B's is delegitimized (Miller and Swift, 1976: 81). 
This can be understood as a mechanism in the public 
engendering of representation by making the world 
appear to be male, unless proven otherwise. 
Consequently, men are often given credit for things 
women may have done (Miller and Swift, 1976: 61). 
However, this dual use of man is absent in Polish. 
Instead there is the neutral singular person 
(czlowiek) and plural people (ludzie). 
Sociolinguistic scholars have also documented what are 
believed to be differences between male and female 
speech in English. Robin Lakoff, for example, 
maintains that women use more tag questions and rising 
inflections in their speech in order to appear more 
conciliatory (Lakoff cited in Miller and Swift, 1976: 
125). Other studies have shown that women use more 
raised, weak syllables, more euphemisms and modal 
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constructions than men (Key, 1975: 71; Jesperson cited 
by Miller and Swift, 1976: 125). Some scholars have 
argued that, whether real or mythical, perceived 
language differences act as particular mechanisms of 
exclusion to certain spheres. Women, for example, may 
be disbelieved in court because their intonation and 
pitch may be interpreted as hysterical (Cameron,, 
1985: 53). However, arguments concerning actual 
gendered linguistic differences in Polish language 
use, in terms of tag questions and modal 
constructions, are less sustainable. The use of a tag 
question at the end of a statement by a man or woman 
would be unusual. similarly, in colloquial 
conversations the use of the conditional tense and 
modal constructions is generally less common (Reading, 
1992: 24). 
The tradition of patronymy in English has been 
criticized for reinforcing "the powerful myth that 
pervades the rest of our language - the myth that the 
human race is essentially male. ' (Miller and Swift, 
1976: 25). Spender (1980) and Daly (1979) argue that 
patronymy excludes women from history; it eliminates 
continuity and tradition for women and makes it 
difficult to trace their ancestry. Titles such as 
Mrs., Miss and Ms., serve to make women the property 
of men, according to Spender (1980: 36). The use of the 
generic man for humanity and the, choice of a male 
pronoun is a way of alienating women from language and 
ideas (Spender, 1980: 149). Language sets up the male 
as norm and the female as minus male: 
At the most basic level of meaning the status of 
the f emale is derived f rom the status of the male 
and on this has been enacted many strata of 
positive and negative classifications. (Spender, 
1980: 3) 
However, simple patronymy is also less common in 
Poland. It is more usual f or a woman to add her 
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husband's surname to their own (father's) name upon 
marriage. In this way continuity and tradition for 
women in Poland has been stronger. Nevertheless, one 
could argue that the implication is that marriage 
extends the woman; it somehow changes one aspect of 
her public representation, her name. The single woman 
by implication signifies publicly with her name that 
she is unmarried, unextended. The man, whether married 
or not, remains publicly the same. 
In certain respects then it seems that the Polish 
language is more gender- inc lus ive than English. In 
other respects, however, the mechanisms of exclusion 
and inclusion are similar to those in other European 
societies. For example, the English pronoun system is 
said to reinforce the gendered system of excluding 
women from the public sphere in discourse (Nilsen, 
1973 cited by Miller and Swift, 1976; Cameron, 1985). 
In old English the gender of a word bore no relation 
to the absence or presence of sex. By middle English 
arbitrary gender was breaking down to what we now 
have, which is a natural gender system. However, 
natural gender is only natural if one is male (Miller 
and Swift, 1976: 71) with many common gender nouns 
assumed to be male, which results in newspaper 
headlines that read 114 survivors, 3 of them women' 
(Cameron, 1985: 66). The effects of this, according to 
Nilsen's study, is that a boy experiences the world in 
terms of a continuum between himself and the animate 
world, whereas for a girl her reality is continually 
violated. For a boy: 'a link is strengthened between 
his own sense of self and other living things. For a 
young girl no such continuum exists' (cited by Miller 
and Swift, 1976: 48). The system of pronouns in Polish 
at first glance appears to be arbitrary. Houses and 
elephants are masculine, books and parrots are 
feminine, meat and towns are neutral. However, in the 
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plural form of verbs there is one form which is used 
f or men, even if there are women in the group. And 
there is another form for objects, animals and women 
(Mazur, 1986: 17). The significance of this is that one 
man is worth more than any number of women; 
conversely, women are worth the same as animals and 
objects within language. 
The words for woman and man, wife and husband also 
embody the memory of different sexual roles in Polish. 
The word for woman Ikobietal before the 18th century 
was a pejorative word. The pre-fix kob comes from 
pigswill as it was a woman"s duty to care for the 
pigs. The Polish for wife "zonal is from the Latin 
genus meaning 'to give birth to'. Both of the words 
for man Imezczyznal and husband Imazl have as their 
etymological roots the verb to think (Doroszeski, 
1980; Encyclopedia Powszechna, 1974). Women are thus 
located in discourse with the particular, the 
domestic, with animals, and are described in terms of 
an historical social role and biological function. Men 
in contrast are located with the general, with the 
mind and with rationality, those qualities ascribed in 
Western discourse with the polity and the public 
sphere. In the phrases for getting married women and 
men are also located differently in terms of the 
private and public realms. A woman goes out for a 
husband Ilwychodzic za maz", or, is given to a husband 
Ilwydawac za maz", but a man 11zenic siell takes a wife. 
Thus in the discourse of marriage women are the 
property passed from the private sphere of their 
father to the private sphere of the husband. The only 
sense in which women go out into the public realm then 
is for the temporary and private purpose of finding 
and being given to a husband. The situation is best 
summarised by a table. 
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Table 2: The Sociallv Inherited Memorv of Women and 










Women Less than Domestic Private 
men Biological (Public 
Labour only for 
giver private 
means) 
Men One man Thinking Public 
=infinite Reasoning 
number of Capital 
, women owner 
The historic (en)gendering of the public sphere is 
also remembered through occupational discourse in 
which in Polish role suffixes mark out women in the 
2 public sphere. Almost every noun has its masculine and 
feminine version, in which the feminine version 
usually has a suffix added to the masculine version. 
The female role in occupational discourse is thus 
derivative. Suffixes remember the gendered development 
of the structure of industries: most service jobs have 
nouns with feminine versions, but manual trades such 
as plumber, fitter, rigger, carpenter, engineer have 
only masculine forms. There are certain exceptions: 
weavers can be male and f emale; one can only be a 
f emale cleaner "sprzataczka" or toilet cleaner "babcia 
' French feminists, as well as radical feminists such as Spender, have criticized naming and suffixes 
for denigrating women and making us invisible. Gauthier for example points out: 
In French the word writer does not have a feminine form. For poet there is poetess, a particular word, 
it is synonymous with foolish innocence ... or lady-like respectability. (Gauthier. 1981: 164) 
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klosetowall. There are only male farmers; but peasants 
are male and female (Reading, 1992: 25-6). These 
inherited linguistic differences are part of a 
gendered hegemonic process which is not accidental but 
socially engineered: occupational suffixes were 
introduced in the 1920s as more women entered the 
public sphere in the form of the paid workforce 
(Miller and Swift, 1976: 71). Women and men now 
inscribe themselves into discourse which marks them 
out differently in public spaces. 
At the same time within the discourse of obscenity 
women are publicly humiliated (Hauser, Heyns and 
Mansbridge, 1993: 267). In English there are a greater 
number of obscene words which are insulting to women 
(Miller and Swift, 1976: 138). In Polish too, verbal 
insults are gendered, in ways which are profoundly 
insulting to women: 'the everyday language in which we 
describe women is often vulgar and jokes about women 
are eagerly told in all circles' (Czykwin, 1988: 24). 
For example, the term 'kobieta samotnal literally 
means a lonely woman, a woman who has not married, or 
who is divorced or widowed. The implication is that a 
woman must be lonely if she is without a man. There is 
no equivalent for the single 'lonely' man. Instead, 
there is 'kawalerl, which is roughly equivalent to the 
English bachelor which also denotes gallant, and 
derives from the word for knight or cavalier. 
As in English, a number of words reduce the status of 
women to that of the sexual object: there is Ilalkat 
(doll), Itowarl (nice bit of crumpet\skirt), and 
sztuka (piece; also an art work or play). A woman can 
be an old cow, old monkey, simply the colour of her 
hair, or an attractive woman f or whom one has no 
respect. A woman can be lbabal, which has no 
equivalent insult in English, but roughly translated 
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means old hag or witch. The most common swear word is 
Ikurwal or whore: hence the anger, frustration, and 
hatred one feels may be relieved by expelling it into 
the vessel of human sexual depravity, the woman who 
asks for money to have sex with a man. As 
Hauser, Heyns and Mansbridge argued there are many 
sexually debasing insults aimed at women in Polish: 
I (a woman might be called a 'rural or pipe), while men 
are only insulted by reference to women, as in 
Iskurwysyn' *(son of a bitch). ' (1993: 267) In Spender's 
view insults against women are not merely a reflection 
of patriarchy but are a form of social control: 
They are verbal violence against women, 
expressing both our essential qualities in 
patriarchy (repositories of sexuality, 
prostitutes) and male woman-hatred, which makes 
women afraid ... women are daily humiliated" (Cameron, 1985: 78) 
Despite the emphasis on woman as sexual object in 
Polish, there are at the same time silences in 
language in terms of words to describe male violence 
against women and sexual violence against children: 
There is a choice between complicated legal 
terminology and convoluted euphemisms. There are 
no concepts or equivalents f or marital rape or 
indecent assault and for child sexual abuse the 
nearest one can say is lwykorzstywanie seksualne 
dziecit. It sounds pretty nonsensical in Polish 
and literally means to make the most of a sexual 
child. (Reading, 1992: 27) 
The word for incest 'kazirodztwol is defined as 
'sexual relations between family relations' 
(Encyklopedia Powszechna, 1974). As in English, the 
word has connotations of corruption, pollution and 
contamination; and makes no distinction between the 
ten year old survivor of father-daughter-rape (Ward, 
1980: 175) and two cousins engaging in mutually 
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consenting sexual relations. Such a linguistic gap, 
common also in Western societies, is significant in 
that it assists in the maintenance of public power 
relations by denying the gendered abuse of power in 
the private realm (Ward, 1980). The word for rape in 
Polish, "gwalt, ' or 'zgwalcic', denotes an act of 
violence or force. However, there is, it seems an 
element of ambiguity within the words because of their 
semantic link with Isamogwalt' masturbation, 
literally, self-rape. 
As in English, the discourse of sexuality is gendered. 
Polarization and the location of women within negative 
semantic space together serve to make women's 
experiences invisible or classified -as non-data; 
language tends to provide a monodimensional view of 
sexuality. Spender argues, like Greer in The Female 
Eunuch, that it is significant that words referring to 
the sexual act between men and women emphasize 
penetration, such as fucking, screwing, rooting, 
whereas a woman-centred word might be something like 
'enclosure'. The word *-foreplay' is also misleading 
since it can be -an end in itself for women, argues 
Spender. In addition it is significant that in English 
men can be virile and potent, but a woman can only be 
a nymphomaniac (Spender, 1980: 175). In Polish one can 
have sexual intercourse 'stosunek seksualnyl which 
sounds rather clinical, as in English. One can also 
make love, as in English; but whereas in English there 
is a host of other slang words, in Polish there is 
only 'pierdolic'. A woman cannot 'pierdolic' a man, 
but a man can "pierdolic' a woman or a man. What two 
women do is thereby outside discourse since: "in 
Polish sexual slang the penis is central and supreme. ' 
(Reading, 1992: 27). The linguistic representation of 
the sexual act is biased towards the action of the 
male and thus in public discourse the penis, and by 
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extension the male, is dominant and supreme, even 
though between mutually consenting adults, whether 
heterosexual or homosexual, the act in private maybe 
otherwise, and understood to be buch. 
Also of significance is the language used to refer to 
women who choose to challenge the established order. 
Feminists in Polish are referred to as Ifeministkal 
and I walczaca f eministka both of which have negative 
connotations, including fighting and man-hater. 
Further, according to most Polish encyclopedia 
feminism does not exist; although one does describe it 
as a movement which was active during the French 
Revolution in 1789 and another states that it 
consisted of a 19th century movement for 
enfranchisement (Jankowska, 1989). This is what I 
would term a classic instance of discourse relocation. 
The existence of a feminist movement is temporally 
relocated to the 19th century: this has the effect of 
denying the existence of a contemporary feminist 
movement. Or, feminism is spatially relocated to 
another country: France. This has the effect of 
denying the historical development of feminism within 
Poland by different ethnic groups, when empirically 
the situation in the 20th century is clearly otherwise 
(Reading, 1992). Thus, representation of public 
resistance to established gender relations is made 
invisible and publicly mystified. To publicly campaign 
as a feminist in Poland is therefore to risk 
relocation oneself. 
Finally, one area of the Polish language which is 
replete with linguistic watchtowers to police gender 
relations are 'homely' proverbs and superstitions. 
These represent women as follows: 
A woman out of the wagon, and the horses have an 
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easier job 
(Baba z wazu konian lzej) 
Where the devil cannot go, there he sends a woman 
(Gdzie diabel nie moze tam baba posle) 
There is no meat without bones, no woman without spite 
(Nie ma miesa bez kosci, a baby bez zlosci) 
Cats and women should stay in the home (kotki i 
kobiety w domu siedziec powinny) 
A woman on the threshold, peace under foot (baba w 
progi, cisza w nogi) (Szymanski, 1984: 90) 
Homely discourse represents women as a burden, more 
evil than the devil, spiteful, fit only for the home, 
although put out preferably on the doorstep so as not 
to make a racket. Superstitions, are similarly 
pejorative. If you see a nun or a woman with an empty 
bucket then you are bound to have bad luck. If you are 
a single woman you must never sit at the corner of a 
table because then you will never marry. However, you 
can sit in the corner of the room, and patiently wait, 
and 'then you will be'found' by the man of your dreams 
(Czykwin, 1988: 24). Such homely discourse continues 
the process of publicly devaluing women in relation to 
men. 
2.6 Language and historical change 
However, what my analysis implies thus far is that the 
Polish language is unchanging and homogeneous in its 
representation of women. This is not the case. If we 
take a diachronic view we find that, significantly, 
key references to women, 's value have changed over 
time. For example, one way of complementing a woman, 
particularly amongst the women of the older generation 
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was to use the word powprawnie, which literally means 
that one has improved, or gained a plumper appearance 
(Eva Bednarowicz, Personal Communication: 1990). Such 
a complement is common in poorer countries, since to 
have a little extra fat is to indicate publicly one's 
wealth. This view is giving way to one which values 
thinness in women, as in Western Europe (Secondary 
School Girls, Lodz, Personal Communication: 1991). 
Thinness has become the public symbol of private 
wealth: one has the money to eat healthily, the 
leisure time and money to exercise, the capital to 
provide enough security to ensure that even if one is 
without surplus fat, should things take a turn for the 
worse, ones wife won't starve. 
What is clear from this example, however, is that 
there may have been some change in the way that women 
are represented in Poland, but that the underlying 
mechanisms for engendering this are the same: what 
underlies the complement that one is plumper or 
thinner is the inherited social memory of a woman's 
lesser value in relation to a man. This provides the 
context for what is a change but which in both cases 
refers to a territorialization of the body of a woman 
as part of an indication not only of her value, but 
her value as representing the capital of her partner 
or family. 
There is also the implication in the discussion thus 
far that there is no public resistance to the de- 
valued representation of women in different 
discourses. But, as in Western democracies in the 
1970s, Poland's feminists in the 1990s attempted to 
enfranchise women linguistically. For example, in a 
workshop in Lodz in January 1991 it was pointed out 
that Polish does not have equivalents yet for words 
coined by feminists in the West for particular aspects 
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of women's aggression. The meeting coined the Polish 
Itokenizm' and lassertivenoscl as equivalents for 
tokenism and assertiveness (Want Project, 1991: Lodz 
Feminist Workshop). Such linguistic attempts at public 
enfranchisement are the equivalent of attempts at 
legal reform according to Julia Kristeva: 
There is no equivalence, but rather, identity 
between challenging official linguistic codes and 
challenging official law. (Kristeva, 1980: 65) 
However, it is also important to note that to many 
women such newly-coined words usually only benefit a 
small elite with the cultural capital in the first 
place; they are worthless currency to those who do not 
have access to them. As the organizer of the National 
Solidarity Women's unit explained: 
Women from Solidarity rejected the feminists. The 
feminists - they are very articulate and they 
spoke a different language from the union women. 
Although there were feminists from Lodz-they were 
accepted, because they spoke in a language that 
was understood. The others used very academic 
language. (Malgorzata Taraszewicz, personal 
communication, 1990) 
Further, resistance is limited since particular words 
which may have become building blocks of Western 
feminists attempts to shift or understand public 
engendering mechanisms are tainted by the socially 
inherited memory of previous regimes. For example, 
consciousness-raising, an essential element of Western 
feminist thought, is a problematic word to Poles. The 
word Iswiadomoscl, to become conscious of something, 
inhabits what Spender would term a negative semantic 
space. It is associated with being forced to know the 
negative consequences of your actions. To become 
conscious is to become aware that one should not go 
beyond certain boundaries; that one must not do 
particular things (Eva Bednarowocz, Personal 
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Communication: 1990). This is very different from the 
sense of gaining an understanding of a situation or 
oneself as the first step in liberation. Polish 
swiadomosc is gained by the fear of the belt, or the 
fear of Eternal damnation in hell, rather than gained 
through shared experience supported by others 
(Reading, 1992: 210). Swiadomosc has also undergone 
what Spender would term a process of pejoration under 
the old Communist regime's distorted version of 
Marxism. Swiadomosc is associated with a consciousness 
of class and capitalist structures forced on people 
through ideological teaching in schools and in higher 
education (Secondary School Girls, Lodz, Personal 
Communication: 1991). 
2.7 conclusion 
what I would argue from this is that linguistic (en) 
gendering mechanisms are historically produced and 
will therefore vary according to the industrial and 
colonial development of a place and its people. 
Secondly, that there are gender fossils in language, 
as the Polish language shows. Words such kobieta 
(woman) and meczyzyna (man) in Polish resonate with 
what Pateman calls the 'repressed story of political 
right'. Through them men and women inherit and are 
inscribed into the memory of past gender structures 
and public values. Such fossils I would liken not so 
much to the isolated ammonite, but more to chalk, the 
fossil bed of millions of crushed sea creatures laid 
down in the Cretaceous period, with which our senses 
are so familiar we fail to recognize the structure of 
its organic resonance. Language then communicates and 
inscribes us within a socially inherited memory which 
is gendered. Further, whatever other changes may have 
occurred to the public representation of women in the 
1980s and early 1990s, these linguistic mechanisms are 
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still there. Certain new words may have been produced, 
to alter in some way the mechanisms of exclusion to 
the public sphere. But, these need to be understood 
within the context of Polish class relations and the 
cultural capital required to access them. Further, the 
impact of Western representations of women in the 
public sphere, such as imported television programmes 
depicting rich and thin women (such as Dallas) or 
newly established Polish versions of European women's 
magazines (Elle, Cosmopolitan) may have contributed to 
a shift in the way a woman's body is valued, but, 
linguistically, it is still her body which is valued 
within a gendered grammatical structure which 
pejorates women publicly in relation to men. Overall, 
this then would suggest that the representation of 
women in the public sphere since 1989 may have changed 
very little. ' 
However, before we can look at more recent events we 
need to unravel further the historical development of 
the genesis of political right during the period when 
Polish became endorsed as the language of the 
'homeland'. Hence in the next chapter I look at 
aspects of the gendered development of the public 
sphere during Poland's identity formation between 1792 
and 1939. The socially inherited memory of this, 
either repressed or recalled, may well have influenced 
the continuance of (en)gendering mechanisms today. 
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Chapter 3: 
The Gendered Development of Social Memory: the 
Public Sphere in Poland 1792-1939 
Denial, repression and dissociation operate on a 
social as well as individual level... like 
traumatized people, we have been cut off from the 
knowledge of our past. Like traumatized people, 
we need to understand the past in order to 
reclaim the present and the future. (Judith 
Herman Trauma and Recoverv: From Domestic Abuse 
to Political Terror 1994: 2) 
Poland is not yet lost, while we still live 
Polish National Anthem 
3.1 Introduction 
Thus far I have established the theoretical basis for 
the thesis and argued that the conceptual iz ation of 
socially inherited memory may offer the explanatory 
tool required to explain the continuation of public 
(en)gendering mechanisms. A key part of socially 
inherited memory, I argued, is language since it is 
through language we inherit and are inscribed into the 
memory of gender structures and public values. Yet, 
how in Poland did these past structures and public 
values come about? In this third chapter of Part One 
of the thesis Iýestablish the historical background to 
the early formation of the public sphere in Poland and 
attend to the particular circumstances which prevailed 
to create conceptions of female political activity. 
These conceptions of female political activity, I 
argue, are part of the repressed story of political 
right which has formed Poland"s socially inherited 
memory; a socially inherited memory in which certain 
aspects were remembered but other aspects were 
forgotten or suppressed. I begin by giving an outline 
of Polish 19th century history and follow this with an 
examination of aspects of women in Polish society in 
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the 19th century. I then move on through to the first 
half of the 20th century up until the Second World 
War. The chapter introduces and analyzes the re- 
presentation of Mother Poland (Matka Polka) and the 
importance of the Church and the Nation in ongoing 
aspects of public (en)gendering processes. The legacy 
of the 19th century and pre-war representations of 
Polish women and Jewish women in relation to the 
development of political right, as we shall see, may 
have formed the basis for a socially inherited memory 
that has impacted on the (en) gendering of public 
space under Communism and post-Communism. 
I 
3.2 Poland as a Nation State 
A key factor in Poland's history as a nation state was 
its continual struggle for identity and recognition. 
Unlike an island state, Poland has no natural 
boundaries, except for the Carpathian mountains to the 
South. Subsequently, its history is one of invasion by 
other states and peoples (Reddaway, Penson, Haledin 
and Dybolski, 1950). In 1772 part of Poland was 
partitioned between Prussia and Russia. Despite a 
"spirited defense" organized by General Kosciuszko a 
second partition was declared in 1793 (Davies, 1990: 
310). Kosciuszko mounted another defense known as the 
National Rising in 1794 which was put down by General 
Suvorov. Poland was then divided into three sections 
between the Russians, Prussians and Austrians (Davies, 
1990: 311). Poland as a nation state was erased from 
the European map: 
Having thus changed the boundary lines, the 
partitioning powers at once settled the necessary 
changes in inscriptions, assuring their new 
subjects in gracious proclamations that this had 
happened for all time. (Reddaway, Penson, Haledin 
and Dybolski, 1951: 74) 
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In 1806 Napoleon Bonaparte set up a 
government. This was dismantled 
retreat from Moscow. The division 
Austria, Prussia and Russia was 
Congress of Vienna in 1814. The 
century is dotted with attempt! 
followed by harsh repression (1830, 
provisional Polish 
with Bonaparte's 
of Poland between 
confirmed at the 
rest of the 19th 
at insurrection 
1846,1863,1905). 
It was only after the First World War that Poland 
regained its independence and returned to the European 
map. However, in August 1939 Germany and the Soviet 
Union agreed to divide up Poland between them. At the 
end of the Second World war Poland was reinstated as 
a nation state but its borders were moved several 
hundred miles to the West. The influence of the Soviet 
Union on the new socioeconomic and political system in 
Poland made the country a satellite in the Eastern 
Bloc sphere of influence. As with the partitions of 
the 19th century, Polish history was rewritten, street 
names were changed, Russian was made a compulsory 
language in schools and people were forcibly moved 
inside the new borders from East to West (Reading, 
1992: 18-19). 
3.3 Gender effects of Partitioning and Nationalism 
The history of Poland with its partitioning and 
struggle for national identity points to a particular 
process in terms of the socially inherited memory of 
the gendered development of mechanisms of exclusion 
and inclusion to the public sphere. First, as Davies 
points out, the partitions meant that the Poland of 
the Enlightenment was effectively 'killed by 
Despotism' (Davies, 1990: 311). In general accounts of 
the development of the public sphere it is argued that 
it came out of the principles of the Enlightenment in 
Europe and the gradual extension of limited rights to 
the working classes and women in terms of education, 
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enfranchisement and property rights (see Chapter One). 
As we shall see, in Poland the partitions meant that 
this process was disrupted with particular 
consequences for women and their public representation 
(Wawrzkowska-Wierciochowa, 1986: 51) 
First, in accounts of the pre-industrial attitude to 
women it is clear that there were fewer mechanisms 
against women entering the public sphere than during 
industrialisation (Wyczanski, 1981: 141-150). Many of 
the landed estates of the 16th century were 
administrated by single women known as Dworka 
(Wyczanski, 1981: 141). At the same time, wives were 
allowed a public voice, but not unmarried women. As 
Wawrzkowska-Wierciochowa puts it: "Already in the 16th 
century it was said that the wise and esteemed matrons 
of Poland should be citizens" (1986: 51). By 1726 at 
a meeting of the Polish Seym it was decreed that it 
was forbidden not only: 
to interfere with women in their public affairs 
but even to interfere with their places close at 
hand to the platform on which the married women 
deliberated. (Wawrzkowska-Wierciochowa, 1986: 52) 
There was thus in place the principal that some women 
should have public representation and some public 
voice. Although they were not, as the writer Wladyslav 
Konopczynski argued at the time in Kiedy Nami Rzadzily 
Kobiety, to be permitted direct involvement in public 
affairs on an equal level with men (cited in 
Wawrzkowska-Wierciochowa, 1986: 51). 
However, with the f irst partitioning of Poland such 
rights for women, along with rights of citizenship for 
men, were lost in the annexed territories, which 
amounted to roughly 30 percent of the country 
(Dydynski, 1994: 15). The first partition had the 
effect of a "cold shower" on the Poland that remained 
(Dydynski, 1994: 15). However, the Paris revolutions 
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reasserted the question of the nation, citizenship and 
politics (Wawrzkowska-Wierciochowa, 1986: 51). 
Consequently, in the Great Polish Sejm of 1788-1791 a 
number of important reforms in the public sphere were 
made, particularly in the areas of public 
administration, education and the military (Dydynski, 
1994: 15). The question of women's rights in the public 
realm again came to the fore. In 1791, a new liberal 
constitution was ratified which was known as the 
Constitution of the Third of May. This Constitution, 
applicable only to the remaining part of Poland, was 
based on the principles of the Enlightenment in terms 
of establishing the basis for a liberal democratic 
state (Dydynski, 1994: 15). In the Constitution of 3 
May women were called upon to be full citizens of the 
country. And in 1794, the commander in chief, General 
Kosciusko, acknowledged the special role of women 
(Wawrzkowska-Wierciochowa, 1986: 52). On these rights, 
Jan Kitowicz, wrote in his journals of the period: 
The Polish women, who before had no place in 
public affairs now begin to imitate the French 
women ... slowly they want to be lawmakers and 
have representation in the Sejm. (Cited in 
Wawrzkowska-Wierciochowa, 1986: 52). 
What should be noted here is that although before the 
first partition married women did have limited public 
rights, this f act becomes obscured, at least in the 
account of the development of political rights by Jan 
Kitowicz. This denial, in his discourse, of women's 
previous rights is then followed with the spatial 
relocation of the campaign for women's rights to 
elsewhere to France. This has the effect of making 
feminism or the campaign for equal human rights - 
not Polish but other or foreign. This as we shall see 
later has had important consequences for the 
development of feminism in Poland. 
With the Second Partition of 1793, instigated by 
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Catherine the Great, the embryonic liberal democracy 
was crushed and the reforms abolished by force 
(Dydynski, 1994: 15). With the third partition of 1795 
Poland disappeared from the European map for 123 
years, taking with it one of Europe's earliest 
constitutional attempts to establish equal gender 
rights. 
3.4 Nationalist struggles and the development of 
Mother Poland 
The eradication of Poland from the European map with 
the partitions had other effects in terms of gender 
representation in the public sphere. Although Poland 
as a state had ceased to exist, Polish culture, 
language and to some extent print media continued, 
although fragmented, underground. The central core of 
identity and continuity during the 19th century for 
Polish culture and traditions was, according to 
Magdalena Sokolowska, the family. She maintains that 
the family was the "fortress" and "bastion of the 
national spirit" (Sokolowska, 1977: 350). Polish 
schools and institutions were banned and it was within 
the private sphere that children learnt about Polish 
history, literature and language. As Sokolowska points 
out: 
The guiding spirit of these activities was the 
women. Even though their formal scope within the 
patriarchal pattern was limited to the household, 
their actual tasks and functions were of 
particular importance under the specific 
conditions prevailing in Poland. (Sokolowska, 
1977: 350) 
When Polish men were killed, imprisoned or sent to 
Siberia by foreign rulers this left the women to bring 
up the children. Women, therefore, became the main 
cultural channel (Siemienska, 1986: 90). Hence national 
culture was articulated not through the public sphere 
or the state but through the private domains of 
families and women in particular. 
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This gendered articulation of Polish culture was 
embodied within the f igure of Mother Poland (Matka 
Polka). In her ideal f orm Mother Poland was strong 
but also selfless. Sokolowska states, for example: 
"Fortitude and adherence to duty were demanded of her 
and her importance in bringing up the children and in 
the household was emphasized" (Sokolowska, 1981: 107). 
It is important to note, however, that the figure of 
Mother Poland and the values she embodied were not 
solely the product of the partitions. The importance 
of self-sacrifice for women as a sign of patriotism 
preceded the partitions, as Donimirski shows 
(1988: 190-196). 1 Nevertheless, the participation and 
over-identif ication by women with Mother Poland during 
the partition years is evident, according to 
Siemienska, from the number of women who wore black 
clothes as if in mourning (1986: 10). The memoirs of 
Polish revolutionaries often paid tribute to the 
mother or grandmother who schooled them in their 
patriotism (Davies: 1981: 41). The Nationalist, 
Alexandra Pilsudska, wrote for example: 
My grandmother was a woman of great intelligence 
and strength of character, and in the breadth of 
her mind and reading undoubtedly excelled the 
majority of her contemporaries. After her 
husband's death, she ran the estate herself, 
controlling the servants and the workmen with an 
iron hand ... patriotism was the main motor of 
her life. The entire passion in her intense 
powerful nature was devoted to the cause of her 
country's freedom ... and in her conspiratorial 
work of the January rising she played a prominent 
part in the neighbourhood, chairing secret 
meetings in the house and carrying guns. She took 
on danger with utter contempt. The failure of the 
rising provoked the greatest trauma of her whole 
life. Hence forward, she always wore the same 
black dress with its white lace at the neck and 
cuffs, and on her finger a ring decorated with a 
white Cross in pearls on black enamel (Pilsudska, 
1960: 56). 
1 Such self-sacrifice for women patriots was embedded in the legend of Wanda who it was said killed 
herself rather than accept a forced marriage to a Prussian in 1273 (Donimirski, 1988: 191) 
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The grandmother's ring -a white cross on black enamel 
- is one of mourning. one of mourning not just f or 
close family but for all those who died in the 
uprising. The ring indicates that, symbolically, the 
grandmother was married to her husband, the nation and 
the Roman Catholic Church. Such rings were worn only 
by true patriots (Reading, 1992: 21). A true patriot is 
"someone who loves Poland above everything else in the 
world ... and who will abandon everything, even life 
itself for freedom" (Pilsudska, 1960: 56). Mother 
Poland then is the essence of female self-sacrifice. 
But, she is also a representation in which emptiness 
prevails: the Polish for widow, wdowa, like the 
English, is an historical legacy from the sanskrit 
meaning empty. The development of this representation 
of Mother Poland places women on a pedestal (in terms 
of strength and courage) whilst simultaneously denying 
her meaning, except in relation to loss (of family, 
Poland). 
The partitions and the censorship by the ruling states 
imposed on Polish writers meant that literature 
developed a political status and impact greater than 
other media forms. Poetry, in particular, because of 
the late development of the novel in the former Polish 
territories, came to be seen as an expression of the 
collective will of an oppressed people, with the poet 
in the 19th century hailed as their charismatic 
leader'. As in other East European countries, such as 
Czechoslovakia, the equation of woman with nation was 
linked with that of organised religion3. In the case of 
2 Barbera Einhorn, drawing on an unpublished paper by Bozena Uminska, 'the portrayal of women 
in Polish literature' (1991) says that the novel emerged as a literary genre after the 1850s in Poland. (Einhorn, 
1994: 252. Endnote, 36. ) 
' For a discussion of the imaging of women in the literatures of other East European countries see 
Einhom, 1994. 
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Poland this meant the Roman Catholic Church. The 
Romantic movement in Poland was nationalistic and 
dominated by what was called Messianism. With 
Messianism the central dynamic image of the lost 
Poland is compared with Christ, the savior of the 
world. What is important for us is that Christ in this 
equation becomes female, as for example in the work of 
Adam Mickiewicz (see Reddaway et al. 1950: 323) and in 
one of the most f amous poems of the period Dawn by 
Zymunt Krasinski: 
And I heard ; *ýoice that called in the eternal sky 
as to the world I gave thee a son 
So to it, Poland, thee I give 
My only son he was - and shall be, 
but in thee my purpose in him lives 
Be thou then the truth, as he is, everywhere 
Thee I make my daughter. 
(Krasinski, 1843 cited in Reddaway, 1950: 323) 
In such poetry it was not the mother of God that 
represented Poland, but the daughter. The female is 
represented as the nation as both Mother and Daughter. 
As Mother (Poland) woman is a vessel for the re-birth 
of the Polish nation, a receptacle for culture and 
language; the daughter is she who suffers and 
sacrifices her life like Christ. Poland as the 
equivalent of a female Christ provided a Christian 
explanation for the partitioning and suffering of the 
nation. The daughter, like Mother Poland, takes on 
heroic proportions. At the same time, the traditional 
qualities of passivity and sacrifice and unconditional 
goodness associated with Christ are shifted from the 
(unacceptable) male sphere to the (acceptable) female 
sphere reinforcing the stoic Mother Poland. The person 
of action then becomes not Poland-daughter-Christ but 
the (male) poet in the persona of an omnipotent and 
omniscient God, the creator. The overriding message of 
such a representation was: "Women - you are the 
heroines, the saviors, but keep quiet and turn the 
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other cheek; your suffering is for the good of 
humanity, for Poland" (Reading, 1992: 52). 4 
3.5 The working situation of women in Poland in the 
19th Century 
The spheres and structures of employment for women in 
the nineteenth century are important for the ways in 
which they are socially remembered within more recent 
employment patterns. one of the main areas of 
employment for women was in agriculture, although as 
in the rest of Europe in the nineteenth century the 
industrial revolution did lead to an increase in the 
number of women employed outside agriculture 
(Zarnowska, 1991: 2). Most women working on the land 
were on family peasant holdings rather than as paid 
farm hands or agriculture workers. The social status 
of women and men depended on the size of the peasant 
holding. For young women, in particular, who grew up 
in the ordinary peasant villages of partitioned 
Poland, their material reality included particular 
mechanisms of oppression not felt by the young men of 
the time, as Narkiewicz illustrates: 
The girls were at the mercy of the master, his 
son or the labourers. They often had to leave the 
service pregnant, not knowing who the father was. 
Serving girls slept in cowsheds on wooden benches 
covered in straw; the labourers slept in stables. 
When the master was devout and cared f or the 
maid, she slept in the kitchen. Then the boys 
could not get near her ... but then they would 
find one who slept in the cowshed. (Narkiewicz, 
1976: 34) 
The other main sphere of employment for women in the 
nineteenth was in the textile industry. This, as in 
Western Europe, brought the majority of women into the 
unskilled labour market, replacing skilled weavers and 
' Even in the literature of mainstream women writers representations of women tend to emphasize 
self-sacrifice and self-denial. This was also the case in Czech literature. See Einhorn, 1994: 230. 
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spinners. Zarnowska argues that this had important 
consequences for the economic status of women: 
M;.. 
the entry of women into the labour market 
ant, as if by definition, the entry of 
unskilled labour. This starting point affected 
for many decades the working woman's social 
status, placing her on a low rung of hierarchy in 
industry. (Zarnowska, 1991: 2) 
Women accounted for 46.3 percent of the textile 
workforce in 1908. In some sections, such as the linen 
industry, women constituted half of the workforce. 
Women also accounted for a high percentage of the 
clothing industry workers. In the Congress Kingdom 
women workers in the clothing factories made up 57 
percent of those working in the industry; in Galicia 
the figure was still substantial but lower at 40 
percent. The tobacco and cigarette industries were 
staff ed almost exclusively by women. By the end of the 
19th century the female workforce had stabilized at 
one third of industrial workers. In the first decade 
of the 20th century this increased to 34.5 percent in 
1908 (Zarnowska, 1991: 3-4). This pattern of growth 
continued overall, although as Zarnowska points out, 
economic crises such as that in the 1930's tended to 
hit women hardest: 
The proportional and absolute growth of women's 
employment took place on the whole when the 
economic situation was good. When it 
deteriorated, the first to be dismissed were 
women, who were usually employed in auxiliary 
work or in work not requiring high 
qualifications. (Zarnowska, 1991: 4) 
On the whole then women constituted a similar 
proportion of the workforce at the end of the 19th 
century as the first 30 years of the 20th century in 
other industrial countries of Europe ". one difference, 
Zarnowska argues, was the number of women in the 
5 Lovendowski (1986: 18) shows that throughout Western Europe until about 1850 agriculture provided 
the main employment for women. This was gradually superseded by the textile and then service industries. 
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agricultural and service industries. Prior to World 
War One, in Warsaw, half the number of women employed 
were in service. In 1892 for every one woman in 
industry, there were five women servants. This 
proportion gradually declined, although with a minor 
reversal of this trend in Warsaw during the economic 
crises of the 1930s when the 19th century occupational 
structure of women was restored (Zarnowska, 1991: 6). 
The proportion of white collar workers employed in 
administration, education and the professions was 
small in comparison with other European countries. For 
example in 1897 white collar women constituted only 
five percent and this had risen to only 13 percent by 
1931 (Zarnowska, 1935: 125). 
The increase in the number of working women was due to 
economic necessity: Their wages were needed to 
supplement the man's earnings which were "insufficient 
to maintain a family" (Zarnowska, 1991: 7). Women"s 
wages then were a supplement to those of men and this 
is reflected in wages differentials: women were paid 
50 percent less than men, according to Zarnowska. 
(1991: 7). However, Kaczynska (1970) argues that women 
were paid the same as men at the end of the 19th 
century when it came to doing piece work. And 
Krahelska. (1932) maintains that during the First World 
War in Poland men's wages declined and women earned 
3/4 of the wages of men. By the mid-1920s the currency 
had stabilized and there was a return to pre-War 
gender wage structures, with women in industry earning 
just 65 percent of the wage for a male unskilled 
worker. Zarnowska therefore believes that the 
difference between men and women's wages in industry 
in Poland was as great as in the industrialized 
European countries (Zarnowska, 1991: 8). 
Married women in all sectors worked as well as single 
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parents, despite the lack of maternity leave f or women 
until after Polish independence in 1918. A quarter of 
the working female population in the Congress Kingdom 
in 1897 were married (Zarnowska, 1991: 8). Although 
this proportion was only 20 percent in the service 
sector (Zarnowska, 1980: 130). Overall, the number of 
married working women in industry was lower than in 
other industrialized European countries such as 
Belgium, Switzerland and Austria. This was due to the 
lack of protective legislation, social amenities and 
childcare facilities (Zarnowska, 1991: 10). Reports by 
women labour inspectors in interwar Poland show that 
women tended to do work that could be reconciled with 
the functions of housewife and motherhood. Despite 
this, working women were "overburdened by paid and 
household work" according to factory reports of the 
period (Krahelska, 1936 cited in Zarnowska, 1991: 11). 
However, there was also another class of women. These 
were the skilled workers within the clothing industry 
who produced luxury clothes such as embroidered 
underwear and lace. These women worked in artisan 
workshops or at home and were usually from the 
impoverished gentry or intelligentsia. Such women were 
often forced to take such work as a result of loss of 
land and pauperization. Zarnowska comments: 
Landowning and intellectual circles regarded it 
as a patriotic act when a woman took up paid work 
to support a family victimized by the partitions. 
This enhanced the prestige of working women in 
broad public opinion. (1991: 3) 
Because of this, and the changing industrial scene, 
employment of women in factories in the region 
increased in the last quarter of the 19th century. In 
1865 13 percent of workers in factories were women; by 
1914 this had risen to 34 percent (Kancewicz, 1974: 
23). An enormous number of women were employed in 
textile factories (50 percent) and in agricultural 
82 
production (20 percent). Women employed in heavy 
industry, such as metal factories, were ten percent of 
the work force (Kancewicz, 1974: 23). Women employed 
in industry were, on the whole, located in the great 
industrial centers such as Lodz and Bialstok. On the 
whole, women were paid one third less than men 
(Korespondencje Robotnicze, 1957: 167). Conditions in 
factories were appalling for both men and women, 
although they were ameliorated a little with the 
beginning of factory inspections which began in 
Krolestwie in 1891 (Szyszko, 1986: 85). 
Despite the unequal conditions for women some women 
did break through the mechanisms of exclusion. women 
challenged the efforts to circumscribe their 
activities in all areas, including science, the arts, 
politics, medicine and sport (Krol, 1988: 16). And as 
we shall see in the next section there was always a 
handful of women that successfully entered the public 
sphere '6. Gradually,. in the nineteenth century with the 
advent of the women's movements these numbers grew. 
3.6 The struggle for working class and women's 
representation in the public sphere 
In some respects, the partitions and subsequent 
development of gendered nationalist representation 
circumscribed women's activities in the political 
sphere (Narkiewicz, 1976). Populist movements for 
national liberation were male-dominated and used women 
in support roles in the private sphere. The peasant 
populist Wincenty Witos for example went home after 
his army service, married and with his wife's dowry 
bought more land to farm. Narkiewicz comments: 
He was very lucky in his marriage, f or apart from 
" For example, the first women student entered the Jagiellonian University in Cracow in 1415 (Krol, 
1988: 15) 
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having a pleasant wife, he also found that she 
was an excellent farmer and manager. She arranged 
everything to do with the farm and the household, 
so that he could get on with his political 
activity. (Narkiewicz, 1976: 56) 
By the end of the 19th century, movements f or national 
liberation, both populist and socialist in 
inclination, became embedded within the ideologies of 
the Roman Catholic Church. An illustration of this 
combination of socialism with Catholicism is a strike 
in Cracow in 1896: 
On the 8th of June the strike ended with the 
celebration of high mass in the Marian Church, 
after which workers formed a procession, which 
went to Grodzska Street, singing the Red flag. 
('Naprzod' 11.6.1896 cited in Buszko, 1961: 110) 
One consequence of this, according to Walewska (1909), 
a leading Polish feminist writing at the beginning of 
the twentieth century, was that because of the 
partitioning of Poland, the struggle for national 
identity tended to take precedence over women's 
struggles for public representation and gender 
equality: 
Thý movement towards equality of the sexes can 
only be of a preparatory nature. The women of 
Wielkopolska, however, are so busy defending the 
few remaining areas of national life that they 
have little time to think of their own liberation 
(Walewska, 1909: 40) 
That is not to say that women did not develop their 
own public spaces. They certainly did. As early as 
1830 the Society of Ladies Patriotic Charity was 
founded. In 1845 to 1848 the Society of Enthusiasts 
was active. Between 1861 and 1864 there were women's 
groups called the "Fives" which were underground 
groups operating in Warsaw. In Silesia there were the 
Circles of Polish Women and in the Poznan region there 
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were associations of women called "Warta" and 
"Promien" (Siemienska, 1986: 10). 
However, very of ten the dominance of the national 
question meant that women"s struggles to break the 
mechanisms of exclusion to the public sphere, in areas 
such as education and enfranchisement, were often 
articulated through nationalist discourses, including 
the ideal re-presentation of women as Mother Poland. 
Walewska, for example, said: 
Thought of the nation never leaves us f or a 
second; the same is true of our association of 
self-liberating women, sincerely devoted to work 
for the education of the people and raising 
cultural standards. (Walewska Cited in 
Siemienska, 1986: 44) 
Nevertheless, although nationalist discourses were 
important and the re-presentation of Mother Poland 
made it difficult for women to negotiate the patriotic 
Catholic Mother, there were contradictions which made 
for other possibilities. The relationship between 
Polish nationalism, feminism and socialism in the 
public sphere was a heterogeneous and dialectical one 
(Reading, 1992: 159). The spaces that women did carve 
out in the public sphere were influenced by particular 
differences and contradictions between the three 
sectors during the partition years as well as 
contradictions in terms of class. These were important 
factors that influenced the possibilities for women to 
organize and make themselves heard. 
Initially, the women, s political organisations that 
did develop in the early 19th century had at their 
core the demand for national independence. Such 
organizations drew support, largely, from the middle 
classes (Wawrzkowska-Wierciechowa, 1961: 239). In the 
Prussian sector, due to the repressive nature of the 
regime which implemented harsh policies of 
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Germanization, the women0s organizations worked within 
dominant nationalistic discourses and did not push for 
rights for women to enter the public sphere on an 
equal basis with men. However, in the Russian sector 
education for women had become a key issue, as a 
result of Russian policies of industrialization. These 
policies had led to the collapse of the landed gentry, 
and with it the class of leisured ladies. This class 
of women, according to Jan Hulewicz, then found 
themselves in the newly formed urban areas with little 
possibility for return to the countryside. From 
necessity these women began to demand the right to 
work equally with men and in order to do so demanded 
the right to education (Hulewicz, 1936: 73). In the 
Austrian sector there were greater possibilities for 
political freedom in comparison with the other 
sectors. The denial of women the right to vote, as 
well as access to other political institutions, led to 
a movement for enfranchisement. In 1905 12,000 people 
signed a petition to the governor of the Austrian 
sector in which votes for women was the key demand 
(Sokolowska, 1977: 350). 
one of the contradictions of the partitions was that 
whilst they meant that any Polish women's political 
movement was effectively divided they also meant that 
one step for public sphere recognition in one sector 
spurred on other sectors to take similar steps. For 
example, when women in the Russian sector established 
organizations for women's education, it was not long 
before similar organizations were set up in the 
Austrian sector (Sokolowska, 1977: 350). In addition, 
although Polish nationalism did circumscribe women's 
public involvement, some commentators at the begining 
of the twentieth century argued that it acted as a 
spur to women in particular instances to fight for 
public representation. Orka argued: 
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There came a time when devoted women fighters, 
who had taken part in all the liberation 
struggles of the contemporary era, began to be 
systematically denied access to the gains and 
advantages they had helped to achieve. That was 
when the need began to be felt for the unity for 
fighting sex equality. Thus was the women's 
movement born. (1911: 3) 
The contradictions of the class system in the three 
sectors also had particular effects which were 
significant for understanding the development of 
women's representation. In the beginning of the 19th 
century nationalist movements were made up of mostly 
the middle classes. Narkiewicz asks: 
Who comprised the Polish nation? Before the 
partitions, the state was divided into clearly 
established classes: The gentry, who were the 
nation and the peasants, who were serfs, without 
rights. The nation was Polish, the peasants were 
peasants. (Narkiewicz, 1976: 9) 
The idealised representation of woman as Mother Poland 
was also, intitially, class specific. To begin with it 
was a middle class ideal, like the "Angel in the 
House" of middle and upper class Victorian Britain. It 
was only later in the century that Mother Poland 
became an image that also had working class 
significance (Reading, 1992: 160). 
After the failed insurrection of 1831, the movement 
for an independent Poland began to develop in two 
directions. One direction was 
. 
geared towards the 
gentry and the nation. The other emphasized the 
importance of the needs of ordinary people within the 
struggle for independence (Narkiewicz, 1976: 9-11). 
According to Dionizja Wawrzykowska-Wierciochowa (1986: 
52-72) by 1876 the f irst groups of women began to 
hold separate meetings within Polish Socialist 
circles, which included prominent feminists such as 
Marie Gajowna and later Helene Konowne. Much of the 
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work that they did was illegal, publishing workers' 
leaflets and agitating for change. Consequently, the 
leaders were arrested and sent to Siberia where they 
died in 1880. Women were also active in the Party for 
the Proletariat between 1882 and 1883. This followed 
a similar pattern of illegal print media production, 
followed by arrests and imprisonment and /or death. 
Other socialist women's groups were later established, 
one producing the socialist feminist periodical 
"Proletariat" which was closed down in 1885 with the 
imprisonment of its editor Maria Bohuszwiczowna 
(Wawrzykowska-Wierciochowa: 1986: 70). 
The feminist movement in the 19th century mirrored the 
class divisions of partitioned Poland. Koberdowa 
argues that there were two distinct strands, bourgeois 
feminism and working class feminism, with different 
ideologies and which drew support from different areas 
of society (1986: 27). In the Austrian sector a form 
of practical feminism, which was influenced by 
socialist ideas from France, developed. Women founded 
their own schools, cooperative businesses and 
established day-care centres. Bohachevsky-Chomiak 
(1980: 50) believes that these served to increase 
women's sense of identity, cohesion and self-esteem. 
In the German part of Poland, in the 1880s a socialist 
feminist workers movement was established; in Cracow 
in 1904 the Union of Women was f ounded and across 
partitioned Poland women participated in the women's 
sections of the European socialist movement. There 
were some organizations which were committed to the 
development of international socialism and feminism: 
Maria Konopnicka, for example, advocated day-care 
centres as the key to enabling women to be 
economically independent and as providing the basis 
for a new social order (Bohachevsky-Chomiak, 1980: 55). 
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An important part of the international movement was 
the Central Women-*s Organ of the Polish socialist 
Party (PPS). This ran its own socialist women's 
magazine called Glos Kobiet (Woman's Voice), edited by 
Dorote Kluszynska. This organization was banned in 
1939. The Polish Communist Party which worked through 
the PPS also had a central committee of women to 
mobilize women for revolution. They produced brochures 
and magazines for working class women (Koberdowa, 
1986: 42). The central committee of women in the PPS 
had its own press, organized national conferences 
along with workers organizations for youth and 
children, the Peoples University, working women-*s 
clubs and associations for sport and culture. It also 
organized the yearly women's day. 
At the same time, Milosz writes that culturally there 
was a "feminine invasion' of literature during the 
latter half of the nineteenth century and suggests 
that when nationalism took a back seat women were able 
to come to forefront of culture (Milosz, 1969: 334)7. 
Indeed, writer-women dominated Polish literature at 
the time when Positivism pushed out nationalistic 
Romanticism and again in the interwar years. Writers 
such as Zofia Nalkowska, Zofia Kossak, Maria 
Kuncewiczowa and Maria Dabrowska developed their own 
re-presentations of women, which then were later 
denigrated or marginalised in literary histories. 
Milosc argues for example that Maria Konopnicka (1842- 
1910) was I more interesting perhaps as an example of 
an emancipated woman than a poet (Milosc, 1969: 315). 
This suggests that within Poland"s social memory, 
there is an historical pattern whereby when National 
Liberation takes priority women were pushed out by 
" Before the partitioning of Poland them were many women writers of renown, such as the poet 
Elzbieta Druzbacka (1695-1765) on whose work Nfilosc comments: ' some merits may be found in the prolific 
poetess Elzbicta Druzbacka who was not even scorned by the literati of the Enlightenment' (Nfilosc, 1969: 155). 
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publishing houses, translators and anthologists: hence 
the dual meaning of chauvinism in Polish which means 
national fascism as well as male fascism. 
At the turn of this century, there was a change in the 
socialist movement in Poland which impacted on womenfs 
struggle for public representation. The Polish 
Socialist Party retreated from its internationalist 
principles and began to support, instead, the 
principal of an independent Poland: 
This was an attempt to broaden its base of 
support and to meet the demands of a growing 
urban proletariat, still linked to the land by 
the soil on its hands and the crucifix round its 
neck. (Reading, 1992: 162) 
However, the feminist movement did not follow this 
strategy. Instead, it became more international in 
outlook, particularly in the Russian sector. The 
reason for this was that after the Russian Revolution 
of 1905 groups committed to political representation 
in the public sphere in terms of emancipation were 
legalised. The feminist movement in the Russian sector 
therefore had established a legal public space in 
which to gather support. The Polish Association for 
Women's Emancipation was established followed by the 
Union for Women's Emancipation (Siemienska, 1986: 12). 
The feminist Walewska wrote that these newly 
established organizations were dedicated to improving 
the conditions of women by: 
Facilitating women's education which would put 
them on an equal f ooting with men in terms of 
vocational training. Another of their goals is to 
spread in society the ideals of justice and 
justifiability of the new women's demands; 
Society should educate her to be a citizen fully 
responsible for her actions, develop her own 
political and social commitment, lead her out of 
her narrow-minded parochialism which laid waste 
to her spiritual resources. (Walewska, 1909: 40) 
To lay waste (pustoszyc) usually means the destruction 
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of land, or a place; it is, effectively, the language 
of f oreign domination. Partitioning laid waste to 
Poland but here Walewska uses this to mean women. 
Further she combines parochialism with it, which 
denotes an unhealthy attachment to a place as well as 
small-mindedness. What Walewska has done is to reverse 
nationalistic discourse and used it to give public 
voice to women and their demands. 
3.7 The Jewish Nation and Jewish Women 
The picture given so far suggests that other than the 
crucial division of class, and the divisions caused by 
the partitions, women formed an homogenous group. 
However, the picture is not complete without 
addressing some of the issues raised by the gendered 
representation of ethnic minorities in Poland in the 
19th century, one of the most significant groups of 
which was the Jews. As the historian Artur Eisenbach 
argues, the Jewish Question is one of the 'many 
struggles for emancipation** that formed the public 
sphere in Poland (Eisenbach, 1991: 12-13). Jewish 
people had been long established in Poland since the 
12th century. Indeed the Hebrew text Kiddush ha-shem 
states that Poland (Polin) gets its name from the 
Hebrew poh lin, which literally means 'Here thou shall 
lodge', which were the words of God to the Jews in 
exile as he took a piece of Eretz Yisroel hidden in 
the heavens and set it down on earth (Sholem Asch 
cited in Polonsky, 1993: 1). A Charter of Privileges 
in 1264 protected Jews in Poland. In the 15th century 
there were attempts by the rebellious gentry to force 
the King to withdraw the Statuta Judeorum. In the 16th 
century statutory rights for Jewish men in politics, 
education and the judiciary were confirmed by Zymunt 
I and King Stefan Bathory (Iranek-osmecki, 1971: 2). 
However, in 1764 the Polish Sejm dissolved what was 
known as the Jewish Congress in Poland (Goldberg, 
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1994: 45-63). Thus Jewish men were denied political 
representation before the advent of the first 
partition. With the first partition, according to 
Iranek-Osmecki, this awoke ideas for reforming the 
situation for Jews, by making them fully-fledged 
citizens (1971: 4-5; see also Michalski, 1994: 20-44). 
But, as Eisenbach shows, citizenship was in fact based 
on the'exclusion of Jews. The municipal Law on Towns 
of 1791 (Article 2, Pt. 1) stated that citizenship was 
open to all nationals of the Polish Commonwealth, as 
well as 'aliens' but only aliens who were Christians. 
This version was included in the 3 May Constitution of 
1791 (Eisenbach, 1991: 65). 6 The dangers of this were 
foreseen at the time by Stanlislaw Staszic: 
Whenever exclusiveness arises, justice 
disappears, and where there is no justice there 
cannot be morality. Without morality there are no 
morals. The spirit of exclusiveness is the main 
obstacle at every step of civilization. (Cited by 
Eisenbach, 1991: 74). 
Thus part of the repressed story of the political 
right in Poland of 'national* citizenship, as in other 
countries, is that it was based on ethnic exclusion, 
as well as the exclusion of women. This, as we shall 
see later, was to be socially remembered in the recent 
mediatic transitions in Poland, whilst earlier 
attempts at inclusion were repressed. 
During the Partition years Jewish men and women in the 
different regions experienced both exclusion and 
inclusion at the hands of the ruling powers. In 
Prussia, Frederick II reduced the number of Jews to 1 
per cent of the population, by demanding that each Jew 
possess 300 talers (Iranek-Osmecki, 1971: 6). In 
Austria, however, a Charter of Toleration was issued 
a This was very different from the situation of Jews in France who 24 February 1790 were included 
as full political citizens by the Paris Commune (Eisenbach, 1991: 72). 
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in 1789 which granted Jews mercantile freedom, and, in 
Galicia, Emporer Franz Joseph granted equal rights to 
Jews (Grodziski, 1994: 64-80). In Russia, however, 
Jews were granted the civil rights of education and 
the right to abode only within the Jewish Pale of 
Little Russia and New Russia. These limited rights 
were withdrawn after the 1863 insurrection (Iranek- 
Osmecki, 1971: 6). 
These shared mechanisms of public exclusion against 
Jews were also gendered within Jewish culture. Men and 
women were represented in the public and private 
worlds differently because of their diametric 
relationship with religion, language and culture. 
Shaul Stampfer argues: 
Jewish men and women could be seen as occupying 
adjacent but different cultural worlds in Eastern 
Europe, in which the expression of a function in 
one gender was the mirror image of its expression 
in the other gender. Men and women shared a 
common spoken language and a common 
religious\national identity. However, much else 
was different (Stampfer, 1993: 195). 
The essential basis of this difference was related to 
the education of Jewish children. Education and the 
teaching of the Torah to girls was said to teach her 
Itiflut' or indecency and frivolity and therefore was 
not allowed. The result according to Stampfer was that 
whilst there was a standard approved pattern for boys' 
education, which took place in the public sphere in 
Jewish schools, there was no such formal structure for 
girls, who tended to be educated piecemeal in the 
domestic or private sphere with individual tutors for 
af ew hours a day. Whilst boys learnt to read and 
write Hebrew, girls learnt to read and write Yiddish. 
A boy's social life consisted of contact in the public 
sphere through synagogue, school and hevrot (formal 
association). Girls, in contrast, attended synagogue 
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less often, in a different part of the temple and 
their social contacts were informal within the 
domestic realm (Stamfer, 1993: 1965-6). Despite this, 
in Jewish circles the ideal types for men and women 
were quite different from Polish stereotypes of men 
and women. The ideal Jewish woman was supposed to be 
active, aggressive and full-bodied. In contrast, the 
ideal Jewish man was a retiring, palid, delicate 
Talmudist (Stamfer, 1993: 196). In addition, 
Both men and women generally worked and 
contributed to the family income, so that there 
was no clear distinction between the males as 
breadwinners and women as homemakers, as was 
common in other societies (Stamfer, 1993: 196). 
In these latter respects then, the gendered 
representation of Jewish men and women was almost in 
obverse relation to the gendered division of the 
private and public spheres of Polish men and women. 
By the 1860s the reduction in the numbers of Jewish 
child marriages meant that there was an increase in 
the number of teenage unmarried girls still at home. 
Study provided the solution. But, since there was no 
real tradition of sending girls to Heder (the Hebrew 
Boys' Schools) Jewish girls began attending the Polish 
schools. This provided for a reinforcement of the 
different relationship of Jewish men and women to the 
public sphere in Poland: 
A woman who received a general education was 
introduced to a world, even if only a literary 
one, which promised not only status, but a very 
different set of values. Women often accepted 
these values and made radical changes in their 
lifestyle which led to estrangement from 
traditional forms of Judaism (Stamfer, 1993: 
202). 
It is this aspect of Poland's socially inherited 
memory which, as we shall see, seems to positively 
inform certain aspects of policy and representation in 
Poland's Communist regime in terms of education for 
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women and work in the public sphere. 
Further, as in other areas of literature, the way in 
which Jews in 19th century fiction were re-presented 
is also significant. zdzislaw Libera argues that in 
18th century literature there was an appreciation of 
the separate identity of Jews in Poland which was both 
tolerated and appreciated. But, over time, negative 
stereotypes began to prevail (Libera, 1994: 120). In 
the early 18th century Jewish men were stereotyped as 
the greedy, shrewd, comical villain (Libera, 1994: 
121). Jews were depicted as responsible for the 
decline of towns and the underdevelopment of trade and 
handicrafts (Eisenbach, 1991: 65). A key force in 
this economic scapegoating, according to Eisenbach, 
was the Roman Catholic Church which furthered 
"negative stereotyped opinions about Jews" (1991: 98). 
By the 1860s, however, assimilationism in positivist 
literature resulted in a more positive role for Jewish 
men in literature. This was, though, in relation to 
the greater good of the nation: positivist literature 
was concerned with what Jews and Poles together could 
contribute to a capitalist Poland (Polonskie, 1993: 
163). In this respect we can discern a pattern in re- 
presentations in Poland in which the social memory of 
Jewish men in the public sphere is related to their 
economic role. This may be articulated positively or 
negatively but the inherited meaning concerns their 
economic value in relation to the Polish nation. 
In contrast, by the end of the century the modernist 
taste f or the esoteric and irrational was located with 
certain portrayals of Jewish women in literature 
(Polonskie, 1993: 164). For example in Wesele (The 
Wedding, 1901) by Stanislaw Wyspianski all strata of 
society are brought together f or the occasion of a 
wedding. The acculturated Jewish heroine Rachela 
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establishes spiritual contact with the 'other world'. 
She requests the presence of the spirits of Polish 
history to join the living of the wedding party, 
thereby initiating a confrontation and coming together 
of Poland's past and present. In this respect her 
spirituality has a constructive role to play, 
according to Polonskie (1993: 1 64). A more common 
representation of Jewish women, however, at the end of 
the 19th century was in terms of their "dark and 
destructive sensuality'. Jewish heroines of this 
period often inhabited a 'twilight' zone of the 
strange and exotic between Poland and biblical 
Palestine. This, argues Polonskie (1993: 164) by the 
early twentieth century was linked to "the Jewish 
political cause' and destructive political terrorism, 
as in Jozef Weyssenhoff's Hetmani (The Hetman's, 
1911). Here, there is a discernible resonance in the 
social memory of re-presentations of Jewish women. 
Associated with dangerous sexuality, with the exotic, 
they are the other of Polish Christian mothers and 
virgins. At the same time it is they, not Jewish men, 
who represent political value and voice. When they are 
assimilated with the Polish nation, then they add to 
the value of the political sphere of the nation. But, 
when they part of a separate political movement they 
detract from the political sphere of the nation. Thus 
like Polish women Jewish women could have a public 
voice if it was f or the nation (in this case the 
Jewish nation). But, unlike Polish women, Jewish women 
then become relocated outside the Polish nation and 
the bounds of seemly female sexuality (i. e virginity) 
and therefore become dangerous. However, the Jewish 
feminist, Zofia Woznicka, born in Warsaw in 1924,. 
argues that Polish literature,, unlike German 
literature, never invoked the same outright hatred 
against Jews historically (1988: 67-76). She argues 
that some of the most positive representations of 
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Jewish women's political participation were provided 
by the Polish writer Eliza Orzeszkowa. She was under 
police surveillance for her activities in the January 
uprising 1863 in which Jews in traditional dress 
carried Polish f lags and Jewish youths joined with 
Poles in the underground resistance movement. Despite 
attempts after this to restrict her movements 
Orzeszkowa edited a series of stories about the Jews 
by eminent Polish writers in an attempt to counteract 
the pogroms organized by 10chranal, the Tsarist secret 
police (Woznicka, 1988: 70). Nevertheless, as Artur 
Eisenbach argues, stereotypes of Jews have, 
historically, "exerted a significant influence" on the 
rights of Jewish citizens in Poland (1991: 12). What we 
see is that these re-presentations were highly complex 
and not static. They operated within the nexus of the 
meaning and construction of the Polish nation in the 
nineteenth century which was also gendered. 
3.8 Women in The Interwar Years 
In 1918, women in Poland gained equality of civil 
rights and in 1919 equal suffrage. The Constitution of 
March 21.1921, granted equal rights to all citizens, 
without exception (Iranek-osmecki, 1971: 7). However, 
these legal rights did little to change women's 
participation in the public sphere and few steps were 
taken to improve women's lives on a practical basis 
(Plakwicz, 1992: 78). The new rights accorded women 
contradicted a legacy of restrictive laws from the 
partition years. But women's representation, 
particularly in political terms, was minimal. The 
number of women in the upper house was a mere 2 
percent. Women did little better in the lower house: 
five percent of deputies elected in the newly formed 
Poland were women (Siemienska, 1986: 14). 
The public sphere in the interwar years was dominated 
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by Joseph Pilsudski and Roman Dmowski who became 
increasingly right-wing in their political 
orientations. Pilsudski had been a key figure in the 
Polish Socialist Party before the First World War and 
was also a militarist as commander-in-chief of one of 
the Polish underground armies. He began a campaign to 
secure Poland's frontiers and to extend Polish 
territory into the Ukraine in 1920. This sparked off 
the Polish-Soviet War in which Poland took parts of 
Byelorussia and the Ukraine. In 1926 Pilsudski 
engineered a coup in which he ruled as dictator, with 
a military junta until 1935, when the junta took power 
(Ascherson, 1981: 34). The largest political group in 
the interwar years was the Social Democrats, of which 
Roman Dmowski was a leading member. originally, this 
party as a clandestine group, aligned itself with the 
working classes. In the interwar years it aligned 
itself with landowners and industrialists. The party 
greatly admired the Nazi system in Germany and their 
ideas gained increasing influence in Polish Society. 
Neil Ascherson comments, 'If they had taken power in 
the 19301's, their regime would have had little to 
distinguish it from those of Hitler and Mussolini. 
(Ascherson, 1981: 34). The bequest of this period of 
political history, according to Ascherson, is the way 
in which the party successfully combined ideas which 
previously could be held separately. The party had at 
its core nationalism as a 'supreme moral value' and 
made an indissoluble link between the Roman Catholic 
religion and Polish patriotism (Ascherson, 1981: 34). 
This as we shall see in later chapters is significant 
in terms of the articulation of a national public and 
gendered representations embodied in Poland's new 
media laws after the changes of 1989. 
The emphasis on Polish nationalism was reflected in 
even mainstream regional periodicals such as Kurjera 
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Lodzkieg2 (Figure 1). The magazine in a half folio 
format, with some colour illustrations, was aimed 
specifically at the new type of working woman - the 
women who took up jobs in business in the cities. 
According to an anonymous article entitled "Stare 
Gazety: Kacik Pani Domul (old Magazines) the magazine 
aimed to overturn the stereotypes of women as solely 
keepers of the home and hearth (Kalendarz Kurjera 
Lodzkiego, 1938: 92). This perhaps explains its rather 
eclectic mixture of articles in terms of content. A 
1938 edition included articles on women's sports, such 
as athletes, swimming and hockey; travel pieces, 
fictional stories, world facts, how to type letters 
correctly, current postage prices inland and overseas, 
cartoons, world economic indicators, addresses of key 
government ministries, an article on palmistry, 
pictures of international stars such as Ginger Rogers, 
poetry by women, a short course on photography, nine 
rules of hygiene for young tourists, home medicine 
corner, cosmetics, and technical educational courses. 
Significantly, only 2 percent of the edition was 
devoted to articles on cookery and 1 percent devoted 
to articles relating to children. However, 9 percent 
was devoted to overtly nationalistic and militaristic 
features and illustrations, including full page 
pictures of the then President of Poland, Professor 
Ignacy Moscicki (p. 15), General Edward Smigly-Rydz 
(p. 17), the childhoods of great Polish generals 
(p. 18), the Polish Navy (p. 37), a national map of 
Poland (p. 53), and photograph of Statua Matki Boskiej 
(Statue of Mother of God) by the Polish Sea'. 
The link between the nation, woman and God as in the 
19th century was also maintained in literature between 
the Wars. Representations took a slightly different 
The figures are based on my own content anlysis of Kuýera lAxizkiego, 1938. 
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turn, however, with those by male writers particularly 
linking the triad with overt sexuality and violence. 
This tradition drew on earlier poetry by Cyprian 
Norwid (1821-83) who combined nationalism with sexual 
voyeurism and violence: 
Caught in the brightness, Acteon blenched 
The hounds ignore the trumpets din, 
The Hyperborean wood stands terror-struck 
Quivering like a threadbare shack. 
(Norwid I Undressed' in Czerniawski, 1988: 17) 
Joseph Witlin's later novel Salt of the Earth (1935) 
describes a gathering of Polish statesmen and 
soldiers. The main woman character, Magda, is 
described as being 'in the service of Venus'. She is 
the mistress of Peter, an ordinary hero soldier: 
"Magda's body was the only field on which he felt 
victor. It is difficult for masculine self-love to do 
without this. ' The woman's body is territorialised as 
the f ield, as nature, as a battlefield to be dominated 
by man. Women in Polish interwar literature are 
'taken' and undressed -10, shot at and sexually used for 
the sake of the nation. "' 
The stress on the nation and the rising tide of 
fascism did not prevent women entering the workforce 
in ever increasing numbers. Neither did it, initially 
at least, prevent the continuation of the Polish 
feminist movements which could now work together 
within a united Poland to work at a national level to 
improve women"s lot. New laws reached the statute 
books which provided for the protection of pregnant 
women workers and gave women maternity allowances. The 
"0 See for example Przbyszewski's novel By The Way an extract of which in English is reprinted in 
Gillan (1981) 122-28 
" Gombrowicz clearly takes this tack in Phili for - Honeycombed with Childishness . Extract reprinted ibid, 212-22. 
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number of legislative improvements made between 1922- 
39 were significant for women (Reading, 1992: 163). The 
reason f or this was partly due to the Pilsudski regime 
and its attempts to retain political hegemony through 
a commitment to gender equality before the law. More 
importantly, however, were particular shifts within 
the bases of the feminist movements themselves. Before 
the First World War some feminist groups had been 
attacked for betraying the Polish national cause. For 
example a march in Galicia which included groups from 
Poland and Ukraine had chosen to sing the 
Marseillaise. A number of Poles had reacted by saying 
that feminist movements were covers for 
revolutionaries. This had resulted in some women 
resigning their membership of the movements 
(Bohachevsky-Chomiak, 1980: 57). Some women's 
organizations allied with the National Democratic 
Party after World War one, such as the National 
Women's Organization and the Polish Women's Council, 
and some, such as the Working Women**s Clubs and 
Society of Women's Social Service, aligned themselves 
with the Polish Socialist Party. All groups tended to 
take a more practical and pragmatic stance in 
comparison with the more internationalist and 
revolutionary pre-War groups, according to 
Bohachevsky-Chomiak. Groups often switched alliances 
and worked with any party which they thought might 
assist their ends. Bohachevsky-Chomiak argues: , 
Feminism became, in the interwar period, much 
more so than the pre-war one, a moderating, 
liberal influence. Programs of social progress, 
ironically, tended to become incorporated into 
organizations which opposed socialism in 
principle. (1980: 59) 
The dominant forces within the feminist groups that 
worked within the public political sphere before the 
second world War were the newly educated women of the 
middle and upper classes. Legal equity f or them was 
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essential to further their professional and material 
ambitions. They did not seek to change or disrupt the 
basis of the social structure or its economic order. 
However, there were some groups, just as before World 
War One, which stuck to their revolutionary principles 
and challenged the social order. Such groups believed 
that equality in all spheres could only be established 
with radical social and economic transformation 
achieved through the involvement of the working 
classes. Thus, in 1923, the Communist Party formed a 
Women's Department which sought to campaign for better 
working conditions and pay for women and to increase 
working class women's participation in the public 
sphere through education and training (Koberdowa, 
1986: 45). The Socialist women-*s movement organized 
women candidates for election to the Sejm (Koberdowa, 
1986: 43). 
The creation of a unif ied national state meant that 
women of ethnic backgrounds other than Polish sought 
to have recognition of their own needs and struggled 
to develop their own public voices and 
representatives. In the largest ethinic group, the 
Ukrainians, forming 15 percent of the Polish nation in 
the interwar period, women sought to develop their own 
economic and cultural base in reaction to the 
imposition of the Polish system of administration and 
education. By the 1930s, the Ukrainian Women's 
Movement, made up of women f rom mostly the peasant 
classes, numbered 100,000. The movement, according to 
Bohachevsky-Chomiak, enabled Ukrainian women to forge 
their own public spaces which had a significant 
influence on events on a national scale (Bohachevsky- 
Chomiak, 1985: 88-89). 
The second largest ethnic group, the Jews, constituted 
9.8 per cent of the population between the wars. 
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Despite the anti-disciminatory measures included in 
the constitution of 1921, a welter of 19th century 
exclusionary mechanisms were left in place and other 
measures introduced. A quota system in universities 
worked against Jews and Jewish merchants were excluded 
from state trade (Lewin, 1985: 34). The Compulsory 
Sunday Rest Law, passed in 1931, meant that Orthodox 
Jews were discriminated against (Weissman, 1976: 145). 
But more insidious, "The Jewish President', Gabriel 
Narutowicz, was assassinated in his first day of 
office and there were pogroms and violent attacks 
against Jews and Jewish property in many Polish towns 
and cities. This built to what was known as the 
'Owszem Policy' in the late 1930s which called for an 
economic war against Jews, the freeing of Polish' 
culture from Jewish influence and support for the 
emigration of Jews to Palestine (Lewin, 1985: 228). In 
addition, Jews were on the brunt end of the 
depression. The majority of Jews worked in the cities 
(Weisman, 1976: 140). Many Jewish women who were 
employed in textile producing centres, such as Lodz, 
were pushed out of jobs to make way for Polish 
peasants fleeing from starvation in the countryside. 
Four-fifths of Jewish workers, according to Bina 
Garncarska-Kadari, were below the poverty line in the 
1930s (1986: 135-173). 
Despite this hostile and exclusionary social 
environment, though, Iranek-Osmecki argues that f or 
the first time in more than 100 years, the chance for 
Jewish cultural autonomy was created within the 
established Polish nation. This resulted in a boom in 
Jewish cultural life, with 250 Jewish periodicals and 
715 books published in Poland in 1937 alone (1971: 7). 
The relationship to Polish culture and in turn the 
nation(s) was, as in the nineteenth century, gendered, 
but in a new f orm. Because of the impact of the 
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Jewish enlightenment" movement and Polish 
assimilationists in the latter half of the 19th 
century, this led to the development of a strong 
Polish language Jewish Press (Steinlauf, 1993: 333). 
This in turn meant that many Jewish people were unable 
to read Hebrew or Yiddish. At the same time anti- 
semitism and 'the-Judenrein' Polish press led to the 
establishment of a daily press for Jews in Polish in 
the interwar yearsI3. This resulted in, ironically, the 
strongest expression of Jewish cultural identity in 
Polish, rather than Yiddish or Hebrew. Polish acted as 
a cultural bridge for Jews to the Jewish nation and 
culture. This was far greater for women than for men, 
since the advent of girls attending public Polish 
schools in the 19th century reinforced the sense of 
Jewish women's cultural language as Polish. This is 
born out by the fact that the women's sections in the 
Orthodox Yiddish Press were in Polish, whilst the rest 
of the paper was in Yiddish since in many hasidic 
homes, argues Michael Steinlauf, women read Polish 
more fluently than Yiddish or Hebrew (1993: 358). 
Feminist journals during this period such the Jewish 
Journal for women Ewa (1928-33), edited by Paulina 
Appenszak, sought to: 
reflect the opinions, thoughts, problems and 
aspirations of the contemporary Jewish woman, 
struggling for complete liberation and active 
direct participation in the development of Jewish 
national life. (Od Redakcji, Feburary 19,1928 
ceited by Fuks, 1979: 282) 
What is important here, according to Steinlauf 
(1993: 345), is that the magazine was European in 
emphasis rather than Polish. It sought to make links 
12 The Jewish Enlightenment movement in the nineteenth century itself equated 'becoming civilised' 
with assimilation in terms of dress, language and social contacts (Eisenbach, 1991: 98). 
" According to Michael Stcinlauf the Polish Press was reactionary, Catholic and anti-semitic to the 
extent that if Jews did contribute as writers they were requested to change their names (1993: 333). 
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with Jews throughout Europe rather than simply 
identify with Jews in Poland (Steinlauf, 1993: 345). 
In this respect Jewish women's organisations and 
publications with Bundist links shared similar 
elements with the communist Polish organisations, 
which had established links with the international 
women's and socialist movements. However, what 
resonates with other Polish feminist organizations is 
the attachment of political voice to national 
identity: in this case the Jewish nation\Jewish 
National Life. This is clearer amongst Jewish women*s 
organisations with more Zionist leanings. 14 The Bais 
Yaakov movement was formed in response to the growing 
numbers of Jewish women taught in Polish schools who 
joined the feminist movement and socialist movements 
of the time. This, Deborah Weissman argues, was seen 
as a threat to the Jewish household: 
Young girls would appear for the family's 
Sabbath meals in stylish immodest attire, and 
would respond brazenly to their elders. What was 
to become of the traditional continuity of Jewish 
religious life? Where would the dedicated 
yeshivah students find suitable brides? (1976: 
141) 
Thus Jewish women's public activity was perceived by 
some Jews as dangerous for private harmony. This led 
to the establishment by Sarah Schrenirer, an hasidic 
Jew, of the Bais Yaakov (House of Jacob) schools 
especially for girls, as well as summer camps, youth 
organizations, books and publications in the 1920s 
(Weissman, 1976: 142). The philosophy of the schools 
was a contradictory mixture of training young women in 
economically useful activities whilst also imparting 
modesty, humility and love - the values of the Jewish 
"woman of valor', according to Weissman, who never 
Marian Fuks et al argue that the different factions of Jewish organisations in the interwar years, 
roughly organised around a Bundist/Zionist axis made for greater alliance between, for exmaple, Zionists and 
Polish nationalists, than between Jews themselves (Fuks, 1982: 38). 
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challenged the authority of men (Weissman, 1976: 145). 
However, the publications of the movement show that 
whilst many articles upheld women's traditional role 
within Judaism and criticized the European feminist 
movement, there were articles and letters which were 
in favour of the 'emancipation of women' (Weissman, 
1976: 146). 
Jewish women-*s publications and organisations thus 
represented women in a contradictory and complex 
manner; this provided an irrepresible alternative 
aspect to Poland's social memory which was to be later 
recalled by more recent feminist organisations. 
The interwar period- also saw the establishment of 
public institutions in the form of women's communes 
and communities. These disrupted the usual gendered 
private\public divisions, in different ways according 
to their political orientation. Some of these communes 
were Roman Catholic retreats, in the form of convents, 
in which the nuns did not wear habits and usually 
worked outside the community (Women's House Cracow, 
personal communication: 1989). Others, more 
interestingly, were women's communities established by 
unions to meet the needs of the growing number of 
single women entering the industrial workforce in the 
interwar years. The Cracow House of Women, for 
example, was founded in 1934 by the Polish Postal 
Union for its growing number of women workers. Its 
rules stated that the House was only for single women 
who were economically independent and without children 
or other dependents. In the interwar years, according 
to one elderly member who had lived there since the 
1930s, the women would pool their money, cook and eat 
communally. The women campaigned in local factories 
and would cook and distribute food for the poor 
(Women's Housde Cracow, Personal Communication: 1989). 
f 
106 
The community gave great emphasis at that time to the 
development of a separate women's cultural and 
political space. It encouraged women to paint and 
write, to learn about women's culture, and organized 
political debates and talks. Importantly, such 
communities went against the representation of women 
as acceptable in the public sphere only as mothers. 
The community, said another elderly member of the 
House: 'gave single women a sense of identity, a sense 
of worth, in a society which deemed single women 
unimportant. ' (Women's House Cracow, -personal 
communications: 1989). By the late 1930s, however, the 
junta began to outlaw many political groups, including 
women's organizations which had pacifist elements to 
them. In 1938 the Ukrainian Women's Union and the 
Communist Women's Section were raided by the Polish 
police. The leading members of both organizations were 
arrested and imprisoned. The organizations themselves 
were made illegal. (Bohachevsky-Chomiak, 1985: 96) 
During the Nazi occupation of Poland, in the Second 
World War, the struggle for national liberation again 
became the dominant goal amongst underground groups. 
It became the main aim, for example, of the People's 
Union of Women, an illegal movement which worked with 
the Peasant Battalions in the Polish countryside. A 
few women did gain top positions in mixed underground 
organizations, such as Wanda Wasilewska who was chair 
of the Polish Patriots Union and Malgorzata Fornalska 
who was on the central committee of the Polish 
Worker's Party (Siemienska, 1986: 16). These women, 
along with others who worked as stretcher bearers, 
messengers, printers and teachers died because of 
their political activities (Siemienska, 1986: 15). 
During the war periodicals and newspapers provided a 
particular kind of voice for women. Zofia Sokol argues 
that between 1942 and 1945 there were nine womens 
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publications which represented the needs of women 
under occupation and which have been ignored by 
scholars of the period (Sokol, 1995: 94). Some women's 
communes, however, such as the Women's House in Cracow 
continued with their activities after the Second World 
War (Reading, 1992: 166-173). 
3.8 Continuity and dissonance in the historical 
representations of gender 
In this chapter I outlined the historical background 
to representations of Polish women and their place in 
the public sphere. What I hope I have indicated is 
that an important factor in Poland"s history for 
gender representation and the public sphere is its 
troubled status as a nation state. The partitioning of 
Poland and the struggle for recognition of its 
national identity and the identities of different 
ethnic groups within this point to particular 
developments in terms of gender relations, and 
especially the representation of women publicly. I 
argued that before the partitions it seems that wives 
were allowed a public voice, but not single women. 
This embryonic beginning of the political recognition 
of women was effectively prevented from gaining a hold 
since the partitions crushed the establishment of the 
Enlightenment in Poland. The partitions had another 
effect in terms of gender representation in the public 
sphere. The destruction of the state meant that Polish 
women became the vessels of Polish national culture 
and language. This gendered articulation of Polish 
culture was embodied in the representation of woman as 
Mother Poland (Matka Polka), in which self-sacrifice, 
loss and emptiness are dominant values. 
In terms of the main spheres of employment for women 
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in the 19th century we saw that these were, in many 
respects, similar to the kind of changes seen in other 
countries in Europe which were experiencing 
industrialization. Similar also was the fact that the 
19th century set the pattern for women entering the 
workforce as unskilled labor, and with overall levels 
of renumeration between one third and one half of 
those for men. What was different, perhaps, was the 
extent to which women from the landed gentry were 
after the partitions increasingly required to become 
economically active and thus entered the new urban 
workforce. This in turn, 'as we saw, in some areas led 
to the initiation of campaigns by women for education 
and enfranchisement: basic rights of representation 
within the public sphere. 
Nevertheless, the partitions to some extent 
circumscribed women's activities in the underground 
political movements in which the struggle for national 
identity usually took priority over women's particular 
struggles for public representation and arguments for 
gender equality. Despite these factors, however, there 
did develop clandestine public spaces for women. 
Particular contradictions such as those of class and 
ethnicity and the heterogeneous and dialectical 
relationship between nationalism, feminism and 
socialism in Poland made it possible for women at 
particular moments to organize and make themselves 
visible. In some instances women even reversed 
nationalistic discourses to give public voice to 
women's demands. 
The recognition of equal rights in 1918 and equal 
suffrage in 1919, along with the reestablishment of 
Poland as a nation state,, had a limited impact on 
women's lives. The interwar period, however, is 
interesting in a number of other respects. One is the 
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alliances that the different strands of the feminist 
movement in, Poland made with the dominant political 
forces of the day in order to forward women's rights. 
This is contiguous with the suggestion by some 
commentators that the Pilsudski regime courted women 
activists and the feminist movements in order to 
bolster its hegemony. 
Parts Two and Three seek to establish whether the 
social inheritance of the formation of political right 
in Poland and the particular manner in which 
historically the public sphere was (en)gendered is 
remembered in the ways in women were represented by 
the post-second world war Communist regime in the 
official public sphere. Then, whether, this was in 
turn remembered in terms of the strategies later 
developed by the opposition movement, Solidarity, 
which drew on aspects of the country's social 
inheritance. Finally, I examine particular aspects of 
Poland's socially inherited memory in the articulation 
of the public sphere in the 1980s and 1990s as shown 
through the representation of women in Polish 
television, and particularly the ways in which they 
are now embodied within media policy. 
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Part Two: 
Socially Inherited Memory Under State Capitalism 
ill 
Chapter 4 
Womenfs Representation in the Public Sphere between 
1945-79 
"Some of the problems of Communism are not the 
problems of Communism itself. I don, t think 
intolerance and parochialism were invented by the 
Communists. The Polish stance has always been a 
defensive one because it is a country ruled by 
fear, not by popular consent. 11 (Ewa Bednarowicz, 
Personal Communication, 1991) 
4.1 Introduction 
In Part One I discussed the theoretical concept of 
socially inherited memory. This was then related 
empirically to a discussion of the conscious and 
repressed stories of political right in the Polish 
language, and, to historical developments during the 
partition years and in between the wars. In Part Two 
I examine the period leading up to Poland's recent 
transition in terms of how women were both represented 
(Chapter 4) and re-presented in Polish society 
(Chapter 5). In the next two chapters I attempt to 
demonstrate how Poland's socially inherited memory was 
articulated historically in (en)gendering the public 
sphere and how gendered elements resonated within key 
media aspects under state capitalism between 1945 and 
1979. In Chapter Four I examine how particular 
representations of female political activity developed 
during the period of Poland's identity formation as a 
nation state were recalled, articulated and re- 
articulated by the Communists at different times to 
bolster the Party led drive for economic 
industrialization. Further, how a key part of this was 
the legacy of the annihilation of the majority of 
Poland"s ethnic population. The social amnesia and 
remembering which followed the holocaust in Poland had 
particular consequences, I argue, for the 
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representation of women in the public sphere. Thus in 
this Chapter I begin by establishing the legacy of the 
war in terms of Poland's ethnic minorities, with a 
particular focus on its bequest in terms of the 
genocide against Poland's Jews. This, I argue, 
interlocked with Poland's social inheritance after the 
war of Soviet gender policies and may have influenced 
the ways in which, subsequently, women were publicly 
represented under state capitalism in Communist 
policies, in politics, in workplace structures and in 
education. This argument is then explored further in 
Chapter 5 in relation to restrictive cultural policies 
and gendered re-presentations in cultural production. 
4.2 The Jews and Poland's Social Amnesia 
The crucial aspect to Poland"s social inheritance 
after World War Two was the legacy of the mass murder 
of 3 million Jews and other ethnic groups by the 
Germans. This, as well as the campaign of mass 
deportation by the Soviets during the war, combined 
with national border changes in the post-war 
settlement meant that Poland was virtually ethnically 
homogenous after 1945. As Norman Davies points out, 
the ethnic conflicts experienced before the War were 
not actually resolved in Poland they were silenced 
through virtual destruction (1993: 238). Krystyna 
Kersten-Pawelszapiro argues that this had a profound 
effect on national consciousness: 
The stereotype imposed by the Nazi racist 
selection criteria was absorbed into the 
consciousness of all living through the day-to- 
day realities of occupation. Even with full 
awareness of the criminality of these criteria 
and with their complete rejecting in theory, it 
was difficult to ignore them since they defined 
the fate of individuals: they divided society 
into those who were condemned to immediate 
execution and those for whom this sentence was 
suspended, allowing them to live for a while. 
(1993: 461) 
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Whilst the few remaining Jews welcomed the post-war 
settlement, hoping it would bring equalityl many Poles 
in contrast feared the Soviet empire and everything it 
represented (Kersten-Pawelszapiro, 1993: 461). At the 
same time the effect of the holocaust it seems for 
Poles was that the aspect of social memory which was 
easily recalled was the martyrdom of Poles and their 
heroic and dramatic efforts at resistance (Kersten- 
Pawelszapiro, 1993: 463). But, what for years remained 
unspoken was the fact that the majority of Poles did 
nothing and were passive witnesses to the Nazi outrage 
(1993: 463). If we take further the argument of the 
pschychiatrist Judith Herman (1993) that there is a 
connection between the remembering of public and 
private trauma, this makes sense of this social 
amnesia. Polishý society, having witnessed horrific 
political trauma locked this into a separate part of 
its socially inherited memory. The collective 
experience was repressed because it was so horrible it 
was unspeakable and, short term, may have threatened 
the survival of the 'nation' if recalled and spoken. 
Longer term though the consequences for the nation was 
that, as with other aspects of socially inherited 
memory, repressed memories found ways to speak through 
social symptoms or reenactments of traumatic events. 
Thus aspects of the holocaust were reenacted in the 
form of what Kersten-Pawelszapiro aptly calls the 
'March Inheritance' of 1968 in which the government 
hate campaign against Jews led to the exodus of 25, 
000 Jewish people (1993: 465). It was also reenacted 
in the stereotype of Jews that developed after the war 
despite their virtual annihilation. The Jew as the 
alien, hostile to the Polish nation was reenacted 
under state capitalism in terms of the Jewish 
Communist hostile to both the development of a truly 
socialist society and the Polish nation (Kersten- 
Pawelszapiro, 1993: 463-4). As Isaac Lewin notes, in 
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the period between the wars: I there was too little 
time to develop an image of a Jew who was a citizen, 
consistent with the land's thousand year historical 
tradition' (1985: 34). The murder of virtually the 
entire Jewish population and other ethnic groups meant 
that there was a social vacuum in terms of labour, 
particularly in- the cities and amongst the 
intelligentsia (Davies, 1993; Kersten-Pawelszapiro, 
1993; Lewin, 1985). Richard Lucas in out of the 
Inferno: Poles Remember the Holocaust notes that the 
Nazi's murdered 45 per cent of the country's doctors 
and dentists, 30 per cent of technicians, -57 per cent 
of lawyers and many leading journalists (Lucas cited 
by Richmond, 1995: 485). This had a devastating 
effect on Poland's public elites, which interlocked 
with the other crucial aspect to Poland after the war: 
the inheritance from the Soviet Union of a particular 
articulation of the private and public in terms of 
gender relations. This inheritance from the Soviet 
Union itself had, resonance with certain aspects of 
Poland's own traditions of female political activity. 
This, quite crudely, may have plugged the public gap. 
In the next section I examine whether this was indeed 
the case. 
4.3 The legal position of women 
The People's Republic of Poland set up in 1946 by the 
ruling Polish United Worker's Party (PUWP) based its 
new laws and constitutional rights on Marxist-Leninist 
principles. Essentially, its establishment as a state 
capitalist country meant that in addition to the 
stories of political right developed during the 19th 
century and independence, the country socially 
inherited the memory of legal gender equality 
established previously in the Soviet Union in the 
1920s and 1930s. On paper, at least, as in the rest 
of Central and Eastern Europe, the situation for women 
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with regard to civil rights became far superior to 
those rights granted women in the West and ahead of 
similar provisions laid down by the UN. ' 
The Constitution of 22 July 1952 guaranteed women's 
equality in all spheres of life and ensured provision 
for those services necessary to make this possible, 
such as creche and nursery facilities and public 
restaurants. The Family and Guardianship Code of 1964 
to some extent went further in that it stipulated that 
there should also be equity in the household and 
family arrangements. The Code established the legality 
of divorce on the single grounds of "a complete and 
lasting decomposition of marriage" or battery. other 
key policies in relation to gender equality included 
the 1975 Alimony Fund which regulated maintenance of 
ex-partners after divorce (Morgan, 1984: 556), the 
legalization of abortion in 1956 and its 
liberalization in 1960 which made termination free and 
available on request during the first three months of 
pregnancy. The law also established that a three day 
leave from work be available to women who had 
undergone the operation for abortion (Morgan, 
1984: 558). Homosexuality was not legally effected 
under the Communist regime; it was made legal before 
the Communists came to power in 1932. The new 
government did not change this. Incest was made 
illegal under the 1964 Penal Code (Article 175) and 
was punishable by up to 5 years penal servitude. The 
same Code also established that rape was a criminal 
offence with up to 10 years imprisonment for 
' In Czechoslovakia, the Constitution of II July 1960, Article 20 states: 'Men and women shaU have 
equal status in the family, at work and in public activity". Article 27 states: "the equal status of women in the 
family shall be secured by special adjustment of working conditions and special health care during pregnancy 
and maternity, as well as by the development of facilities and services which will enable women to fuUy 
participate in the life of society. " In Hungary, Law XLIH, 1948, forbade discrimination against women in 
public employment. After 1956, the legal equality of women was reaffirmed by a new Civil Code promulgated 
by Law IV, 1959. 
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offenders. Domestic violence was illegal under general 
family battery laws with imprisonment for offenders up 
to five years (Morgan, 1984: 559). Poland was a 
signatory to the United Nations Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms Of Discrimination Against 
Women ratified in 1980 (Leven, 1994: 28). This 
included the stipulation that all measures should be 
taken to eliminate discrimination against women in all 
areas of life, including cultural, political and 
public life (part 2, Article 7) and the elimination of 
"any stereotyped concept of the roles of men and women 
at all levels" (part 3, Article 10). Further, under 
part 1 Article 5 state parties must take all 
appropriate measures to: 
modify the social and cultural patterns of 
conduct of men and women, with a view to 
achieving the elimination of prejudices and 
customary and all other practices which are based 
on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority 
of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles 
for men and women. (Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 
1989: 7) 
Signatories to the convention agreed that 11... the 
full and complete development of a country, the 
welfare of the world and the cause of peace require 
the maximum participation of women on equal terms with 
men in all fields. " (Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 1989: 1) 
4.4 The Theoretical Position of Women 
In principle it may seem that the legal position of 
women in Poland was a remarkably privileged one which 
would surely provide the foundations necessary to 
facilitate true gender equality. However, according to 
Barbara Einhorn, who takes the position, like many 
Western feminists, that Poland was a "state socialist" 
country, the new regimes of, Eastern Europe inherited 
from the Soviet Union a set of principles with regard 
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to women that were fundamentally flawed. These 
underlying principles to women's statutory equality, 
theoretically, included those contained in Engel's 
statement on the origins of the family that the 
emancipation of women is possible only when they are 
able to participate in large scale production 
processes and when domestic activities are converted 
into public industry (Engels, 1977: 152). The new 
gender laws of Poland thus socially recalled the 
Soviet tendency to privilege the public sphere over 
the private sphere and thus ignored the fundamental 
contradictions between women's productive and 
reproductive roles. This resulted in the subordination 
of social to economic goals in discussions of the 
family (Einhorn, 1994: 31). If we examine closely the 
relevant clauses relating to gender in Poland's 
Constitution of 22 July 1952 we f ind that it was 
women's public role that was emphasized. What was 
stressed was that women were to have equal rights in 
all areas of the public arena: 
1. Women in the Polish People's Republic have 
equal rights with men in all spheres of state, 
political, economic, social and cultural life. 
2. The equality of women is guaranteed by: (1) an 
equal right with men to work and pay according to 
the principal equal pay for equal work; the right 
to rest and social insurance, to education, to 
honours and distinctions and the holding of 
public office (2) Care for mother and child, 
protection of expectant mothers, paid holiday 
during the period before and after confinement, 
the development of a network of maternity, homes, 
crbches and nursery schools and the extension of 
a network of service establishments and communal 
eating places. (3) The Polish People's Republic 
strengthens the position of women in society, 
especially of mothers and women who work 
professionally. (Article 78) 
Yet, there are a number of problems with this 
constitutional guarantee of equality. Firstly, where 
gender equality is guaranteed separately from human 
equality the implication is that we are sexual beings 
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first and humans second. Secondly, there is the 
assumption that rights alone provide a guarantee for 
equality. There is no sense that rights require the 
will and means to uphold them; there is no clear 
indication where the responsibility lies for upholding 
such rights; or, any recourse to legal and penal 
sanction should such rights be contravened and the 
equivalent of 'civil death' occur. The implication of 
the Polish Constitution is that the responsibility, if 
it lies anywhere, for gender equality lies with the 
state's protection and strengthening of the 'position 
of women in society'. Whilst the wider 
responsibilities certainly may rest with society and 
the state, the individual human dimension should not 
be ignored. Thirdly, following on from this, there is 
no mention of men's role in human reproduction (both 
biologically and socially); it is as if women 
reproduced through pathogenesis. Thus parenting is 
reduced to mothering. Fourthly, the implication is 
that public\state provision for previously private 
concerns, such as child care and daily sustenance, 
will resolve the double burden faced by women. This 
f orgets the f act that these matters need to be of 
human concern to engender equality. It also reduces 
reproduction entirely to the functional and economic. 
Whilst Marx could, in his wisdom, see that, ideally, 
work is something that should allow the human spirit 
to grow and flourish, somehow this emotional and 
spiritual side to the human reproductive role was 
forgotten. 
However, as Einhorn indicates 'this is not to assert 
that gendered divisions of labour within the family 
were never questioned' (1994: 28). In some Eastern Bloc 
countries Family Codes were introduced in the 1960s 
which attempted to provide for both equality in terms 
of rights within the family and for responsibilities 
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within the family. In Poland, the Family and 
Guardianship Code emphasized the need for equality in 
the private sphere; the interdependent relationship 
between the private and public spheres; as well as the 
possible role of both men and women in both spheres: 
Both partners in matrimony are obligated each 
according to his\her power and earning 
possibilities to contribute to the satisfaction 
of the needs of the family which they founded 
with their union. This obligation may also be met 
in whole or in part by personal efforts to bring 
up the children and by work in the common 
household. 
There are several key dimensions which were forgotten 
here and which thus ensured the continuance of gender 
inequalities. The first was the sexual and emotional 
aspects of. family life. The assumption was that human 
beings only created relationships with each other for 
economic means; that family unions were solely 
functional affairs. This tendency, according to 
Rowbotham, had its roots in the early. suppression in 
Soviet society of the idea that love would provide a 
basis for Communism, as well as the functionalist 
tendencies of Marxist theory (Rowbotham, 1993). 
It also has precedents within the social memory of 
Poland itself in terms of the positivism that 
developed in response to the failure of the 
insurrections in the 1860s. it recalls the 
representations of Jewish men at that time who were 
depicted as having a positive public role to play, but 
only in terms of their economic function or 
contribution to capitalist Poland (Thesis, p. 75). It 
also recalls aspects of earlier twentieth century 
social ist-f eminist discourse, which itself was part of 
the Enlightenment tradition that privileged the 
rational over the emotional, the public over the 
private (see Pateman, 1988; Fraser, 1990; Okin, 1980). 
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In Women and Economics for example, Charlotte 
Perkins Gilman advocated communal kitchens, day 
nurseries and public dining rooms as a logical 
progression towards a more equal society through the 
specialization and rationalization of society. As 
early as 1898 she argued: 
Eating is an individual function. Cooking is a 
social function. Neither is in the faintest 
degree a family function. That we have found it 
convenient in early stages of civilization to do 
our cooking at home proves no more than the 
allied fact that we have also found it convenient 
in such stages to do our weaving and spinning at 
home, as our soap and candle-making, our 
butchering and pickling, our baking and washing 
(Gilman, 1972: 243). 
What was forgotten here was any sense that we do not 
eat simply because we are hungry or share a meal 
simply because it is convenient; we do not even 
butcher the pig simply because we require its meat. We 
kill the pig to dance with our neighbours; we share 
our meals for human contact; we eat to fill not only 
the hole in our bellies but the hole in our hearts. 
The memory of this aspect of collective human life is 
entirely missing from the ways in which equality was 
to be guaranteed in People's Poland. Feminists other 
than Charlotte Perkins Gilman were well aware that 
improvements to people's lives involved not only the 
recognition of their material needs but also their 
spiritual needs: hence the cry for Bread and Roses - 
a call for wage equity and access to the beautiful 
aspects of lif e denied to so many working class men as 
well as women. ' However, as Einhorn points out, it was 
the approach which emphasized the economic functions 
' Ile slogan comes from a strike by 20,000 textile workers in Lawrence, Massachusetts in 1912. The 
strikers were mostly women and children protesting against poverty wages and inhumane living and working 
conditions. Tle banners during the strike stated: 'We Want Bread and Roses, Too'. Ile strike and the slogan 
were made into the song still popular today, a version of which on 'Honor Thy Woman Self. Songs of 
Liberation' is available in the Fawcett Library, London. 
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of the family which formed the basis of Marxist 
orthodoxy by the time of the establishment of Soviet 
society and which was then socially inherited by the 
regimes of Eastern Europe (Einhorn, 1994: 30). The 
result was collective amnesia about those aspects of 
family life fundamental to human reproduction: the 
state failed to remember that its people needed love, 
respect, sex and beauty as much as food, a roof and a 
school. 
The second aspect of Polandts socially inherited 
memory which was recalled by the new state capitalist 
regime was the emphasis given to the importance of the 
family and a family formed by two people of both 
sexes. There was no sense that marriage as a legal 
property arrangement,, locating women and men 
differently within it (as discussed in Chapter 2) 
might not have a place in socialist society. 3 What was 
not recalled was the sense that there were other kinds 
of union or communities which had existed before the 
war (see Chapter 3) and certainly after 1945. The 
Woments House in Kracow, for example, continued to 
provide communal women-only housing after 1945, 
despite the radical political changes. According to my 
sources there were known lesbian relationships and 
covert '-female friendships, ' (Women"s House Kracow, 
Personal Communication, 1989). Such legislative 
heterosexism,, theorists such as Adrienne Rich have 
argued, provides for one of the fundamental bases of 
an unequal society. Compulsory adherence to 
heterosexuality constitutes a political institution 
advancing the social dominance of men (Rich, 1980: 
' Under state capitalism, the marriage ceremony in Poland and the wording of the vows the couple 
made were virtually identical to those in the UK. T'he one difference was that the couple promiý to uphold 
the principles of the socialist family and bring up their children in the spirit of Marxist-Leninism. (Marriage 
Ceremony, Lodz Palace of Weddings, July 31,1990) 
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635-400) .' 
In these respects public policy designed to regulate 
gender equality after World War Two established the 
basis for the continuance of exclusion of women in the 
public sphere. This was because the state drew on not 
only aspects of the Soviet Union's social inheritance 
but also its own tradition of 19th century Positivism 
to fill the public vacuum left by the annihilation of 
its ethnic population. However, these aspects of 
social inheritance were themselves part of the much 
broader social inheritance of the Enlightenment in 
which the public function of human beings was 
separated from the private and then prioritized over 
other aspects of human life. In the next section we 
shall see whether the effect of this was in fact to 
include women in the work force, politics and 
education. Or, whether in fact the repression of 
aspects of Poland's social inheritance, such as the 
social amnesia concerning aspects of the holocaust and 
the "private' dimensions of human life were to provide 
for exclusion and ghettoisation. 
4.5 Representation of Women in Education and the 
Workplace 
Immediately after World War Two, Poland, like other 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe, underwent 
large-scale industrialization. Private banks and 
private industrial property became the property of the 
Polish state. People sold their labour to the state, 
rather than private employers; the state controlled, 
organized, and planned the manufacture and production, 
4 Radical feminists such as Andrea Dworkin would go a step further arguing that the norm of 
Western societies is seemingly heterosexuality 'because most men are fixated on women as sexual objects; but, 
in fact, we live in a homosexual society because all transactions of power, authority and authenticity take place 
among men ... heterosexuality, which can be defined as the sexual dominance of men over women, is like an 
acorn - from it grows the mighty oak of the male homosexual society' (Dworldn, 1976: 104) 
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distribution, and sale of goods and labour (Harman, 
1988: 27-32). These industrial developments in the 
country required an expansion of the workforce. 
Western countries, also experiencing labour shortages, 
drew on labour from their colonies. In Poland, the 
state saw that its own labour shortage, caused by the 
losses of the war, could be fulfilled by an increase 
in the number of women workers (Sokolowska, 1977: 358). 
one of the first steps the new government took was to 
implement educational programmes to encourage women 
into the industrial workforce. A national literacy 
programme was established which was especially 
beneficial for women, since theyýformed the majority 
of Poland's illiterates. A campaign to get women into 
further and higher education was also implemented. 
Evening classes provided supplementary training for 
women entering new roles (Muszalski, 1982: 127). Anna 
Szymanska-Kwiatkowska,, Member of the Seym and then 
Editor-in-Chief of Kobiety i Zvcie (Women and Life) 
asserted that the only 'unquestionable achievement of 
the communist period is the fact that women were 
educated' (Personal Communication, 1990). Women 
entered all levels of education in unprecedented 
numbers (Siemienska, 1991: 108). Before 1939 women 
constituted just under one third of those in higher 
education (Zollinger-Giele and Chapman-Smock, 
1977: 361). Between 1950 and 1980 the number of women 
with higher educational qualifications increased 
nearly six-fold; the number with secondary vocational 
and post-secondary school education rose more than 
five times; the number with secondary vocational 
education rose three fold (Niedzielska, 1985: 16). " 
Polish women after 1945 began to fill the places left 
" The dominance of women in higher education was a feature of all East European countries, 
according to Einhorn (1994: 12). 
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by Poland's educated Jewish population. Many Polish 
men, in contrast, were not educated to the same extent 
because the highest paid jobs were in manual work 
rather than white collar work (Bednarowicz, personal 
communication, 1990). Further, education, like the 
workplace structures women were to enter, excluded 
women from some areas whilst over-including them in 
others. Teacher training, languages and the arts in 
1970\72 had-an average ratio of three women students 
to one man. Technical subjects in contrast had on 
average one woman student to three men (derived from 
Siemienska, 1990: Table 6.6.65). 
The Polish United Workers Party established state 
child care in the form of crbches, daily and weekly 
play groups and nursery schools. There were 
residential homes for children from one-parent 
families and for those children whose parents worked 
shifts: children would be cared for by the state home 
from Monday to Friday (Miczkowski, 1985: 258). State 
run restaurants were established to provide cheap 
meals for families to which workers were given meal 
vouchers as part of their renumeration. 
Despite these mechanisms to' include women in 'the 
workforce this was combined immediately after the War 
with the retention of the 1932 law an abortion which 
banned abortion except when the pregnancy endangered 
a woman's health, or was the result of a criminal act 
(Fuszara, 1993 : 241). The law according to Fuszara was 
retained for demographic reasons. It was felt that the 
loss of population suffered during the hostilities 
needed to be made up' (Fuszara, 1993: 242). This was 
part of a process by which particular mechanisms into 
certain aspects of the public sphere'were changed by 
the state to meet the labour needs of capital. This is 
more clearly illustrated by analysing the shifts in 
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these mechanisms, noted by scholars, over the 
following three decades. 
In the 1950s, the political thaw that followed 
Stalin's death led to new discussions relating to 
women and abortion rights. A commission was 
established in 1956 under the Ministry of Health to 
investigate the situation for women wanting 
terminations. The Commission argued that a new law was 
required to prevent back street abortions and to 
protect womens health. Subsequently,, the new act 
passed by the Sejm in 1956 stated in its preamble that 
it was to prevent 'abortions in unsuitable conditions 
by non physicians'. Abortion was to be permitted on 
the following grounds: medical reasons, if the 
pregnancy resulted from a criminal act and most 
importantly if the pregnant woman has 'difficult 
living conditions'. The latter clause effectively gave 
women the right to abortion on request, since doctors 
based their assessments on a patients own assessment 
of their condition (Fuszara, 1993: 242). The reversal 
of the 1932 Law, according to Hauser, Heyns and 
Mansbridge, had a dramatic effect on working class 
women's lives: abortion became the main form of 
contraception, with other forms easily available only 
to members of the nomenclature ( 1993: 260). People I 
interviewed in the contemporary Polish feminist groups 
have argued differently, however. one interviewee, 
Janina Suska-Jankowska, the chairperson of the Lodz 
Women's League, for example, maintained that family 
planning and forms of contraception were, before 1989, 
available on request and provided free of charge 
(Personal Communication, 1990). Lecturer and feminist 
Ewa Bednarowicz said: 
I don't buy the stock Polish excuses that 
contraceptives are not available. It's just that 
I believe a lot of Polish women for patriotic 
procreative reasons refuse to develop a sense of 
self, responsibility and so on ... this is a 
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sexually squeamish nation and abortions are the 
simplest method of birth control, if only because 
you are knocked out and it's not really you doing 
the dirty work or you preventing the birth from 
happening, but somebody else. (Personal 
Communication, 1990). 
This would, nevertheless, seem to support the argument 
that the social inheritance of the Soviet story of 
political right and the broader inheritance of the 
Enlightenment with its emphasis on the public rational 
function of human beings was detrimental to equality. 
The interviewee suggests that women themselves 
embedded within social memory repressed their private 
relationship to their own bodies and submitted to the 
attempts at territorialization by the Polish state. 
Such territorialization of women's bodies also recalls 
the interwar literature representations of womens 
bodies to be 'taken', undressed and used (See Chapter 
3: 80). 
Nevertheless, by the late 1950s there had been a 
decline in the Polish birth rate. This led to f ears of 
af uture labour shortage. Subsequently, the state 
implemented measures which effectively switched the 
mechanisms of inclusion, which had allowed women into 
the workforce, back again. Resources for crbches were 
reduced: wages and family allowances were increased. 
The government emphasized women**s f amily role 
(Adamski, 1980: 213-14). Over the following decade the 
state attempted to regulate these mechanisms so that 
the flow of female labour was more evenly balanced. In 
1968, one year unpaid upbringing leaves were 
introduced (Niedzielska, 1985: 32). By the 1970s the 
birth rate had declined even further. This 
precipitated further pro-natalist policies making it 
more difficult for women to work in the paid labour 
sphere and easier to fulfill their traditional roles 
as wives and mothers. In 1972 unpaid upbringing leaves 
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were extended to three years (Niedzielska, 1985: 32). 
This was reinforced in the 1980s with the 
introduction, at Solidarity's request (see Chapter 7) 
of paid upbringing leaves for parents with children 
aged from birth to three years old (Adamski, 
1980: 214). In Poland, in contrast to other East 
European Countries6: 'policy wavered from pro-natalist 
to pro-workerist measures, with the result that there 
was never sufficient public childcare provision to 
meet more than a fraction of demand' (Einhorn, 
1994: 13). 
The result was that women entered the workforce in 
unprecedented numbers in the late 1940s and 1950s 
(Siemienska, 1991: 108). However, first of all, they 
entered professions which tended to be extensions of 
their established private roles such as education, 
culture and health (Siemienska, 1986: 5-35). Secondly, 
within the gender ghettoized workforce women 
continued to be excluded horizontally from the elite 
of the professional ladder. For example, despite women 
in the education profession being in the majority, 
they remained virtually excluded from the higher 
echelons of the profession: in 1970 whilst 37.2 
percent of University assistants were women 7 only 8.3 
percent were Professors (Rocznik Statystczny Polski, 
1990: 477). Similarly, in the work place structures of 
periodicals and newspapers top positions remained in 
the hands of men, even with women's magazines. Zofia 
Sokol describes how the position of editor-in-chief of 
9 selected women's periodicals between the years 1944- 
82 was in the majority of cases held by men (1991: 87- 
6 In the GDR for example more consistent policies in relation to reproduction resulted in an effective 
mixture of freely available childcare and nursery places, adequate contraception, and ongoing abortion rights. 
This provided women with the necessary facilities to make real choices about having children and returning to 
paid employment after the birth. (See Einhorn, 1994: 12) 
" Assistant in Poland is the lowest rank signiýing someone teaching and writing a doctoral thesis. 
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98). This recalls the linguistic value of women in 
Polish who will always, no matter what, be worth less 
than any man (see Chapter 2). 
The other crucial aspect to post-war Poland was that 
many women were still in fact as the word Ikobietal 
remembers - "keepers of the pig-swill" (Chapter 2) 
since the country remained a predominantly rural 
peasant society. Out of a population of 35,525,000 in 
the late 1970s (Titkow, 1984: 555) there was a rural 
population of 15-16 million people (Hann, 1985: vii). 
In most other Eastern Bloc countries peasant culture 
was broken up by collectivisation by the Communist 
regimes, but, in Poland 80 percent of land remained in 
private hands (Adamski, 1980: 218). The Polish United 
Workers Party, after the War, in order to increase its 
base of support, passed a series of reforms which gave 
land to people who had previously been hired farm 
hands. The plots distributed were very small. The 
Polish State owned the rest of the land in the form of 
state run cooperatives. All produce whether from 
cooperative or private sources was sold and 
distributed through state run cooperatives (Hann, 
1985). Through a system of state credits and loans 
agricultural mechanisation was encouraged. However, 
the system rapidly became corrupt, with priority given 
to those with Party credibility. The system also did 
little to assist the poorest peasants who could not 
afford the journey to local Party Administrative 
Unit's up to 30 kilometres away from isolated rural 
villages. The result was that even the most basic 
agricultural machinery, such as tractors and combine 
harvesters, was only available to a small peasant 
elite, whilst on the majority of tiny plots work was 
done by hand and with ancient machinery (Hann, 1985). 
Whether farms were mechanized or not, women were worse 
off. Farmers who successfully introduced mechanization 
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became isolated from other peasants since they had to 
break the tradition of cooperation in which peasants 
readily gave each other labour during periods of heavy 
work. As one peasant family pointed out, a tractor 
cannot be lent out in the same way since the 
recipients cannot hope to return the labour in kind 
(jakubczak Family, Personal Communication, 1990). 
Whilst successful male farmers gained status from this 
self-reliance, women, according to research, did not. 
Successful women would be described as Ichytrel- 
crafty and keen on material gain: 'it is they who are 
more isolated, who must pay the penalty for breaking 
with traditional values, while their husbands may gain 
prestige' (Hann, 1985: 155). 
More than 60 percent of divorced and separated women 
worked on the land (Morgan, 1984: 556); combined with 
this was the fact that many men on smaller farms often 
had two jobs, one on the farm and one in the town in 
order to make ends meet (Adamski , 1980: 218). The 
result was that many women found themselves running 
farms virtually single-handedly (Tryfan, 1987: 70). On 
small farms women would have to plough by themselves 
(Danuta Jakubczak, Personal Communication: 1990). In 
most cases such women would work more than 12 hours 
per day (Tryfan, 1987: 14) and usually seven days a 
week with just af ew hours of f on Sundays, as one 
interviewee described: 
I, get up at 6 a. m. milk the cows, then I lead the 
cows to the pasture and about 8 a. m., we have 
breakfast. Since we had our house redecorated 
some time has to be devoted to cleaning the 
house. Then I go to work in the f ield and come 
back about mid-day to milk the cows again. In the 
afternoon I do shopping or work at home until 10 
p. m. The cows must be milked again in the evening 
about 9 p. m., during the harvest the day is 
different. On Sundays I have time for myself 
(Danuta Jakubczak, Personal Communication, 1990). 
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Despite shouldering an increasing burden of . work, 
rural women, like their urban counterparts, were 
excluded f rom sharing the same economic and social 
positions as men. In 1980 women constituted 46 percent 
of the total agricultural work force yet made up only 
31 percent of those employed in state agriculture 
(Morgan, 1984: 556). The majority of women working in 
agriculture were like the peasant women of the 19th 
century (see Chapter 3) since they worked 
predominantly as unpaid family members (Tryfan, 
1987: 14). In rural political and administrative 
structures very few women gained positions of power. 
Tryfan's survey of women and rural life in Poland in 
the post-war years revealed that under state 
capitalism for every one woman manager in agriculture 
there were fourteen men managing cooperatives or state 
enterprises (Tryfan, 1987: 14). As in the cities, the 
higher the position in the administrative structures 
the fewer women were found (Tryfan, 1987: 40). Research 
on villages in Bieszczardy in the South East of Poland 
showed similar gender bias: 
The persons who enjoy above average prestige and 
esteem in the village, apart from the teachers, 
are those who have demonstrated their competence 
as farmers. Normally these will be the persons 
invited to the gmina officials to stand for the 
local council, and one of them is likely to be 
vested with the powers of village headman. These 
are invariably male (Hann, 1985: 93). 
Hann, *s study A Village without Solidarity, Polish 
Peasants in Years of Crisis revealed that the 
continuation of private peasant holdings under the 
state capitalist regime in Poland was a significant 
factor in the persistence of traditional gender 
attitudes in rural areas. Hann argues that the 
retention of private property meant that patronymy and 
the preference for male babies to keep property in the 
male line remained. In the small villages around 
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Sanok, where part of Hann's study was conducted, there 
was only one instance where a farm had been inherited 
by a daughter. However, stated Hann, after the young 
woman's marriage to a former logger, formal ownership 
of the farm she had inherited was signed over to her 
husband (Hann, 1985: 137). As in many rural societies, 
large families were still favoured as a form, 'of 
security in old age. The introduction of state pension 
schemes did little to change this tradition. Thus, in 
addition to their largely unpaid farm work, after the 
war, women remained bound to their traditional roles 
as wives and mothers: 
Marriage is seldom delayed beyond the early 
twenties for women; those who marry locally 
seldom see any reason to delay starting a family; 
pregnancy remains a common reason for getting 
married (Hann, 1985: 136). 
Poland's economic crises in the 1970s led to serious 
cuts in public services and the closure of many 
village amenities such as village halls and local 
libraries. The consumption of vodka, a traditional 
part of Polish rural culture, increased rapidly during 
this time with per capita consumption one of the 
highest in Europe (Malinowska, 1985: 3). Alcoholism 
continued to rise, with cheap wine used as an 
alternative when vodka was rationed (Malinowska, 1985: 
5). Alcohol consumption was far greater amongst rural 
men because rural tradition saw male drinking as a 
positive sign of manliness, but female drinking as a 
negative detraction from femininity (Hann, 1985: 130). 
Alcohol related violence and abuse were found to be an 
established pattern of life. This had a particular 
impact on women, as Hann points out: "women are 
certainly abused and many children must be permanently 
affected* (Hann, 1985: 130). 
Overall the ef f ects of state capitalism on women in 
Poland were some what dif f erent f rom those in other 
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East European countries because of the retention of 
private property and the promotion of the peasant 
agricultural base. Men had more leisure time, more 
prestige and more power. The majority of peasant 
women, 85.1 percent, also saw themselves as benefiting 
little from the industrial advances experienced by 
Poland after 1945 (Tryfan, 1987: 64). Such advances 
were for city dwellers alone, according to the mother 
and daughter of the peasant family I interviewed in 
1990 in Mogiino, near Lodz, (Mrs Jakubczak and Danuta 
Jakubczak, Personal Communication: 1990): 
As the peasant woman watched a programme on her 
old monochrome TV set about af actory making 
washing machines, she was reminded that she had 
yet to do the f amily washing, in the river, by 
hand (Reading, 1992: 47). 
4.4 women in Politics up to 1980 
Despite some changes in the workforce and education, 
however, between 1945-1979, the number of women in 
formal Polish politics remained limited, argues Renata 
Siemienska (1991: 108-130). In fact, women's 
representation in the Communist Party did rise in the 
decades following World War Two, but, as Jancar shows, 
the number of women in Communist Party elites 
throughout Central and Eastern Europe was still very 
low by 1974: Poland had just three women in the 
Communist Party Politbureau in comparison with 56 men 
(Jancar, 1974: 215). a The very highest positions were 
all occupied by men (Leven, 1994: 30) overall, the 
percentage of women in parliament in Poland actually 
fell between 1952 and 1972 from 17 to 13 percent 
(Rocznik Statstyczny Polski, 1990: 65). 
* This is effectively the highest proportion of women in Communist Party elites in the mid-1970s. In 
Hungary there was just one woman in relation to 35 men and in both the Czech Republic and Slovakia there 
were no women, in comparison with 19 and 18 men respectively. (Jancar, 1978: 215-28). 
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The percentage of women in political parties also 
remained pretty low. In 1970, for example, women made 
up 22.5 percent of the Polish United workers Party; 
20.6 percent of the Social Democratic Union Party; and 
27.8 percent of the Peasant Party (Rocznik 
Statystyczny Polski, 1988: 34-5; 1987: 33-4). In 1972- 
76 women occupied just 16 per cent of seats in the 
Polish Seym. This was the lowest in Eastern Europe and 
the USSR, though by no means the lowest in Western and 
Eastern Europe together (Einhorn, 1994: Table A10, 
274) 9 
4.6 Concluding Remarks 
An argument put f orward by Renata Siemienska as to why 
women remained so under-represented in politics was 
that it was due to the absence of grass-roots 
organisations (Siemienska, 1991: 108-130). However, 
as we have already seen in Chapter 3, women's 
organizations have a long history in Poland. Under 
state capitalism working class women developed their 
own spontaneous forms of protest, even before the 
advent of Solidarity. For example, peasant women sick 
of their husbands drinking would picket village 
alcohol stores and demand that sales of vodka be 
stopped (Hann, 1985: 86). Under the Gierek government 
price hikes initiated a rash of all-women strikes in 
1971. In one in a textile plant in Lodz the women 
refused the traditional forms of public negotiation 
and representation and insisted on collective 
responsibility. They refused the demands by the 
government that they represent their demands through 
a delegate. As a result, when the Polish Premier 
' Women occupied a far greater percentage of seats in other East European countries at this time. For 
example, the Polish figure compares to 28.7 percent in Hungary, 26 percent in Czechoslovakia And 31.8 in 
the GDR in 1975. France had only 1.6 percent of its seats occupied by women (Einhorn, 1994: table AlO, 
274). 
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visited the f actory it was not possible to pick off or 
blame individuals. Negotiation was made impossible, 
consequently, the government cancelled the price hikes 
and increased wages, as Siemienska herself notes in an 
earlier article (1986: 28). Women -in a Zyradow food 
factory strike used the same tactic with equal 
success (Jancar, 1985: 175-76). The unstructured 
strike, argues Jancar, was a particular form favoured 
by women in Poland (Jancar, 1985: 175-76),. This method 
was one way 'of breaking through the mechanisms of 
exclusion to women entering the officialý public 
sphere. It is also a method favoured'by'marginalized 
groups in other societies in protest situations (see 
for example Jones, 1983)'-o In addition, state 
sanctioned women's organisations continued-'along the 
same lines the work of women's organisations before 
the war. The Communist regime set up its own League of 
Women which continued the pre World War Two middle 
class work of the National Organization of Women (See 
Chapter 6). There was in this way what we could term 
an alternative public sphere which in fact continued 
after the War. 
It seems, however, f rom the evidence thus far, that 
the (en)gendering process of exclusion within the 
public sphere established during Poland's period of 
identity formation and, during the interwar years, on 
the whole, continued under state capitalism. Women 
were drawn into the paid workforce but mostly only 
into areas which were extensions of their 'Private' 
roles as mothers' and carers. Women were drawn into 
education, but again, only into certain areas. women 
continued their own tradition of a political sphere 
but were still marginalised within official politics. 
The alternative forms of representation employed by women in an effort to break through the 
mechanisms of exclusion to the public sphere as far back as ancient Greece. Aristophanes wrote of a 
demonstration on roof tops by the wives of Athenian senators (Lysistrata 387-96 cited in Winkler, 1992: 190) 
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The reason for this, I would suggest, is not because 
of a lack of 'grass-roots' organisations, as 
Siemienska and Einhorn (1993) indicate, but was, 
perhaps, because of a complex process of inherited 
events and values or socially inherited memory. Post- 
War Poland socially inherited the memory of the 
exclusion of women and ethnic minorities politically 
from the nineteenth and early twentieth century. It 
then inherited the economic and social results of the 
holocaust: the elimination of a large part of its 
Jewish workforce and intelligentsia, combined with the 
denial of the Polish population's role in witnessing 
the events. To fill the public vacuum the state drew 
on the social memory of Soviet style equality laws. 
These fitted well with part of Poland's own 
inheritance of Positivism in which Jewish men were 
depicted as able to make a positive contribution to 
society through their labour. Women, effectively, took 
on this role after the War. At the same time, Soviet 
style equality laws recalled the Enlightenment 
tradition of giving priority to the public, the 
rational, the functional aspect of human beings, 
whilst repressing the private, the emotional, the 
spontaneous and the connection between these. The 
consequence was that women were to re-enact their own 
ghettoisation and that of the Jews by entering mostly 
those areas of the workforce and education which 
remembered their social roles of mother and carer. By 
emphasising only women's public economic function, and 
territorialising women's bodies to this effect, women 
were denied the possibility of either rising to the 
top in their profession or having a significant 
political voice. Thus we can conclude from this that 
although the representation of women publicly under 
state capitalism seemed radically different in terms 
of the laws granted women, there was actually marked 
continuity, even in terms of how equality laws were 
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f ramed. Yet was this also the case in cultural re- 
presentations of women in the public sphere? Or, did 
the system of censorship within the arena of cultural 
production result in a radical disjuncture? In the 
next chapter I address these issues in terms of 
whether state capitalist censorship in key areas of 
culture recalled solely the inheritance of exclusive 
public right between 1945-1979, or, whether there 
were also re-presentations of women which challenged 
aspects of Poland's social inheritance. 
137 
Chapter 5 
Speaking the Unspeakable: 
Social Memory and Censorship Under State Capitalism 
A woman who writes commits two crimes: she 
increases the number of writers - and decreases the 
number of women (Julian Tuwim) 
She stretches her fists to the sky. 
and with her fists 
she writes across the sky 
from horizon to horizon: 
-I don't want to. 
(Anna Swir, 1985) 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter I examined the impact of 
socially inherited memory on the public (en)gendering 
of representation in Poland leading up to the 
beginning of the period of transition. In this 
chapter I analyse to what extent socially inherited 
memory has impacted on re-presentations of women in 
cultural production during the same period. During 
this time a key factor of the regime was its reliance 
on censorship. This is crucial to understanding the 
role of socially inherited memory in the post-War 
period: If we draw again on the work of Judith Herman, 
who makes the connection between domestic abuse and 
political terror (1993), then similar to the ways in 
which individuals under threat censor or repress 
thoughts and feelings in order to survive, elites in 
societies censor to ensure their own survival, or 
position of power within the nation. Herman, who 
brings together research on the effects of political 
terror and sexual abuse on the memories of victims, 
argues that only when an individual is in a position 
of relative safety and economic security can they 
begin to speak the unspeakable. Perhaps the same may 
be said of societies: when ruling elites are confident 
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and feel secure the gags of censorship are undone. If 
this is the case, this would also reinforce the 
suggestion in the previous chapter of the importance 
of the economic dimension in understanding social 
memory. In addition, since the development of 
Poland's socially inherited memory was contradictory 
and dialectical in terms of gender, ethnicity and 
class, then the effects of censorship may also be 
contradictory in terms of cultural re-presentations of 
women in the public sphere. 
Thus what I examine in this chapter are the gendered 
aspects of socially inherited memory in relation to 
cultural re-presentations. I begin with an outline of 
censorship in Poland after the War; I then attend to 
the gendered implications of censorship policy in 
relation to culture. The focus on culture is then 
narrowed to examine re-presentations of women in 
literature in particular. This is because, as Barbara 
Einhorn points out, the 'occlusion of the space for 
articulating alternative views in public discourse 
meant that literature attained the status of political 
statement and sociological evidence' in Eastern Europe 
(1994: 216). Censorship policies also contributed to 
this heightening of literature's importance. 
Consequently, 'literature became a more widely read 
media form than the often turgid daily newspapers' 
(Einhorn, 1994: 217). 1 then argue that socially 
inherited memory had an important part to play in 
post-War re-presentations of women in literature. But, 
that this was not an inevitable historical process 
since in some instances other social re-presentations 
of women were drawn on and produced. An illustration 
of the latter I suggest is to be found in some of the 
work of the playwright, poet and radio writer Anna 
Swir (Anna Swirszczynska) who was able to challenge 
the dominant re-representations of women found in both 
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underground and state produced literature. In terms 
of socially inherited memory, it is significant that 
Swirls most radical work concerned with women was 
published in the 1970s, which was a period of 
confident state capitalism. Although, as we have seen 
in the previous Chapter, there was social discord and 
growing economic problems, during that period the 
Polish United Workers Party publicly claimed that 
their project to eradicate class divisions in Poland 
was almost complete. This meant that there developed 
a new space for state writers in terms of the subject 
matter that they were permitted to tackle (Baranczak, 
1980: 58-80; Nycezek, 1984: 20; Short, 1982: 8-12; 
Krynski, 1978: 64-75). Furthermore, feminist work, 
such as that by Swirl provided an alternative to the 
new voices coming from the underground literary 
movement in which women were frequently portrayed as 
sex objects. This, ironically, made Swirls work in 
state terms officially acceptable. The medium of 
poetry chosen by Swir is also significant. Poetry 
certainly did use gender stereotypes after the War, 
but not to the same extent as fiction. The symbolism 
of underground poets concerned language and censorship 
itself. The dominant themes were of distrust with the 
state and pessimism about life: 'Overall, there is a 
marked absence of gendered types' (Reading, 1992: 58). 
Thus, what I argue is that at that particular time 
Swir was able to enter and use poetical discourse to 
publicly engender re-presentations that effectively 
challenged Polish cultural traditions and the 'Social 
inheritance remembered culturally elsewhere. 
5.2 An Overview of Censorship under State Capitalism 
1945-1979 
The state capitalist regime enshrined the principle of 
freedom of speech in the Polish Constitution of 1945 
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(Solecki, 1978: 7). Yet under state capitalism 
censorship was applied to every image and word 
recorded; this included not only the editorial pages 
of newspapers and magazines, but also newspaper 
advertisements, obituaries, stage design, mime and 
works of art (Mianowicz, 1983: 24)1. Publishing houses, 
bookshops and libraries were owned and controlled by 
the state. Writers and artists were paid by the state. 
Thus, in return for a secure financial situation 
writers and artists had to account for their products 
(Milosz, 1969: 453). The metaphor usually used to 
describe the situation for the media in Poland was the 
gag (Reading, 1992: 49). 
However, censorship in Poland was not something 
unif orm and unchanging; it was also in some periods 
the least restrictive of the regimes in the Eastern 
Bloc. As Goban-Klas shows in The orchestration of the 
Media the history of censorship in People's Poland is 
one of modification and adaptation to meet the 
political needs of the ruling elite. Initially, in 
1944, with the establishment of the Polish Committee 
for National Liberation, democratic freedoms were 
restored, including freedom of - the press and 
information. There was a clause, however, that 
limited this where such freedom was exercised by the 
"enemies of democracy" (Goban-Klas, 1994: 52). In 
' Even as late as 1989, plays performed in state theatres were supposed to be submitted to the state 
authorities for approval, yet increasingly companies ignored this rule. Nevertheless, this did not mean that the 
authorities were unaware of the situation or even approved. For example, I was advised by Polish feminists 
for the production of one of my plays "Want" not to submit a copy of the script or to inform the authorities 
of its performances in seven Polish cities, as the play was highly critical of the Polish regime and equally 
critical of Solidarity. The English actors and video team thus entered the country as tourists, stayed informally 
in the homes of Polish feminists and the play itself was performed illegally in a variety of venues from State 
run Theatres to Houses of Culture. Despite this the play was reviewed in a number of state run newspapers 
and featured on Polish Radio and Television. Later we Icarnt that my Polish ex-husband, who had been most 
helpful in the organisation of the Polish tour, had been working for the security services and informed on all 
those involved. The play at his suggestion was sponsored by the British Council, an arm of the British foreign 
office. Ile lesson to be learnt from this I suggest is that by the latter days of the regime, whilst overt 
censorship policies were increasingly ignored, covert strategies were not. 
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practice, argues Goban-Klas, the Communists denied 
equal access to equipment and newsprint. Gradually, 
between the years 1944 and 1948, the Communists 
eliminated opposition and through a series of laws and 
policy documents established a monopoly over the media 
industry. At the same time, the Ministry of 
Information and Propaganda developed a network of 
publications along with an ethos of what was termed 
"new journalism" that moved away from commercialism 
and sensationalism and sought to mobilize the masses 
for a better society (Goban-Klas, 1994: 57). In 1947 
the Decree on the Main Office of Control of Press, 
Publications and Public Performances was passed. This 
provided a legal basis for censorship that stayed in 
place until October 1981, with censorship itself 
remaining in force until June 1990. The decree allowed 
for four kinds restriction: introductory control, 
actual control, post-publication review and secondary 
analysis (Goban-Klas, 1994: 61). The ruling elite put 
forward the idea that there was a distinction to be 
made between the absolute freedom of the press found 
in bourgeois societies and institutions, and, limited 
freedom which was equated with real freedom by banning 
expression from enemies of the people, reactionaries 
and Nazis. In 1949 Gomulka was removed from power and 
new political cadres were installed in Party 
newspapers. By the end of the 1940s the Stalinist 
regime was fully established: 
In those years Poland, like the other countries 
in that region, suffered political terror, 
ideological subjugation, and the ludicrous cult 
of Stalinism. The Iron Curtain became a reality - 
an impassable barrier to the flow of people and 
ideas. All forms of communications with the West 
were cut off (Goban-Klas, 1994: 71). 
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Despite the fact that the Polish Constitution of 1952 2 
upheld the principles of the rights of citizens to 
freedom of expression and freedom of the press with 
access to the material means to use this right, the 
reality by the early 1950s was very different. In the 
arts the doctrine of Socialist-Realism was paramount 
(Baranczak, 1980: 58-80; Nycezek, 1984: 20; Short, 
1982: 8-12; Krynski, 1978: 64-75)., 3 The essence of 
Social ist-Real ism entailed a style which upheld the 
ideals of Communism even if these contradicted the 
reality of the present. The doctrine applied not just 
to writers but also to journalists and artists who 
were required to provide positive and optimistic 
representations of society even under the most 
depressing of circumstances. 4A favoured subject of 
Socialist- Realism, as we shall see further on, was 
the woman-worker-heroine. Anyone who deviated from 
this perspective was stigmatized and went unpublished 
(Baranczak, 1980: 58-80; Nycezek, 1984: 20; Short, 
1982: 8-12; Krynski, 1978: 64-75). In 1950 and 1952 
state censorship was extended to include the control 
of duplicating machines, the production of posters, 
' The Polish Constitution, as Goban-Klas (1994: 80), points out was a virtual copy in this respect of 
the Soviet Constitution of 1936. Article 125 read: 
The citizens of the USSR are guaranteed by law: (a) freedom of press; (b) freedom of assembly, 
including the holding of mass meetings; (c) freedom of street processions and demonstrations. These 
civil rights arc ensured by placing at the disposal of the working people and their organizations printing 
presses, stocks of paper, public buildings and streets, communications facilities and other material 
resources for the exercise of these rights. 
It should be noted that these rights were only permissible "in conformity with the interests of the worldng 
people and in order to strengthen the socialist system". 
' Ile origins of this stemmed from a resolution adopted by the Central Committee in the Soviet 
Union, headed by Joseph Stalin, which outlined the policies of the Communist Party in relation to Soviet 
literature. This was further developed by Stalin and a group of loyal writers who coined the term socialist 
realism in 1932. 
4 Goban-Klas points out that the doctrine provided a framework for nearly all forms of public 
signification including that of the dressing of shop windows. "They were to be dressed in such a way as to offer 
material proof of the advance of socialism and, at the same time, to scorn the myth of consumption for its own 
sake" (1994: 85). Thus during the 1970s butchers' shops were instructed in the event of the absence of any meat 
or meat products to display posters of Edward Gierek (Tomasz Bednarowicz, personal communication, 1989). 
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and the restriction of personnel. The period also saw 
the development of the networks of Kolhoznik, 
loudspeakers installed in clubs,, private homes and 
public streets to emit broadcasts of Party doctrine. 
After the death of Stalin in 1953 there were demands 
by intellectuals and journalists to be able to write 
"the truth". This was reinforced in the Autumn of 1954 
by the propaganda campaign of Radio Free Europe which 
broadcast the confessions of the escaped UB Officer, 
Joseph Swiatlo, who shook the Party elite with his 
tales of torture and brutality by the security f orces. 
However, according to commentators, politically 
"Stalin was dead, but Poland was still Stalinist" 
(Goban-Klas, 1994: 85). It was not until the mid-to- 
late 1950s that Poland saw the beginning of some 
cultural and journalistic pluralism: 
The Hungarian uprising in 1956 and the Polish 
October marked the beginnings of a short thaw: 
although writers had to adhere to state ideology 
they were allowed to use a variety of styles and 
forms (Reading, 1992: 49) 
The thaw included the Fif th World Youth Festival in 
Warsaw in 1955 and the establishment of a new Journal, 
Po Prostu, in which Jerzy Urban, a regular columnist, 
told what was happening in Poland at the time. These 
events were crowned by the denunciation by Khrushchev 
of Stalin"s cult. This contributed to the Polish 
Party's elite pressure for "democratization" to retain 
Party hegemony (Goban-Klas, 1994: 102). The election of 
Wladyslaw Gomulka to the position of First Secretary 
led to a flowering of Polish cultural life. The 
jamming of foreign radio signals was ended; libraries 
began to stock foreign books and periodicals; cinemas 
began to show foreign films and foreign newspapers 
were sold openly on the streets. According to Goban- 
Klas: "throughout 1956 the cultural life in Poland 
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remained f reer than at any time since the Communist 
takeover" (1994: 109). 
The thaw was short lived, however. By January 1957 
Gomulka was calling for the return to restrictive 
information policies. The journal Po Prostu was closed 
and a new weekly political journal, established as a 
voice of the party, called Polityka. The period marked 
the beginnings of a connection between freedom of 
expression and representation within Polish communism 
with the Polish nation and nationalism. This, as we 
shall see later on, is crucial for the public 
(en)gendering of representation. An article in 
Polityka. in 1957 stated for example: 
Freedom of speech has defined boundaries in post- 
October Poland. These boundaries end where 
propaganda directed against the building of 
socialism in our country starts; they end where 
the vital interests of the state and nation 
start" (my emphasis) (Polityka, October 28,1957 
cited by Goban-Klas, 1994: 117) 
Despite this clamp down, Goban-Klas argues that it was 
also a time in which women's magazines and, the ethnic 
press (re) developed in Poland. By 1963, however, a 
number of academics and intellectuals had been 
imprisoned f or their views. The Party also began a 
policy of harassment of the Roman Catholic Church 
(Baranczak, 1980: 58-80; Nycezek, 1984: 20; Short, 
1982: 8-12; Krynski, 1978: 64-75). The Six Day War in 
the Middle East in 1967 led to a different turn of 
events. The Party leadership shifted its attention 
from thePolish Catholics to Jews. 1968 saw the 
development of what was termed the "partisan" faction 
in the Party which advocated a nationalist anti- 
Semitic stance. Communication policies began to take 
a particularly pernicious turn. Firstlyl. in March of 
that year a production of Dziady (Forefathers Eve) by 
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the Polish 19th century Romantic poet Adam Hickiewicz 
was banned. The Party stopped the production because 
of its supposedly anti-Communist tendencies 
(Baranczak,, 1980: 58-80; Nycezek, 1984: 20; Short, 
1982: 8-12; Krynski, 1978: 64-75). Lists of Jews in 
politics, mass communications, propaganda and 
managerial positions were drawn up by General Moczar. 
Jews and members of the intelligentsia were used as 
scapegoats by the Party which fuelled anti-Semitic 
sentiments amongst the workers. By the end of the year 
two thirds of Poland*s Jewish population had been 
forced to emigrate (Goban-Klas, 1994: 140). Further: 
As the rifts between classes widened the Party 
appealed to the patriotism of the people to hold 
the nation together. The madness of 1968 was to 
radically alter the intellectual opposition in 
Poland in years to come: no longer would it seek 
reforms to socialism - instead it would align 
itself with Catholicism and the Church. (Reading, 
1992: 228, note 12) 
The atmosphere of repression continued in a different 
vein in 1969 with the arrests of what were termed the 
Taternicy. These were a group of people who smuggled 
books f rom the West through Czechoslovakia over the 
Tatra mountains and into Poland. By 1970 the situation 
was aggravated by the impending economic crisis which 
led to riots on the Baltic coast by shipyard workers, 
of which 44 were shot and killed. (Goban-Klas, 
1994: 141). This instigated the replacement of Gomulka 
by a Silesian union leader, Edward Gierek. Gierek's 
rule promised greater intellectual and cultural 
freedom. Between 1971 and 1973 there was what has been 
termed the 'little thawl(Baranczak, 1980: 58-80; 
Nycezek, 1984: 20; Short, 1982: 8-12; Krynski, 1978: 
64-75). Nevertheless, the censors continued to 
distort, alter, mutilate and silence particular 
subjects they believed threatened their hegemony. 
Sometimes this resulted in the most ridiculous 
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alterations. In 1971, for example, the poet and writer 
Stanislaw Baranczak was prevented f rom publishing a 
poem with the words 'liver sausage' in it because it 
implied, according to the censors, that there was a 
meat shortage (there was). Baranczak was requested to 
replace the words liver sausage with salami or steak 
(Baranczak, 1981: 38). 
one crucial difference in information policy under 
Edward Gierek's rule, however, concerned his attitude 
to television broadcasting. According to Goban-Klas, 
Gierek was the first of Poland's rulers to grasp the 
full significance of television. with his initial 
policy of openness Gierek initiated a new television 
programme called "Citizen's Tribune". This, 
ostensibly, was to provide a forum for debate for 
ordinary people. Effectively, however, the programme 
acted as a space for Gierek and the Party to explain 
its policies. (Goban-Klas, 1994: 147-148). Television 
became increasingly important in the transmission of 
what was later termed "the propaganda of success" or 
"compulsory optimism". With this. television news was 
obliged to present the upside of all news events and 
their impact in terms of the achievement of a 
socialist Poland. Furthermore, a crucial facet of the 
propaganda of the period was, again, the centrality of 
the nation state. The new information policy 
established by the Party stressed that it was not only 
Marxist-Leninism which was being sold to the masses, 
but the Polish National leadership. The media was 
expected to gather not so much the people, but the 
Polish nation around the Party and its programme 
(Goban-Klas, 1994: 149). The editor-in-chief of the 
News department of Polish television stated: 
We, Polish journalists, serve the Party and its 
leadership. And both the Party and the leadership 
have no other goal than to serve the nation. (VII 
Zjazd PZPR. Stenogram W Zespolach Problemowych, 
1976: 62 cited in Goban-Klas, 1994: 152) 
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Gierek it seems was attempting to establish what some 
commentators have called national communism (Brown, 
1991). This recalls the emphasis on the nation that 
developed in Poland in the 19th century, and, as we 
shall see, is important in terms of gendered 
mechanisms of representation in the public sphere. 
As the link between the journalist or artist to the 
Party and ultimately their responsibility to the 
integrity of the nation was made, Communist Party 
Information policy was also moving in the direction of 
increasing centralization and profit-orientation. By 
the mid-1970s the economic situation in Poland had 
become so dire workers in the towns of Radom and Ursus 
protested their opposition to a rise in meat prices. 
Although the government returned the price to its 
original level it imprisoned key workers who had 
instigated the protests. This led to what commentators 
have subsequently seen as a crucial shift in 
information accessibility in Poland with the 
establishment of the opposition's Committee for the 
Defense of Workers (KOR) which included Jacek Kuron 
and Adam Michnik (Baranczak,, 1980: 58-80; Nycezek, 
1984: 20; Short, 1982: 8-12; Krynski, 1978: 64-75). 
The Committee began the impetus for a secondary 
literary and journalistic system with the publication 
of a periodical called Komunikat. This led the way 
for later unofficial periodicals such as PULS (Pulse) 
and Bratniak (Fraternity). Two unofficial publishing 
houses NOWA and KRAG were set up which published and 
distributed literature, leaflets, handbooks, fly- 
sheets and pamphlets which the official publishers 
would never print (Pzenicki, 1983: 8-11; Krynski, 
1978: 78-75). A system of video tape distribution was 
established which included copies of banned films,, 
plays, alternative news magazines, cabaret and 
literature (Diehl, J, 1986: 24-27). An alternative 
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education movement was also set up in 1978 under the 
name of 'The Flying University' in which academics and 
students who opposed the regime met in people's homes 
to discuss issues of importance and interest 
(Bartowszewski, 1985: 21-24). 
overall, Poland in the 1970s was -much more pluralistic 
than other East European countries. The situation was 
later encapsulated by Tadeusz Konwicki, s A Minor 
Apocalypaje where a cinema advertises on the outside 
the officially sanctioned film, whilst screening 
inside a banned film (Konwicki, 1988). The scene was 
effectively set for the rise of Solidarity and the 
contradictory information policies of the regime in 
the 1980s (See next Chapter). 
5.3 censorship and Gender 
State censorship to many social scientists and writers 
is treated as if it is gender-neutral; as if somehow 
the policies of a male-dominated state serve to 
exclude each sex equally. The writer Rysard Kowalski 
stated, for example: 
Nobody will ever know how many books were not 
written, not even begun, because their 
prospective authors did not feel optimistic 
enough (Kowalski, 1980: 84). 
He argued that state censorship resulted in f ear, 
pessimism and self-censorship by artists and writers. 
The socio-psychological impact of censorship was 
indeed one of the most important difficulties under 
communism, according to regional women journalists I 
asked. For example, a senior Lodz journalist. whose 
husband had been a top party official, Elzbieta 
Adamczewska, said that the worst aspect of communism 
was: 
The fact that you couldn't think freely. It is 
hard to believe, but I was a grown woman when I 
started to learn about certain facts. In my 
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family there was no tradition of talking about 
some things. For a long time I was not aware of 
such facts as the 17 September 1939. ... I**m 
trying to make up for that in relation to my own 
children. I don't want them to have a blank page 
of history. ... I'm still ashamed that I could live for such a long time without that knowledge 
and that I didn't feel that something was wrong, 
that I wasn't bothered by it. 0.. The 
consciousness that it was all a big con came only 
afterwards. This is the biggest problem and I try 
to. protect my children from experiencing the 
same. I try to explain to them everything that 
is ambiguous or unclear concerning both the past 
and present situation. I don't want them to lose 
their lives, to have this feeling of loss. The 
lack of information in these various areas is the 
problem in my life. It's more important than the 
stupid work I had to do or the f act that I 
couldn't work for a long time. (Elzbieta 
Adamczewska, Personal communication, 1990) 
Another Polish writer, Jan Prokop, believed that 
censorship led to mediocre writers being praised and 
elevated simply because they upheld Communist Party 
doctrine. Conversely, underground writers in 
unofficial circles were praised and favoured simply 
because they did not uphold Party doctrine, regardless 
of the, quality of their work (Prokopf 1983: 49-52). 
The Polish poet Adam Czerniawski' extended this 
argument. He maintained that the underground writer in 
Poland had, traditionally, to act as the nation"s 
conscience. The writer, he said, had the choice in 
Poland of either socialist-realism or what he termed 
Pol-Realism, Polish patriotic realism (Czerniawski, 
1979: 3-27). Journalist and writer, Timothy Wiles? 
writing a few years later, argued that unofficial 
literature in Poland was hampered by playing to the 
state and by viewing the state, as the source of all 
evils. This, he said, led to what has been termed the 
'monocular perceptiont of unofficial literature 
(Wiles, 1983: 112-19). Added to this, critics said, was 
also a covert form of censorship by publishers in the 
West: 
150 
Many a rebuffed hack has been sympathetically 
received in the West, just because the message he 
(sic) was struggling to express was the one the 
West was longing to hear (Czerniawski, 1979: 4) 
The problem, however, with these arguments concerning 
the problems of the circumscribed dichotomy in 
journalism and literature is that they are gender 
blind. They fail to analyze the differential impact 
concepts such as the "custodian of the nations 
conscience" and the "state as the source of all evils" 
may have on women in contrast to men. Censorship and 
the use of the nation as a political vortex for 
expression has, as we know, a long tradition in 
Poland. In Part One it was shown how in 19th century 
representations of women the dominant images in 
political discourse and literature were those of 
Mother Poland linked to organized religion. In the 
interwar years, despite Poland's independence, 
nationalism prevailed with a new development in 
representational terms with the nation linked to woman 
and her sexuality. In addition, the representation of 
Poland's ethnic minorities, particularly Jews, in 
relation to the nation, was inflected differently. 
What we will see is that it was not simply the case 
that such representations were an aberration of the 
interwar years. Under state capitalism the effects of 
ongoing forms of censorship recalled earlier aspects 
of the public (en)gendering of re-presentation and the 
kinds of mechanisms of exclusion which effected women 
in particular. 
5.4 Women and Media Re-Presentations 
The re-presentations of women prevalent in the 
mainstream media in the immediate post-war years, 
according to a number of scholars, upheld the regime's 
changing policies towards women's inclusion within the 
workplace. Anna Titkow maintains: 
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In the years 1945-54 when all hands were needed 
for labour, the streets were full of posters with 
joyfully smiling tractor drivers, women street 
car drivers. But in 1958 "the home-coming' of 
women was promoted. (Titkow, 1984: 562) 
But, from 1958 until the late 1960s the re- 
presentation of women and their roles in society by 
the Polish United Workers Party shows a general 
pattern of what Jolanta Plakwicz has since called 
ideological 'confusion'. The confusion stemmed, 
according to Plakwicz, from the contribution women 
made in terms of reproduction, which the Polish 
government at that time did not see as part of their 
economic contribution. Consequently, a woman's 
reproductive role was seen as "standing in conflict 
with her productive role. " (Plakwicz, 1992: 80). The 
confusion in re-presentation terms was articulated 
with images of women as both mothers and workers 
(Plakwicz, 1992: 80). But, in the 1970s the re- 
presentation of women in official literature began to 
have a different emphasis. The media promoted women as 
participating in all spheres of life, but well able to 
perform their traditional duties as mothers and wives 
(Yedlin, 1980: 216). As pressure grew in economic 
terms for women to perform more of what was previously 
deemed social duties at home, such as health care and 
early years education, there was an extra drive in re- 
presentational terms to ensure that women would 
recognize and fulfill their domestic and family 
responsibilities (Plakwicz, 1992: 81). 
These patterns are also found in literature. The 
dominant ideology of socialist realism meant that in 
parallel with the entrance of women into the paid 
workforce in the 1950s socialist realist novels of the 
time revolved very often around the worker-heroine of 
the factory or cooperative. However, it was not the 
case that such representations of women overturned the 
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feminine characteristics traditionally assigned women 
in Poland. The characteristics of the 19th century 
ideal of Mother Poland, such as empathy, patience and 
caring, were simply extended to the work place. 
Rosenberg argues that in the case of literature in the 
GDR, which until the late 1970s followed the same 
route as Polish literature, that the female population 
was generally depicted as: 
a huge and conservative mass to be prodded and 
lured into the work place where the process of 
socialized labour will turn them into emancipated 
women is the key characteristic of literature of 
the 1950s. (Rosenberg, 1985: 354) 
She adds that in the 1960s literature in the GDR saw 
the rise of the 'professional' heroine. This was also 
the case with Polish literature. one of the most 
respected and powerful figures in the Polish Communist 
literati was Jerzy Zawiejski (1902-69). He had a woman 
doctor as the heroine of his popular novel Cry in the 
YQI, d, a short story about the Nazi extermination of 
inmates in a psychiatric hospital (Zawiejski, 1981: 
322). Tadeusz Rozewicz (1921 -) who was given a 
literary award by the state and whose work was 
described by critics as 'warped' by its obedience to 
the censor (Gillon, 1981: 331) has an artist as the 
heroine in The Most Beautiful City in the World. 
However, the manner in which Rozewicz attempts to 
advocate equality is highly contradictory: 
'-What"s your opinion of M? 
'A decent human being. ' 
'A decent human being? But she's a woman. 
*-To me she is painter. After all, she herself 
doesn't want to be a woman' 
(Rozewicz, 1981: 331). 
Also in the 1960s, the emphasis by the Party on 
positively building socialism meant that in literary 
re-presentational terms a link was again established 
between women and self-sacrifice for the greater 
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social good, in this particular case, sacrifice for 
the socialist vision, rather than independence as in 
the 19th century. The woman doctor in Zawiejski's Cry 
in the Void is both an independent professional woman, 
but one who ultimately sacrifices her life with that 
of the psychiatric inmates of the hospital in which 
she works. The inmates effectively symbolize a 
surrogate family. The extent to which censorship was 
gendered in its literary impact is further illustrated 
by a subtle parody of the emphasis on female self- 
sacrifice by the writer Kazimierz Brandy's who was 
criticized for failing to provide positive socialist 
heroes. In the following extract from How to Be Loved 
, the heroine, a radio actress in a weekly drama, only 
receives letters of praise from the League of Women 
when she behaves in a spirit of female Party- 
mindedness to which self-sacrifice is crucial: 
When I say to Tom: do eat that piece of meat 
darling, the one nearer the bone -I feel their 
gratitude and know that I shall receive many 
letters. I am capable of much more in real life, 
but they know only that piece of meat and self- 
sacrifice, this spoonful of soup and the 
certainty that I shan't eat so that he will eat 
well (Brandy, 1981: 283). 
A further effect of censorship in (en)gendering public 
re-presentations in the period before the transition 
was to perpetuate the longstanding dichotomy of women 
in Poland as either sexless (virgins) or sex objects 
(whores). Male writers even by the 1960s began to 
associate the Party image of the worker heroine with 
sexless independence. In Rozewicz's The Most 
Beautiful City in the World, the heroine I'M" is 
certainly an independent female artist, but, with her 
short-cropped hair she is portrayed as rejecting her 
'femininity'. The other women in the novel, in 
contrast, are praised for their bodies and ultimately 
undergo commoditization and objectification: 
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Women walk along those streets. They carry around 
their bodies, their wares, very ingeniously. Even 
experienced advertisers couldn't show their 
exhibits to better advantage. One of them not 
only had her legs raised in stiletto heels, but 
her bottom too seemed to be raised up on 
scaffolding (Rozewicz, 1981: 345). 
Further on women's bodies are reduced to animals and 
fruit: 
A herd of beautiful naked women paraded around a 
golden tree. Veils f ell f rom them ... they turned 
their breasts, bellies, faces. Now a whole bunch 
of buttocks was swaying rhythmically among the 
branches of the golden tree (Rozewicz, 1981: 345) 
By the 1970s the (en)gendering of women publicly as 
sex objects was nowhere more apparent than in the 
growth of unofficial writing, ' which rose dramatically 
in Poland with the opening of the independent 
publishing houses NOVA and KRAG. 6 In perhaps one of 
the most famous of independently, published novels in 
Poland, Tadeusz Konwicki's A Minor ADocalvpse, the re- 
presentation of Poland as a raped woman is reused; the 
nation once more is linked not only to women's 
sexuality but to the patriarchal myth of the woman who 
enjoys sexual violence and abuse: 
Poland has been raped. She defended herself for 
a long time, she scratched and bit, but in the 
end she submitted. And she took a certain 
delight in that passive, unwilling submission. 
She felt an ambiguous, strange and somewhat 
filthy pleasure in being raped. Poland lies at 
the heart of Europe, screwed by lowlife. 
(Konwicki, 1988: 205) 
The plot of Konwicki's novel concerns the last day in 
5 It is at this point that Polish literature and that of the GDR part company. The emphasis in the GDR 
remained on the socialist heroine, whereas, in Poland the re-presentation of women, particularly in unofficial 
literature became sexualized. 
6 Wbilst it is true that even in the more repressive regime of the GDR there was samizdat, the 
number, range and distribution of Poland's independent publishing houses was unique in Eastern Europe at the 
time (Bielipski and Chojecki, 1981: 42-38). 
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the life of a failed male writer. The writer finally 
sets fire to himself in front of the Palace of Culture 
in Warsaw. 7 During the day the hero lusts after and 
screws Nadezhda, and in the process strips her of her 
Russian name and renames her the English version " 
Hope'. Russian\Communist domination is thus replaced 
with woman as Christian allegorical virtue, as the 
hope of the West. 
Under state capitalism in dissenting fiction ýthe women 
who had entered the public sphere after the war were 
re-presented as gross imitations of men: 
Now everywhere there's only little women in 
pants. Mannish women with long hair; frills and 
d6colletage. Greedy avaricious shameless women 
with penises concealed in their lace panties. 
(Konwicki, 1988: 96) 
More broadly, 'sexless' or mannish women were used to 
represent publicly what 'Communism' had done to Polish 
society, as MiloszIs description of the Red Army's 
takeover shows in The Captive Mind: 
It was lead by a young woman, f elt-booted and 
carrying a submachine gun. Like all compatriots, 
I was liberated from the domination of Berlin - 
in other words, brought under the domination of 
Moscow (Milosc, 1985: x) 
In contrast to the sexless symbol of Stalinism in 
dissenting fiction, from the 1960s onwards there was 
also her opposite: the whore or woman as sex object. 
Literary critic, Keyna-Sharratt, argues that Polish 
prose from this time on contained a strong Playboy 
element in which the plot would consist of the male 
protagonists pursuit of sexual gratification. 
Moreover, the sexual and emotional spheres in such 
" The Palace of Culture, given as a present by Stalin to the citizens of the city, to this day dominates 
the sky line in Warsaw. A Polish joke asks: What is the best place to stand to get a good view in Warsaw? 
Answer: Directly underneath the Palace of Culture because then you can't see it. 
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prose are portrayed as utterly distinct and separate 
(Keyna-Sharratt: 1985: 133-40). In Konwicki's A Minor 
Apocalypse, for example, sex has little meaning beyond 
the simply biological; it is reduced to the level of 
genitals as instruments and receptacles: 'Nothing had 
happened ... I had inserted my genital organ into 
hers' (Konwicki, 1988: 211). Keyna-Sharratt argues: I 
Women in this scheme of things become sex objects and 
they play this role willingly and graciously' (Keyna- 
Sharratt, 1985: 134). In some texts there is sadistic 
hatred for women as revealed in Michael Choromanskils 
Radosc in which the main character deliberately 
crushes the toes of the woman behind him in a queue at 
the chemist: 
Now the heel of my shoe was suspended above the 
top of her shoe, above her very toes. I froze. I 
could see no more. It was as if a whitish curtain 
fell before my eyes. And, at the same time, I 
felt approaching joy. I remember that I shivered 
with a light delightful shiver. And then not to 
delay the pleasure I crushed her foot with the 
whole weight of my body (Choromanski, 1964: 11). 
This trend towards the pornographic or the sexual 
objectification and humiliation of women was not only 
a feature of Polish prose. Poetry too developed its 
share of the virgin-whore dichotomy under state 
capitalism. In Zbigniew Herbert's "Pan Cognito on 
Virtue' the re-presentation of woman as Christian 
saint is overturned only to be replaced by its 
opposite: 
If only she took more care 
looked human 
Like Liz Taylor 
or the Goddess Venus (Herbert, 1988: 111) 
The human woman here is the flickering fantasy of the 
cinema heroine, or, the classical goddess Venus, who, 
interestingly, was always symbolized as a mirror (to 
reflect what? The male poet's ego? ). In contrast, as 
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with prose, the sexless woman or crone publicly re- 
presented state repression under State Capitalism: 
We were enticed by Baba Yaga 
to the fabulous land of adventure 
and she is feeding us 
to eat us (Grynberg, 1981: 496) 
Baba Yaga is the old witch of Russian and Polish 
fairy-tales who lives alone in the forest surrounded 
by a fence of human skulls and bones. The implication 
of Baba Yaga, according to Einhorn, is that women and 
female sexuality in particular have magical powers 
which will engulf and consume the unwary male to the 
point of death (Einhorn, 1994: 227). " Here the witch is 
symbolic of the vision of a Communist Poland enticed 
by the Soviet Union, which fed the people propaganda 
in order to consume Poland's National independence. 
The representation in unofficial literature of women 
as sexual objects were attempts by, mostly, male 
writers to subvert the woman-worker-heroine of Party 
approved literature. The unofficial yet public 
pornography (literally = writing of whores) was a way 
that writers could 'demonstrate that we are with the 
West, the West meaning culture, surviving and 
progress' (Keyna-Sharratt, 1985: 140). After all, 
censorship in Poland, as in the West theoretically, 
included pornography (Farar, 1979: 58-61). Pornography 
was thus the public (en)gendering of dissent. The 
pornographic (en) gendering of representation is 
essential to an understanding of the mechanisms of 
exclusion to women in the public sphere in Poland, 
whether more broadly, or in terms of women's access to 
* Einhom cites a passage from the classical Russian version of the Baba Yaga tale Vassilisa the 
Beautiful which illustrates the female cannibalistic sexuality: ' The day passod, and the night, and it was only 
toward evening of the next day that Vassilisa reached Baba Yaga's hut. The fence round it was made of h 
bones and crowned with human skulls, the gate was no gate but the bones of men's legs, the bolts, no bolts but 
the bones of men's arms, and the lock, no lock but a set of sharp teeth. Vassilisa was horrified and stood stock- 
still' (Einhorn, 1994: 227) 
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literary and journalistic production. 
5.4 Women and Literary Production 
In the official publishing market the system of 
'literary gate-keepers' (Spender and Spender, 
1983: 487) worked against women and tended to favour 
men: 
In People's Poland it was crucial to be a member 
of the Polish Artists or Polish Writers 
Associations to be recognized and have access to 
resources. But to be a member a writer had to be 
recommended; to be recommended a writer had to be 
published or accepted by various cultural 
commissions; those in the position to give 
recommendations, as in other sectors of society, 
were predominantly men. The result was that fewer 
women were visible on the official market 
(Reading, 1992: 59). 
This picture is supported by a leading member of the 
Association of Polish Artists in Lodz who said that it 
was more difficult for women to have their work 
accepted for exhibition, yet, this was crucial in 
order to become a member of the Association which was 
necessary for public recognition. She added: 
It is easier f or men. A woman if she wants to be 
noticed and get her work exhibited must work for 
years. She must prove that what she does is not 
something that happens by coincidence or chance. 
Women are not treated as seriously as men, 
neither is their work. Men have an easier start 
and are treated as if they are some how 
predestined to be artists; a woman has to prove 
it. My experience is an example of this; it is 
not that someone didn't like me or was against 
me, it is just that they didn't take me 
seriously. only now that I have status no one 
doubts that I'll go on doing what I do (Joanna 
Wisniewska, Artist, Personal communication: 
1990). 
In the unofficial market the situation was the same, 
if not worse. There was a significant gender gap in 
the numbers of women and men writers who were 
represented in print by the new independent publishing 
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houses in the 1970s. For example, my own headcount, 
using the lists of the output of the independent 
publishing house NOWA between 1977 and 1980, shows 
that no books by women were published between 1977-80 
(Bielinski and Chojacki, 1981: 35-7). ' 
This situation was reinforced by mechanisms of 
exclusion used by Western Publishing houses. The 
overwhelming majority of Polish-prose translated for 
the British market and in print in 1988 was by men 
(Reading, 1992: 59). In anthologies women are sorely 
outnumbered. In a collection of modern Polish poetry 
edited by Adam Czerniawski only two women'poets'were 
represented (See Czerniawski, 1988)"0. In the most 
extensive English language collection of modern Polish 
literature edited by Gillan et al there are fifty male 
writers and 11 female writers represented (See Gillan, 
1981). The situation by the late 1980s for dissident 
writers was the same. A survey of Index on censorship 
between 1980-87 of Polish writers published shows that 
only a few women writers were published 
Thus, what is clear so far is -that the socially 
inherited memory of Polish literature's role as the 
nation's conscience and the emphasis on the male as 
the creative force (see Chapter 3) continued to have 
a significant impact on the public (en) gendering of 
representation even under state capitalism. This is 
born out by the way in which the nation was so 
essential to the (en)gendering of dissident public re- 
' Derived from my own analysis of lists of publications during in the period referred to by Bielecsld 
and Chojnacld. 
"' Einhern notes that the dominance of male authors in the former Czechoslovalda was reflected in the 
1969 Penguin edition of New Writing in Czechoslovajda which featured not a single woman writer. 
" From my own survey of 'Index on Censorship 1980-7. 
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presentation. 
5.5 Contradictions and Alternatives 
Commentators both East and West would agree with my 
analysis so far of gender re-presentations in Polish 
culture, particularly with the equation of woman with 
nation (Uminska, 1991 cited by Einhorn, 1994: 233; 
Slawinska, 1989). These are also cultural gender 
patterns found elsewhere in Eastern Europe (Cermakova 
and Navarova, 1992 cited by Einhorn, 1994: 236; 
Rosenberg, 1985) as well as the former Soviet Union 
(Buckley, 1992; Du Plexis Gray, 1991; Mamonova, 1989; 
Hubbs, 1988). 
However, it seems to me that many feminist 
commentators, although they have recognised the 
resonance of cultural stereotypes, have failed to see 
occasions where these were also broken down. 
Admittedly, Einhorn shows how in the GDR there was a 
definite cultural shift in the 1970s with the 
development of women writers who challenged the gap 
between the socialist superwoman and triple burden of 
women's lives (Einhorn, 1994: 239-242). 12 The editors 
of a women's poetry collection, Bassnett and Kuhiwczak 
in Ariadne's Thread: Polish Women Poet's, also refer 
generally to: 
The extraordinary energy of so many women writing 
in Eastern Europe generally - the poets of 
Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union, the 
novelists and short story writers of the GDR for 
example, and the growing numbers of women working 
for the alternative theatre in Poland, 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary, all of which points 
to the emergence of a female creativity that 
transcends patriarchal structures and 
expectations of the official scene (1988: xi) 
" This includes the work of writers such as Christa Wolf whose The Quest for Christa T. * became 
a feminist classic in the West. 
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There is, however, a lack of cultural and political 
analysis of female creativity which does challenge 
established structures and stereotypes in Poland. 
There were, as we shall see, particular contradictions 
to the public (en)gendering of representation under 
state capitalism by the 1970s which provided for 
different images of women in the public sphere. Where 
official writers did not challenge the state or the 
Communist Party directly but challenged patriarchy or 
men it seems their writing could be acceptable to the 
state censor. 
A key example of such engagement and resistance is 
found in the poetry of Anna Swir (1909-1984) whose 
work bridges the interwar and state capitalist 
periods. The Polish Who is Who (1986: 206-211) 
recognized Swir as a poet, author, playwright and 
children's writer and scriptwriter. Before World War 
Two Swir worked as a writer and editor, as well as 
contributing to Polish radio. At the same time she was 
active in underground literary circles against the 
Pilsudski regime. After the War, in which she narrowly 
escaped execution, she wrote plays for radio and 
television, as well as plays and stories throughout 
the 1950s and 1960s for children. These stories, 
written in the 1960s, such as Jak Bolko Niemce 
Zadziwil (1988), 0 Gdanskiej Burmistrzance (1988), and 
Paz Krolowei Barbary (1987), reproduced traditional 
gender stereotypes. In her poetry of the 1970s, 
however, she forged alternative re-presentations 
despite the limitations of censorship and the dominant 
sexual stereotypes of both official and dissident 
literature. Her dual language collection Budowalam 
Barvkade: Building the Barricades provided a 
remarkable picture of the Jewish Ghetto in Warsaw and 
her own work as a nurse in which she was nearly 
executed by the Nazils. When she first tried to write 
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about the War and to remember the events, she said she 
f ound it so traumatic she was unable to and tore up 
her initial efforts. It was not until the 1970s that 
she was able to provide a picture in the f orm, of a 
poetical diary witnessing some of the horrors 
(Swirszczynska, 1979: 2-5). Remarkably, Swir was 
given several literary awards by the state f or her 
work, receiving the Officer's and Bachelor's Cross for 
Services Rendered to the Regeneration of Poland, 
literary awards for her children's stories and plays, 
as well as the Lodz Spring Award for Poetry. In this 
final section of the chapter I analyse in detail the 
key ways in which Swirls poetry of the 1970s, a 
selection of which is published in English as Fat Like 
the Sun (Baran and Marshment, 1986), remembers 
alternative historical re-presentations of women and 
goes on to voice her own. " 
5.6 The Case of Anna Swir 
The first aspect of Swirls poetry that is striking in 
relation to Poland"s social inheritance is that it 
provided an alternative to the woman as whore\virgin 
dichotomy by deconstructing the dualisms on which this 
rests: mind\body, object\subject, reason\emotion. She 
demonstrated how these terms lock into each other; how 
one term holds a superior position and dominates 
meaning. She then overturned the oppositional 
hierarchy. And ultimately then displaced the inversion 
itself and reintegrated the two terms (Reading, 
1992: 176-179). For example, in the first of a series 
of love poems 'A Woman Speaks to her Thigh' Swir 
takes apart the socially inherited dialectic of 
" Swir's nine volumes of poetry are as follows:. Wierze i Proze (Poems and Prose) 1936; Wyja 
Zebrane (Lyrical Assembly) 1958; Czarne Slowa (Black Words) (1967); Wiatr (Wind) 1970; Jestem Baba (I 
am the Old Woman 1972; Budowalam JIMkade Building the Barricades) (1974); Szczesliwa Jak Psi Ogon 
(HaMy as a dog's tail) ( 1978); Wybor WiersZy (Selected Verse) (1980); Ciaj&nie I Radosc (Pain and Jgy) 
(1985) 
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desire. In this, as the feminist literary critic Jan 
Montifiore has pointed out, what is usually at stake 
is not in fact the woman's beauty or the relationship 
between the lovers but the establishment of the male 
poet's identity (1987: 198). In Polish poetry we have 
seen how the male poet traditionally establishes his 
identity as mind through the objectification of woman 
as body (Chapters 3,5). Swir begins her poem with: 
It's entirely due to your beauty 
that I can take part 
in the rites of love (Baran and Marshment, 
1986: 3-4) 
This establishes that the woman's body provides the 
woman\poet with the possibility to speak and to 
establish herself in terms of ' the first person. 
Simultaneously, this is undermined by the language of 
debt 'due' and 'owe' which consciously recalls the 
memory of the equation of woman's body with property 
(See for example, Chapter 2). Swir continues by 
mocking this: I ought to whip you tenderly each 
day\with jets of ice-cold water. ' (Baran and 
Marshment, 1986: 3-4). Thus she establishes that 
traditionally she ought to practice mild self-harm or 
beauty treatment, but she does not: 'The woman admits 
a debt yet refuses to pay it. The body object as the 
powerful opposite of the %I' self is 
underminedl(Reading, 1991: 177). 
Next, Swir highlights the contradictions of the 
relationship for women in Poland's socially inherited 
memory between the body\self and the woman 
writer\poetry. She writes that it is to her body that 
she owes: 'the small betrayals exquisite\as scarlet 
lipstick' (Baran and Marshment, 1986: 3). To betray is 
to reveal treacherously, to be disloyal, to be lead 
astray: thus Swir recalls the de-meaning inheritance 
of women's construction and representation, since the 
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cosmetic-lipstick is a metonym for the betrayal of the 
self. To her thigh (the representation of woman as 
body) the woman also owes, according to Swir: "the 
perverse rococo\convolutions of the psyche' (Baran and 
Marshment, 1986: 3). The social inheritance of the 
woman as object-body thus results in a perversion or 
distortion of the architecture or structure of the 
mind' (Reading, 1992: 177). It also leads to a language 
of desire 'rococo' which is ornamental and florid 
which stimulates affection through absence but which 
strangles the self-woman poet: 'the sweetness of 
sensual longing\choking the breath in my breast (Baran 
and Marshment, 1986: 3). 
Thirdly, having consciously recalled the social 
memory of the gendered body/self dichotomy, Swir 
begins to reverse it by using her lovers to engender 
a public representation in which the woman is 
subject/mind rather than object/body: 
The souls of lovers open before me 
in the moment of love 
and I have them in my power. 
Like a sculptor regarding 
his work... (Baran and Marshment, 1986: 3) 
The woman as sculptor simile recalls the social 
inheritance of the male gaze, reminding us how women 
were, traditionally, publicly engendered. At the same 
time Swir reverses this by putting woman in the 
position of voyeur. Swir then exaggerates this since 
she uses as her mirror not one man but many lovers. 
This recalls the repressed part of Poland, s social 
memory in which women were cultural producers in their 
own right (See Chapter 3). The poem repudiates the 
tradition in Polish literature in which women are 
objects to be entered bodily, as in Konwicki's A Minor 
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A]ýocalvpse , since her lovers' 'souls' rather than 
bodies 'open' before her. The woman/poet then suggests 
the effect that the socially inherited dialectic of 
desire causes: 
I gaze 
their eye-lid locked faces, 
tormented with ecstasy, 
thickened 
with joy. (Baran and Marshment, 1986: 3) 
Thus the power to objectif y (as a woman or a man) 
imprisons and blinds, restricting the human object 
from being subjects in their own right. Further on, 
Swir shows how the simple reversal of the dialectic 
of desire, in which she depicts the woman poet as 
similar to the God-like poets of the 19th century with 
their privileged access to the truth of the nation, 
results in corruption, in concealment and imposition 
in terms of public representation. Swir shows that the 
woman-poet-God, 'relies on the objectification of an 
opposite - the body as object, or her lovers as 
object. ' (Reading, 1992: 179) What is posited by Swir 
is the re-presentation of human beings in which 
neither women nor men are routinely objectified or 
made into poet-Gods. Swir calls for the equality and 
bringing together of the socially inherited 
dichotomies of mind and body, object and subject. In 
the English translation of the poem, this is not so 
obvious because some of the puns and word-building 
established in Polish is, unfortunately, lost. In the 
Polish original many of the words used are pre-fixed 
with ludol which is the word for thigh. With 'I enter' 
and "the souls of lovers open before me, ' the verb 
udostepnic is used. In the final stanza of the poem 
the adjective doskonaly 'perfect' is connected to the 
verb udoskonalic 'perfect': 
the most perfect beauty of soul 
would give me no such treasures 
were it not for your bright smooth charm; 
166 
you amoral little animal. (Baran and Marshment, 
1986: 3). 
The poem hence links the perf ect soul to the body - 
udo. Thus Anna Swir, having demonstrated the socially 
inherited mind/body split in which woman is 
traditionally the object of desire, overturns it: 'Yet 
in doing so she does not reject the body and desire is 
mockingly accepted. Swir forges a different dialectic 
of desire by finally welding together woman's body- 
mind, the object-subject, into III. (Reading, 1992: 
179-80). 
Swir also tackled the prevailing re-presentation of 
women as Mother Poland. In 'Her Hand' for example Swir 
attempted to destroy the image: 
When my mother was dying 
I held her hand 
When she died I burnt everything 
her hand had touched. 
Only my own hands 
I couldn't burn. (Swir, 1986: 87) 
Mother Poland is, traditionally, the one who lives 
whilst all around may die. In Swirls poem the mother 
dies and the daughter tries to destroy everything that 
is connected to her. However, what is impossible to 
destroy without self-destruction is the socially 
inherited memory of the Mother within the daughter. 
This results in fragmentation of female identity. The 
Mother is split between the third person 'she' and the 
body '-hand'. This split is then passed on to the 
daughter who moves from an integrated self 'I held her 
hand' to alienation between that which is and is not 
her mother; alienation between the subjective III and 
the body 'my own hands'. In this poem, as in other 
work by Swirl the impact and complexity of re- 
presenting women, is deconstructed. Here Mother Poland 
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is not the heart of a nation, or the ongoing hearth of 
the family. The Mother bequests fragmentation; she 
divides the daughter-poet, she splits self from self. 
In "Motherhood' Swir explored this destruction 
further. The baby in the poem demands that the woman 
sacrifice her life, her creativity, her public 
representation of herself. The woman-poet refuses: 
I won't be the shell 
of the egg you crack open 
as you burst into the world, 
nor the footbridge you cross to get your own 
life. 
I'll defend myself. ( Swir, 1986: 93) 
Footbridge is a metonym for the Mother Poland as 
bastion of the Polish nation. Swir reject this. 
However, Swir does not leave the matter there. In the 
next part of the poem the baby, originally described 
as 'the small doll' takes on a life of its own. The 
woman-poet sees the baby's small finger move, and with 
it her own blood under its veins. The woman-poet 
becomes torn between the contradictions of her 
position as writer and Mother. Her public identity - 
as woman-poet - is ultimately 'swallowed like air'. In 
" series of poems which followed this the baby becomes 
" child in which the Mother invests her future; the 
daughter becomes then the saviour for the Mother. The 
woman-poet realizes that 'in giving her life, I 
sentenced her': embedded her within language and the 
socially inherited memory of women's exclusion from 
political right. However, in her final poem on 
motherhood, Swir vows that she will, despite the 
legacy of history, claim her right to full human 
egoism 'Reserved for centuries/for men'(Swir, 
"Courage, ', 1986: 100). Swir asserts that the final 
frontier to equal representation is the hedges of 
submission in a woman's mind 'Trained for millennia\in 
the inhuman virtue of sacrifice'. 
168 
Swir thus takes apart and makes anew Mother Poland. 
Swir also tackles the traditional opposite of 
Mother Poland in public representation: the image of 
woman as the epitome of evil - as crone, witch or Baba 
Yaga. She takes on those negative characteristics 
traditionally assigned to women who refuse to be 
'virtuous': ugliness, madness, fatness and badness. 
She encapsulates these in a selection of poems 
entitled 'Jestem Babat directly translated as 'I am 
the old woman'. However, as Marshment points out: 
The Polish word 'Babal [is] a word so profoundly 
insulting one must use a euphemism to refer non- 
derogatively to a woman of advanced age. "Babal 
is a crone, virago, peasant woman, witch, like 
Baba Yaga in Hansel and Gretal (Marshment, 1985: 
4) 
Baba Yaga, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, was 
used in Polish dissenting literature to symbolize the 
predatory features of Communism. The assertion 'I am 
Babal challenges this insult and reclaims the old bag, 
the old hag, the crone, virago, peasant. Through her 
poetic re-presentations Swir highlights the barriers 
to women created by the term 'Babal. She then 
recuperates the term by remeaning it with the 
qualities of endurance, rebellion and beauty. In 
'Sisters in the Gutter' the woman-poet describes the 
beggar women and mad women ignored by the regime, but 
common to every railway station and park. These were 
the women who were destitute, who were discarded by 
the system, who apparently lacked any beauty or value. 
Swir writes: 'In their eyes are rings\from which the 
jewels have fallen out'. The poem asserts that the 
women have their own language; the language of the 
poor and mad; a language on the margins of public 
discourse and representation; yet comprehensible. The 
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poem ends by asserting the beauty of these women: 
valueless and ugly in the eyes of society yet with 
cheeks 'delicate as water, ', the essence of life, 
changing and sensual. In another poem in the series 
'-Rebellion, ', a woman who has run away from an old 
people's home is described: 
She tramps the streets, the fields, 
shouting, singing, cursing, 
obscenely (Swir, 'Rebellion', 1986: 104) 
The action implied by the use of the verbs 'tramps', 
**shouting' ' singing' '-cursing' disrupt their noun 
equivalents: tramp, whore, witch. Here it is not that 
Baba is the state capitalist institution but a 
revolutionary force beyond this. It is this wild 
rebellion, what Rosa Luxembourg would call 
spontaneity, which Swir implies will overturn the 
repressive state, rather than the 'Hope' (woman sex 
object) of the West implied by some dissenting 
fiction. Further, this forceful rebellion is carried 
in her memory 'in the bone reliquary of her skull': 
which means that it cannot actually be completely 
gagged or repressed. It is part of the woman, Baba.. 
Swir also recuperates qualities which are usually re- 
presented as the, ultimate in feminine ugliness: 
fatness. To Swir: 
She has a right to have a fat belly 
her belly has born five children. 
They warmed themselves at it, 
it was the sun of their childhood. 
(Swir, 'Her Belly', 1986: 126) 
The Polish word for sun is Isloncel and the word for 
elephant is Islont: the use of phonolexis reinforces 
the inversion of fatness and ugliness. In another 
poem, the woman's belly is 'Fat like the sun': thus 
the belly is huge, bigger than all known life, the 
source of all light, energy and colour. 
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Finally, Swir provided a vision which, whilst 
officially sanctioned, challenged the dominant 
socialist realist version of women as worker-heroines 
capable of doing all duties of motherhood, wifehood 
and Party worker for the socialist nation 
simultaneously. Instead of the abstract concepts of 
nation and 'building socialism, we are presented with 
the burdens that women must carry in magic real form: 
She carries on her shoulders 
the house, the garden, the farm 
the cows, the pigs, the calves and the children. 
(Swir, 'Peasant Woman': 106) 
In the next stanza, Swir deconstructs the super-woman- 
worker: 
Her back wonders 
why it doesn't break 
Her hands wonder 
Why they don't fall off. 
She doesn't wonder. 
( Swir, I Peasant Woman': 106) 
The weight of what the woman must carry alienates her 
from her body: her back, and hands are simply tools, 
separate from herself. The anaphora re-presents the 
repetition and monotony of the woman's life. The use 
of the word wonder, with its religious associations of 
something miraculous is recuperated: something cannot 
be a miracle or surprise if the outcome is already 
known. Finally, Swir overturns the traditional re- 
presentation of woman's socially inherited role 
through her own fortitude and courage: 
Like a bloodstained stick 
her dead mother's drudgery 
sustains her 
That lash 
shines on her through the clouds 
instead of the sun 
(Swir, I Peasant Woman': 106) 
The implication is that the memory of her mother's 
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life keeps the daughter in her place but also 
nourishes or sustains her. The recollection of the 
memory then simultaneously disrupts the present, since 
it is voicing the fact that private violence and force 
engendered women"s position. Yet even in this Swir 
refuses to stereotype the woman as victim. The lash 
shines on the woman, not out of her: her suffering is 
externalized rather than internalized as part of her 
identity. The lash shines not like the sun, but 
instead of the sun, and, hence the lash 'shines' or 
appears clearly. The implication is that the peasant 
woman sees her situation as clearly as the poet: she 
sees the violence done to her, her mother and 
grandmother. This confirms her life as not-miracle. 
Swir challenges a range of other socially inherited 
sexual stereotypes, including the battered woman 
(Reading, 1992: 188) and the Ikobieta samotnal or 
"lonely women'. With the latter, she both recalls and 
recreates the social inheritance that a woman without 
a man is lonely *, kobieta samotna" (See Chapter 2). 
For example in 'I'll Open the Window' Anthonia's lover 
leaves and she can sleep in peace between "clean 
sheets'. In this Isolitude\is the first rule of 
hygiene' and 'solitude makes the room bigger/I'll open 
a window' (Baran and Marshment, 1986: 54). This might 
appear to be the admission of f ear, of an opening void 
now her lover has gone. But by choosing to open the 
window the space is made larger and through it come 
"human thoughts " and "human affairs': "Thus to be 
alone is not to be isolated; it is to connect with the 
rest of humanity. To be alone is not to feel lonely, 
it is to be holy; a (w)hole that is full. ' (Reading, 
1992: 180). 
In the final poem of the collection Fat Like the Sun 
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Swir brings her alternative re-presentations together: 
Born under a dark star 
we gave birth 
to the world. 
(Swir 'A Dark Star', 1986: 144) 
If we compare this to the Biblical version we f ind 
that it is, effectively, a re-writing of the creation 
myth in Genesis. The word 'world' in Polish is 
Iswiat". The word '-light' is '-swiatlo, *. The world 
(swiat) thus connotes light (swiatlo) which contrasts 
with the dark star. According to the Old Testament one 
of the first creative activities of the singular male 
God was, allegedly, to make light. Then, on the fourth 
day of a very creative week he added a pleasing 
addition - stars: 
God set them in the firmament of the heaven to 
give light upon the earth and to rule over the 
day and over the night, and to divide the light 
from the darkness (The Bible, 1960: 1,17-19) 
The poem reverses the Christian order of creation by 
beginning with division (darkness and starlight) and, 
hierarchy signified by the word 'under'. Unity and 
collectivity then follow this. Furthermore, woman as 
childbearer is far greater than the economic and 
political divisions of nation states and military 
blocs. Such collective creation is also beyond woman's 
re-presentation as the custodian of the nation. The 
genderless "we' creates the world. Further, it is 
significant that Swir used the past tense 'gave 
birth'. This establishes that this has already 
happened, despite the dark Star. 
5.7 Concluding Remarks 
What we have seen is that in the period leading up to 
the period of transition censorship was used by the 
regime to produce re-presentations recalling certain 
aspects of Poland's social memory to supplement social 
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policies. The re-presentations which resulted served 
to include women in some ways whilst continuing to 
exclude them in others. Further, the reaction to 
censorship by the opposition was also to draw on 
particular aspects of Poland's socially inherited 
memory in terms of gender, such as the equation of 
woman with the nation, and, freedom with pornography. 
This thereby continued the public exclusion of women. 
However, what I have also argued is that elites in 
societies, like individuals, are able to relax the 
gags of censorship when they feel relatively safe and 
economically secure. Consequently, the reproduction of 
exclusionary aspects of socially inherited memory is 
not an inevitable historical process: There may be 
historical moments and realms of discourse which allow 
for inclusive representations in terms of gender. An 
example of this is some of the work of Anna Swirl 
which radically engaged with, deconstructed and 
(en)gendered re-presentations which challenged those 
of the state, of the opposition and dominant literary 
traditions. It is significant that Swirls most radical 
work concerned with women was published in the 1970s. 
During that period the Polish United Workers Party 
publicly claimed that class divisions in Poland had 
been resolved and this consequently created a new 
space for state writers in terms of the subject matter 
that they were permitted to tackle (Baranczak, 1980: 
58-80; Nycezek, 1984: 20; Short, 1982: 8-12; Krynski, 
1978: 64-75). Furthermore, since Swir challenged the 
underground literary movement in which women were 
frequently portrayed as sex objects this would have 
made such work officially acceptable, hence the 
literary awards she received from the party. The fact 
that Swir chose to use poetic discourse is also 
crucial since poetry did not use gender stereotypes to 
express wider discontent to the same extent as 
fiction. The main concern of underground writers since 
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World War Two was with language and censorship itself. 
The dominant themes were of disillusionment, general 
distrust and pessimism. This provided for a gap in 
poetic discourse which Swir entered and used to 
publicly engender re-presentations that effectively 
challenged Polish cultural traditions. However, 
having said this, it is not then that Swir poetically 
re-presents real or true Polish women. It is that her 
work indicates that even in the 1970s the 
contradictions in Polish culture and society allowed 
for the memory and social recreation of the long 
established but publicly marginalised woman-centred 
tradition in Poland (see Chapter 3) in which women 
were publicly engendered neither as sexual objects, or 
virgin Mother Poland. What this suggests is that 
socially inherited memory is not wholly negative, 
since it passes on a legacy of resistance as well as 
submission to exclusion in the public sphere. The 
added implication of this may be that the attempt to 
repress the memory of inclusion and resistance may be 
impossible, since it is as much a part of Poland, s 
social inheritance as the story of exclusionary 
political right. In the main and third part of the 
thesis I examine these arguments further in relation 
to the role of socially inherited memory during the 
period of transition in Poland. As with the previous 
parts I do this by examining the (re)presentation of 
women publicly in the official public sphere and in 
Poland's developing oppositional sphere. I examine 
mediated aspects of this in terms of the re- 
presentations of women produced by the state 
capitalist regime and by Solidarity. I then focus the 
discussion on the most fought over medium of 
communication in Poland during the period of 
transition - television. By narrowing the focus in 
this way we are able to examine in detail the 
continuation and contradictions of socially inherited 
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memory and the implications of that f or (en) gendering 
the public sphere in future. 
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Part Three: 
Socially Inherited Memory in the Transition and 
After: Poland 1980-1994 
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Chapter 6 
Contradictions and convergence in the official 
Public Sphere 
In relation to Polish women the verses of the 
Arabic prayer are fully understandable: thank you 
God for not making me a horse, a dog or a woman. 
(Krystyna Sienkiewicz, Minister for Health, 
Personal Communication, 1990) 
6.1: Introduction 
In the first part of the thesis I established a 
theoretical and empirical framework for the concept of 
socially inherited memory in Poland. In Part Two I 
attempted to demonstrate how this was articulated in 
the public sphere within different media aspects under 
state capitalism up until 1979. In this third part I 
argue that socially inherited memory may help to 
explain the nature of the gendered changes in the 
public sphere in Poland since 1980. 
The reason I begin the period of 'transition' from 
1980 onwards is that scholars have since established 
that it was from this time that contradictions in 
eastern Europe began to occur which lead to the 
"revolutions, ' of 1989 (Kovats and Tolgeysi, 1990; 
Kowalik, 1994: 171). Some media scholars would argue 
that in Poland the regime began to fall apart from its 
inception after the War (Jakubowicz, 1992). In terms 
of gender, I argue that the (en) gendering process in 
the official public sphere became increasingly 
contradictory in the early 1980s. But, as the decade 
continued, there were increasing convergences in the 
representations of women by the ruling regime and 
Solidarity in politics, in education, in the media and 
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in social and communication policies. There formed, 
effectively, a tripartite alliance between the elites 
of the Church, Solidarity and the Polish United 
Workers Party. Within the enlightened calls for 
democracy and freedom of speech, they sought to 
recover the most conservative aspects of Poland"s 
repressed story of political right and to use the 
socially inherited memory of this to legitimize their 
own economic and political power. However, because 
Poland's social memory was inherently gender biased 
this served to reproduce the public exclusion of women 
after 1989: hence the implementation of a number of 
mechanisms to exclude women from the public sphere, 
except in particular roles. Nevertheless, as in Parts 
One and Two, I also argue that it was not the case 
that this was an inevitable historical process: I 
found that men and women themselves in interviews 
engaged with Poland's social inheritance in complex, 
contradictory and varied ways; as did women in 
Poland's women's movement. I then felt that this 
general argument would benefit from examining one 
medium in greater detail during the transition; thus, 
in the penultimate chapter I narrow the analysis and 
examine the impact of socially inherited memory on 
changes within television. The logic for choosing 
television was that it was undoubtedly the most fought 
over medium during the transition in Poland and the 
central debates concerned the importance of the 
'public' for the medium. It therefore seemed a more 
appropriate choice than, for example, literature or 
print media which in earlier historical contexts were 
apposite examples for exploring Poland's social 
inheritance. 
In this chapter and the next I examine re- 
presentations of Polish women more broadly by the 
state capitalist regime and by Solidarity. Thus in 
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this chapter I begin by deconstructing an example of 
print culture in the form of official propaganda on 
women produced in the 1980s in order to demonstrate 
the growing contradictions in Party representations of 
women. I then compare this with public policy 
developments during the period and the impact of these 
on women's inclusion in politics, the workplace, 
education, at home and in the official women's 
movement. 
6.2 Re-Presentations of Polish Women by the Polish 
United Workers Party 
one of the key propaganda documents produced on women 
in the 1980s is "Women in contemporary Poland" by 
Krystyna Niedzielska (1985). A analysis of the 
language of this government booklet illustrates the 
contradictory processes occurring within the state 
capitalist regime in relation to gender. It begins by 
stating that women constituted 46 percent of, the paid 
workforce and were present in all professions. Women 
had access to free state education and in higher 
education women constituted 50.8 percent of the 
student population. Women, Niedzielska, states were 
easily able to combine work with children because of 
the system of state cr&ches and nurseries, combined 
with paid upbringing leaves for either parent with 
children up to the age of three. Women's health was 
given top priority with a new hospital devoted 
entirely to women's health needs in Lodz. The 
traditional multi-generational family had been 
replaced in Poland by a family in which members shared 
everyday chores: in 65 percent of families husbands 
assisted with housework, according to Niedzielska. 
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What this re-presentation of women indicates is that 
on one level the Polish United Workers Party was 
convinced of the importance of gender equality, even 
in its latter days in the 1980s. However, if we 
deconstruct this we find that the public engendering 
of representation by the 1980s was riddled with 
contradictions; contradictions which are indicative of 
the transitionary processes occurring at the time in 
terms of the established ruling class's atomization. 
Firstly, there is the position that the author herself 
takes. In the first paragraph, Niedzielska writes: 
There are 18 million of them -a little more than 
half the nation. If we could imagine the national 
economy as one great production plant, every 
second employee there would be a woman. This 
however is a purely theoretical picture, for many 
professions such as in education, health service, 
trade and finances are dominated by women. 
(Niedzielska, 1985: 4) (my emphasis) 
Niedzielska uses the word 'them' rather than us when 
referring to Polish women. In other words, she does 
not position herself with Polish women, despite her 
identity as one. She positions herself with us, the 
West. This indicates that there is a crucial 
contradiction between herself and the party re- 
presentation of Polish women. 
Secondly, a deconstruction of this re-presentation 
highlights particular economic gender mechanisms at 
work. For example, women are 'esteemed as workers and 
said to be very good managers' (Niedzielska, 1985: 4). 
The English esteem and the Polish "cenic" mean to 
regard or respect, but also to regard as valuable, to 
rate, to value, to price. To f ix the price of an 
individual is one of the central features of 
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capitalism. Marx stated that under capitalism "all are 
instruments of labor, more or less expensive to use, 
according to their age and sex" (Marx, 1970: 42). The 
phrase *, said to be good managers' contradicts the 
value or price of women, since women are not as a 
matter of fact good managers, only reported to be so. 
It also suggests that there is a rif t between re- 
presentation and representation: a difference between 
how women are portrayed and their presence in the 
higher echelons of Polish society. This is further 
upheld by later paragraphs in the booklet which 
describe women as 'loving and caring mothers, thrifty 
housewives, wise and devoted partners of their men' 
(Niedzielska, 1995: 4). This seems a wholly 
complementary re-presentation of women. But is it? 
Love and care and all things sweet and nice are the 
usual attributes of femininity. It silences the 
humanity of women: our unlovingness, our carelessness, 
grumpiness, untidiness, laziness, wickedness, 
selfishness. All attributes that any human may have, 
and being a woman certainly does not inoculate one 
against them. It equates with what Edward Said argues 
is in racial terms 'the burden of representation', or 
the pressure for representations of marginalized 
groups to show only the positive attributes of its 
members in an attempt to balance negative 
representations by the dominant order. Furthermore, in 
this re-presentation, women are wise: prudent, 
sensible, discreet, unobtrusive in our actions. This 
implies that there are those for whom we must be 
discreet. This is reinforced with the adjective 
"devoted' which connotes that women give up their 
lives, themselves to others: 
This is hardly Marx's vision of the free 
development of each as the condition for the free 
development of all. What it means to be an ideal 
Polish woman, according to this propaganda, is to 
be a non-person. The woman's identity is defined 
not for herself but through others. (Reading, 
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1992: 34) 
The official re-presentation of women given here also 
contains within it a sense of Poland's imminent shift 
towards the Western sphere of influence: a crucial 
part of the party image is that Polish women are like 
women everywhere, concerned with fashion, clothes, the 
ephemera of their appearance: 
Their charm and elegance are widely known not 
only in Poland but also abroad. Polish women 
catch up, with world trends in fashion and are 
often even ahead of it (Niedzielska, 1985: 4). 
Charm is a quality which excites admiration, it is an 
attractiveness, as well as a power to delight that is 
indefinable. Charm or ', czar, * is both glamour and a 
spell: to charm is in some way to use magic to ensnare 
the other. This is part of the social inheritance 
within discourse which attempts to marginalize women 
in two ways: first they are sexual objects and 
secondly any power that women have, whether sexual or 
otherwise, is somehow mysterious or magical, not, 
significantly, quite rational. 
Further, this example of mid-1980s Polish United 
Worker's Party gender propaganda purports to uphold 
the equality of women, and yet, repeatedly, stresses 
that the mechanisms of exclusion to the public sphere, 
that the party have attempted to abolish or 
ameliorate, are something for which women should be 
especially grateful. The opportunities for women to 
participate publicly on an equal basis with men are 
re-presented in terms of something women should feel 
privileged to have, for which women should feel lucky. 
Women 'enjoy' political rights, 'enjoy' special state 
protection, 'People's Poland provided a great chance 
for women, '; '-women have the chance to return to 
professional work'; 'this privilege is very important 
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for mother and child'. What is problematic about this 
from a gendered perspective is that the reverse is not 
said to be true for men: Thus whilst for men access 
to the public sphere is usual, normal, expected, for 
women it is something special. This is a reproduction 
of the repressed story of political right in which men 
automatically have political rights but for women they 
are a privilege, an appendage, an after thought. 
Further, when women do enter the public sphere they do 
so on state capitalist version of the Mother Poland 
ticket. Niedzielska writes: 'Motherhood has been 
deemed an important social function and enjoys special 
state protection'. Motherhood here is an institution; 
Motherhood is the proper collective activity for 
women; their contribution to the reproduction of 
capital in the form of human capital is recognized. 
But, that is it, fatherhood or parenting is not. What 
was thus recalled in this propaganda by the mid-1980s 
in Poland, was, yet again, the 19th century re- 
presentation of women as Mother Poland: 
We have to remember their great social role. It 
is they (women) who bring up the younger 
generation of Poles ... it is mainly they who 
organize cultural life ... this is as if an 
extension, in new conditions of the historic role 
of women, mothers in the first place, who were 
the first to teach the younger generation respect 
for work, patriotism and respect for others in 
the society. (Niedzielska, 1985: 39) 
This suggests that the socially inherited memory of 
women's public participation only as a vessel for the 
nation was recalled by the Party during the 
transition to legitimatize its power. Further on, the 
same document states: 
In Poland family (sic) is the foundation of 
social life and a woman -a mother and wife -a 
full partner in this basic social cell 
(Niedzielska, 1985: 23) 
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What is significant here are two factors. Firstly, 
there is the emphasis on the positive importance of 
the family. Both Marxist and socialist-feminist 
literature argues that the family is the locus of 
oppression for women: it needs restructuring or in 
more radical texts (Perkins-Gilman; Luxembourg) 
actually abolishing. Here, however, the family has not 
been restructured, or abolished. It is firmly in 
place, and within it woman is defined by it as Mother 
and Wife, rather than human. Secondly, the emphasis 
on representing the family as a social unit is 
crucial. Social means to prefer to live in a community 
rather than alone; it denotes relating to human 
society - hence a system of human organizations which 
generate distinctive cultural patterns and 
institutions (Hanks, 1989: 1110-1). The family is not 
represented as anti-social, or as a private haven, 
which we shall see in the next chapter on Solidarity, 
but as contiguous with the public structure of Poland 
and its lifeworld. The family is re-presented here as 
part of the public process; women within it are re- 
presented as full partners: the implication is 
therefore that women are represented publicly on an 
equal basis with men. There is a contradiction, 
however, within this representation. The family is 
represented as basic and a cell. Basic is something 
fundamental, but also it is the standard minimum for 
something. Earlier, Niedzielska had stressed that 
every Pole is awarded a flat fully equipped with 
modern household equipment (Niedzielska, 1985: 27). 
Cell signifies that in some way the family is a 
prison; a prison in which the Queen Bee may be fed the 
monetary equivalent of Royal Jelly in the form of paid 
maternity leave in order to produce and bring up male 
children to participate in the public sphere. 
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The Polish United Workers Party continued use of the 
socially inherited memory of the re-presentation of 
women as Mother Poland is epitomized in its 
description of the Mother Poland Health Center in 
Lodz: 
A unique monument -a monument of a mother's 
heart ... it stands there to pay homage to all Polish mothers who during World War Two lost 
their children: mothers from the villages of 
Zamosc province whose children were taken away to 
the Reich to be Germanized; Warsaw mothers whose 
children fell in the Warsaw uprising, to mothers 
from villages pacified by the aggressor for 
aiding partitions ... special memory is due to those who in effect of criminal medical 
experiments performed on female inmates of Nazi 
concentration camps, were crippled for life 
without any chances of motherhood whatsoever. 
(Niedzielska, 1985: 9-10) 
These were undeniably real atrocities. But, whilst 
there is mention of Polish mothers, there is no 
mention of the Jewish mothers who lost their children, 
of the Jewish children who died in the Jewish uprising 
in Warsaw; of the Jewish women who died in the prison 
camps or lost their ability to reproduce. We do not 
need to be reminded that before World War Two there 
were an estimated 3.5 million Jews in Poland; in 1983 
just 12000 Jews remained (Plakwicz, 1992: 76). 
Secondly, it is solely as mothers that Polish women 
are commemorated and celebrated in the form of a 
monumental re-presentation. Outside the National 
Polish Mother's Hospital in Lodz, there is a sculpture 
of a woman holding a baby. significantly, the female 
model used f or the sculpture was a runner up in the 
beautiful Miss Lodz contest in the early 1980s. If we 
compare this re-presentation of women with another key 
monument in Lodz, we find that a prominent leader of 
the Polish United Worker's Party, stands in the old 
town square pointing the way to a muscle bound male 
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worker who carries a hammer; behind them both is a 
peasant woman with a baby in her arms. That aspect of 
socially inherited memory which includes those women 
who fought in World War Two, who died fighting in the 
underground movements has been socially repressed. The 
re-presentation which is I memorable', which we are 
asked to recall is of the women who performed 
acceptable roles within the private sphere of the 
family and thereby continued the traditions of the 
Polish nation. These are women who: 
Having been left alone, raised their children in 
the series of Polishness and patriotism ... who 
protected monuments of Poland's cultural heritage 
from the looting of the occupier. (Niedzielska, 
1985: 8-9) 
The manner in which this aspect of socially inherited 
memory is being used by the ruling elite in the public 
(en)gendering of re-presentation is clear: those who 
are deemed monumental by the state, who are made 
inanimate objects, are reminders 
(monu=monere=reminder) of the results (ment) of World 
War Two. But no real mention is made that this was a 
Polishness and patriotism gained through the 
elimination of the majority of the Jewish population, 
a Polish nation constructed from the rubble of 
'Poland's cultural heritage', which denies its pre-War 
multi-ethnic cultural heritage. As Marina Warner has 
argued, the relationship between public re- 
presentations, in this instance in the form of 
monuments,, is both a material and dialectical one 
(Warner, 1985). What we find here is that Polish 
women's public re-presentation continued to be 
dialectically related to the public denial of the 
annihilation of the Jews. 
Thus the way that the Polish United Workers Party re- 
presented women in the mid-1980s appears on one level 
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to uphold the principles of Marxist-Leninism; Women 
are re-presented in terms of equal participation in 
the public sphere; in terms of equal rights in legal 
policy and in terms of equality in the home, which is 
socialized. Simultaneously, however, within the same 
document there are re-presentations which indicate the 
beginning of the Polish transition and the beginning 
of a change in the mechanisms of exclusion to women to 
the public sphere. These re-presentations show a move 
by the Department of Agitation and Propaganda towards 
the Western image of women as fashion objects. Others 
indicate the re-use of the Polish Mother re- 
presentation developed in the 19th century, with the 
elimination of other ethnic groups from this re- 
presentation. Again in the public engendering of 
representation, a crucial part of this is the equation 
of woman with nation; but only women of a particular 
kind. In this case, white "Polish" women. Jews, 
Ukrainians, ethnic Germans, students from the African 
region, Vietnamese refugees, in the 1980s, are 
excluded. 
6.3 Women in Government Policy in the 1980s 
By the late 1970s and the 1980s the way women were re- 
presented by the Polish United Workers Party and 
represented in the workforce and political sphere was 
also to become significantly re-articulated through 
new state policies concerning gender relations. An 
article in Nowe Drogi (The New Way) in 1978 
encapsulates this shift in emphasis in the realm of 
policy: 
One of the chief aims of the social policy of 
our party and of the state is to strengthen the 
family and procreative and educational functions. 
(Scroczynska, 1978: 81) 
The way in which women's socially remembered role in 
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the f amily began to be recalled as opposed to their 
public role in the previous decades is indicated by 
the change in 1975 to the rights of parents to take 
paid leave if their child was ill. At the beginning of 
the 1970s fathers as well as mothers had this right. 
But the Regulation of the Council of Ministers, 1 
January, 1975 cancelled this right so that fathers 
could only take paid leave f or a sick child if the 
mother was also ill. 
What was the cause of this shift? Hauser, Heyns and 
Mansbridge argue that we can locate the beginning to 
just after the thaw of 19561. It was then, they argue, 
that state policies towards women began to lose their 
'formal egalitarian' content (1993: 259). But, whilst 
it is true that the return to power of Gomulka did 
alter the political regime in Poland, in terms of 
allowing greater possibilities for dissent, I would 
argue that the impetus for the shift came in the last 
instance from the necessity to restructure the public 
sphere as a result of Poland's massively escalating 
foreign debt, which came from its borrowing in the 
1970s. It was not until the mid 1970s that Mother 
Poland in policy terms began to be so overtly 
' After Stalin's death in March 1953, Boleslaw Bierut began what was termed the "new course" later 
that year. This both relaxed capital investment and allowed for some element of criticism from intellectuals. At 
the end of 1954 Radio Free Europe broadcast the memoirs of a member of the Security Police, UB Officer, 
Joszef Swiatlo, who was in what was called the Tenth Department. This was the most feared and powerful 
section which kept the Polish United Worker's Party itself under surveillance. In the memoirs Swiatlo described 
how members of the Party had undergone torture and blackmail by the section. The revelations led to public 
debate concerning Wladyslaw Gomulka, the First Secretary of the Party who had been put under house arrest 
in 1951. These events led to a period of Party disunity and public protest, called later the October Period. 
Young Poles In the Union of Polish Youth developed their own brand of Communism and were encouraged 
to criticize their elders. A central idea behind this new movement was the virtue of manual labour; members 
of the Union thus labored in voluntary brigades doing construction work and manual labour (See Acherson, 
1981: 66-79) This included women members (Adamczcwska, 1990, Personal Communication). The Union called 
for a new Socialist direction, with more open government. Their calls were then supported in 1956 by a rising 
of workers in Poznan, in which 80 people died at the hands of the security forces. Bierut tried to quell the 
discontent by introducing reforms, but the Workers' Councils wanted a return of Gomulka to power. Soviet 
troops were moved to the Polish border in anticipation of the need to put down an uprising. Khrushchev flew 
to Warsaw to negotiate; in Hungary the uprising began only to be put down. In Poland Gomulka took power. 
(See Ascherson, 1981: 66-79). 
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rearticulated. This is evidenced by the introduction 
of the Kodeks Pracy (Labour Code), which is still in 
force, and which includes all labour laws and 
regulations in Poland (Kodeks Pracy, 1974). This Code, 
later reinforced by the power of the decree Sprawie 
Prac Wzbronionych Kobietom (Decree on Matters Relating 
to Working Women) in 1979, made it illegal for women 
to work in ninety occupations covering 18 branches of 
industry. The Code, and later decree, were in Party 
terms there to provide women workers with a 
"privileged" position in comparison withýmen, and to 
protect women from working in hazardous occupations to 
their health (Niedzielska, 1985). Hauser, Heyns and 
Nansbridge confirm: 
With this decree, the last generation of 
Communists officially outlawed the archetypal 
Stalinist 'happy communist woman on a tractor'. 
(Hauser, Heyns and Mansbridge, 1993: 260) 
Such policies effectively prevented women from working 
in occupations in which they were previously allowed 
to do so. The policies acted as new mechanisms of 
exclusion to women to particular areas of the public 
sphere; particular areas which were well paid under 
the communist regime such as blue-collar jobs in 
construction, underground mining and bus driving 
(Hauser, Heyns and Mansbridge, 1993: 260; Plakwicz, 
1992: 82). The essence of such policies is one which 
sees anatomy as destiny: they serve to perpetuate the 
re-presentation of women as less strong, more fragile 
than men. Research in fact shows that women throughout 
the world often work for longer hours and work doing 
heavy physical labour. Such mechanisms serve to 
perpetuate the vertical and horizontal divisions 
within the public sphere by legally excluding one sex 
from entering particular professions and thereby 
giving the other sex a labour monopoly. This means 
that the included sex have an unfair advantage in 
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terms of the value of their labour; other areas to 
which both sexes are legally entitled to enter may 
then be of less value. It is also significant that 
there are no laws preventing men from entering 
particular professions on the basis of their sex. 
6.4 Women in Official Politics in the 1980s 
Whilst in propaganda terms and policy terms we see the 
advanced recuperation of the social memory of women as 
Matka Polka (Mother Poland), in terms of political 
representation in the official public sphere the 
regime attempted to create new mechanisms of inclusion 
for women, whilst abolishing others. The precursors to 
the new mechanisms of inclusion, according to evidence 
by Hauser, Heyns and Mansbridge (1993: 260) were two 
government offices, created in 1982, called the 
Council for Family Matters and the Council for the 
Elderly and Disabled. Then in 1986 a government 
decree (Uchwala Rady Ministrow Z Dnia 1 Wresnia, 1986, 
Nr 134) established an office for the Government 
Representative for Women's Affairs. The Representative 
(Pelnomocnik) held the rank of Deputy Secretary of 
State within the Polish Ministry of Labour, Wages and 
Social Affairs. The function of the representative was 
to address- the needs of women through examining the 
activities and policies of different government 
offices to ensure gender equality in all spheres: 
political, social, cultural, economic. The overall aim 
of the representative was to better the "living 
conditions" of women (Uchwala Rady Ministrow,, 1986: 
134). The representative, in keeping with the broader 
aims of Communist Women's League, was to ensure the 
development of nurseries, contraceptive information, 
the protection of women in the work place, the 
protection of pregnant women workers, and, was to 
encourage both parents to participate in child 
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rearing. The representative was also responsible for 
the establishment of regular reviews of pay structures 
to ensure gender equity (Uchwala Rady Ministrow, 1986: 
134). 
Nevertheless, the actual representation of women in 
the Polish Seym. was poor, according to the 
government"s own report Women DeRuties in National 
Legislatures (Glowny Urzad Statystczny, 1983). The 
percentage of women deputies certainly rose between 
1960 and 1985. In 1964 the percentage of women in 
parliament was just 12.4 percent; this rose to 15.8 
percent in 1975; 23 percent in 1983 (Glowny Urzad 
Statystczny, 1983) and by the mid-eighties women 
constituted 24 percent of the deputies in the Sejm 
(Niedzielska, 1985: 4). In comparison with other East 
European countries, however, this was the lowest 
number of representatives (Siemienska, 1986: 32). At 
the level of the people's councils the gender 
imbalance was similar: women constituted 20.5 percent 
of councillors at all levels (Niedzielska, 1985: 4). 
There was in 1980 only one woman minister and one 
woman as committee chair in the government (Morgan, 
1984: 555). Women held just three vice-ministerial 
posts and eight key posts at local level in 1983. Only 
10 out of 102 judges in the Polish Supreme Court were 
women in the mid 1980s (Glowny Urzad Statystczny, 
1983). In 1986 just eleven percent of the members of 
the Central Committee of the Polish United Worker's 
Party were women. And on the Consultative Board of 
President Jarulzelsi in the same year only five 
percent of members were women (Titkow, 1993: 254). 
The membership by women of official political parties 
was little better. According to the government's own 
estimate in "Percentage of Women Among Members Of 
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Political Parties In Poland" women's membership of the 
Polish United Worker"s Party and the other parties 
doubled between 1960 and 1982 but by the early 1980s 
this still only constituted one quarter of total 
membership (Glowny Urzad Statystczny, table 3,1978, 
1981,1982,1983). However, women"s membership of 
official trade unions in 1978 was fifty percent 
(Morgan, 1984: 551). 
At local government level political activity increased 
until the 1980s, assisted by the state capitalist 
quota system which provided for a guaranteed 
percentage of women councillors. This mechanism of 
inclusion introduced by the party had mixed results. 
The motivation for the quota system was not so much 
related to a genuine desire for gender equality but a 
new drive by the Polish United Workers' Party to 
strengthen its hegemony by broadening its popular 
political base (Nelson, 1985: 151-3). According to 
Nelson women tended to win seats not because they 
were specjalistki (specialists) in particular areas of 
the public sphere, but because they were posredniczki 
(intermediaries). They were there essentially to make 
up the numbers required for the quota demands 
introduced by the Polish United Worker's Party 
(1985: 151-3). This, according to commentators such as 
Nelson, had the effect of delegitimizing women's 
2 representation in the public sphere. 
However, I should add that although the intentions of 
'This was not something specific to Poland; countries throughout the Eastern bloc had introduced quota 
systems with similar results and which were, after 1989, either dropped or drastically cut. Slavenka Drakulic 
argues that in the case of the former Yugoslavia under the Communist system of quotas introduced after World 
War Two there was generally a 30 percent quota in the different regions for women's participation but that 
"these women were tokens, without power, and unable to make their own decisions" (1993: 124). Bollobas states 
that the situation was the same in Hungary under Communist rule: "women were always present in parliament 
(25 to 30 percent), they were supposed to fill - often to overfill - quotas. No woman was ever a member of a 
body with real political power" (Bollobas, 1993: 202). Similar patterns of power prevailed in the former Soviet 
Union in which there were gender quotas for every political body (LIssyutkina, 1993: 274-5; 279). 
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the government may not have been entirely honourable 
in respect of the introduction of the quota system the 
results on women according to women M. P's themselves 
were, overall, positive. Whilst the Polish women M. Ps 
I interviewed in 1990 had mixed feelings about the 
integrity of the system, they stressed that the 
mechanism of inclusion to the political sphere in the 
form of the quota system had resulted in a greater 
presence of women (in comparison with countries 
outside the Eastern bloc). This had the effect of 
making women used to working in the public sphere and 
psychologically feeling equal to men (Krystyna 
Eysmont; Anna Szymanska-Kwiatkowska; personal 
communication: 1990). Krystyna Eysmont, M. P for Lodz 
said, for example, that in comparison with MPs in 
Western countries she felt that women MPs under state 
capitalism in Poland were more included in the public 
political sphere: "We feel at home in the SejmII she 
said, and, "we feel equal to men" (Krystyna Eysmont, 
personal communication,, 1990). Similarly, Miroslawa 
Grabarkiewicz, M. P, said: 11 our conditions forced us 
to become active in social and political life ... 
we've got into the habit of being active in the public 
sphere. " (Personal communication, 1990). 
Nevertheless, other research does indicate that the 
way in which women were represented in the official 
political arena continued to be structurally gender 
biased horizontally and vertically. Women were 
generally assigned roles in the realm of politics as 
extensions of their "natural" functions in society 
such as in education, culture and light industry. 
Whereas in the economy, business and defense 
departments women were "fillers", mobilized and pushed 
into positions of limited power (Nelson, 1985: 151-3). 
This was confirmed by the Minister for Health, who 
stated that she personally did not feel she had 
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suffered any discrimination but that in wider 
society: 'nothing much as changed. In relation to 
Polish women the verses of the Arabic prayer are 
fully understandable: thank you God for not making 
me a horse, a dog or a woman' (Krystyna Sienkiewicz, 
Minister for Health, Personal Communication, 1990) 
6.5 women in Education in the 1980s 
In education, in the 1980s, the pattern set by 
previous decades of gender equity in terms of the 
rising percentage of educated women continued '(see 
Chapter 4). There remained no restrictions on 
admissions to higher education and the primary and 
secondary schooling system remained coeducational 
(Niedzielska, 1985: 38). In 1981\82 girls accounted for 
48.3 percent of pupils in primary schools; 58.7 
percent in vocational and general secondary stores; 
74.5 percent of pupils in post secondary schools and 
in -institutions of higher learning female students 
made up 50.8 percent of the total number of students 
(Niedzielska, 1985: 16). In 1985 women constituted 43 
percent of all employees with higher education; just 
over half with secondary vocational and post-secondary 
school education and 73 percent of employees with 
general secondary education (Niedzielska, 1985: 16). 
Statistically, the representation of women and girls 
in educational institutions was balanced in comparison 
with the overall sex ratio of Polish society, with 
women dominating higher education because of state 
capitalist polices which emphasized 'vocational 
training and technical skills ... designed to advance 
proletarian males' (Hauser, Heyns and Mansbridge, 
1993: 266). However, what government statistics fail 
to show is the continuation of ghettoisation and the 
gender balance of particular subjects. In 1988 women 
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constituted 85.9 per cent of medical school students, 
and 59.3 per cent of the arts, but only 25 per cent of 
technical schools (Plakwicz, 1992: 76). of the nine 
young women in two secondary schools in Lodz in my 
study only one young woman said computer programming 
was her favourite subject and another mathematics 
(Lodz Secondary School Students, Personal 
Communication: 1991). The barrier and choices were 
more apparent than in further education. Magdalena 
Niewadomska, an executive in a foreign trade company 
stated: 
Women's discrimination starts with entrance 
examinations to colleges. In some departments 
like medicine men are given preference; a man may 
get 20 per cent fewer points than a woman but he 
is still accepted. In the Foreign Trade 
Department it's a rule to have 60 per cent men 
and 40 per cent women. (Magdalena Niewadomska, 
Personal Communication, 1990). 
A key precursor to these public barriers is the social 
inheritance of gender stereotypes in school education. 
Secondary school teachers in Lodz for example firmly 
believed that innate differences between boys and 
girls were articulated in terms of their behaviour, 
educational achievements and particular subject 
abilities. Agata Kaczan a secondary school teacher of 
Polish said: "boys are less meticulous than girls. 
Girls are better at literature, history and languages' 
(Personal Communication, 1990). Others admitted to 
being biased in the way they behaved towards pupils. 
Anna Lis, deputy head teacher said: 
During my classes I pay more attention to boys. 
If there are many of them, I should make them 
interested in the subject - they are more 
difficult to lead. I sooner trust girls, although 
they cope with their problems more easily than 
boys. (Personal communication, 1990) 
This is conf irmed by Czykwin who in research f ound 
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that 70 per cent of teachers' time in the classroom 
was spent with boys (1988: 23). Teachers also saw 
pupils sex related abilities as designing them for 
particular gendered roles in terms of their 
participation in the public sphere. Bozenna Kaminska, 
a teacher of history and social sciences said: 
Boys are dynamic, talkative, spontaneous: girls 
are calmer. Certainly boys are more intelligent 
and capable than girls, who in turn work harder. 
Girls are better there where they can memorize 
well. A woman should take care of the household 
and children, a man should earn their living. 
(Personal Communication, 1990) 
What we see at work here are (en)gendering mechanisms 
at work at the micro level which prepare girls and 
boys for the public (en)gendering of representation. 
Within the educational institution this is then 
reinforced with re-presentations of girls and boys in 
learning materials prescribing particular roles within 
the private and public realms of society. Despite 
government policy, according to Krotki (1980: 260) 
before the 1980s gender stereotypes in school books 
before and during the 1980s were rife. This is also 
confirmed by Czykwin: 
If we examine the current primer in Poland the 
heroes of the fishing expedition amongst the 
rushes at the lakeside are boys, Romek and Marek. 
On the opposite page sits little Dorothy, all 
alone, holding on her lap a dolls house, which, 
incidentally she was given by Adam. Just as the 
poem 'I shall be a sailor' and 'I shall be a 
pilot' are accompanied by pictures of smiling 
little boys clad in their respective uniforms, 
every one of them the text stresses, confident 
and brave, so we can be certain that the person 
with the dustpan and brush in the section on 
Spring cleaning is of course the little girl, 
Dorothy. (Czykwin, 1988: 22) 
However, this is not to say that women and girls do 
not actively engage with such (re)presentations. 
Particularly in higher education I found that the 
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women I interviewed expressed contradictory attitudes 
to their prescribed roles and some challenged them 
outright. The head of the English Department at Lodz 
University said: 
I refused to recognize discrimination too early 
in life so as not to give up. It was very early 
in the game when someone told me that it takes 
f or a woman seven times the amount of work it 
takes a man to reach the same point in his 
career. I didn't believe it, but now I see the 
point. (Agnieszka Salska, Personal Communication: 
1991) 
Ewa Bednarowicz , Lecturer in American Literature at 
the University of Lodz, agreed that the role model f or 
girls and women in education and Polish society was 
Matka Polka, but she saw this as increasingly 
redefined in relation to the West: 
The ideal Polish woman? Matka-Polka, looking 
wistfully back on the glorious past, when she 
produced gallant sons for the national 
battlefield, now decorously dressed for Sunday 
mass, and the dutiful wife during the week. Now 
it's all changing of course, so she drives a 
Hyundai preferably - that's the consumer version 
if the image, and she has her kids learn English 
and computers. (Ewa Bednarowicz, Personal 
Communication, 1990). 
She continued, however, that in her view the young 
women she taught did not passively accept this role: 
I think there are a million closet feminists in 
Poland who simply hate the idea of being 
labelled. My students have the same 'feminist' 
dreams and ideals of taking charge of their own 
lives, of having careers apart from their 
families, but most would sooner die than allow 
anybody to call them a feminist -I mean, what 
Polish male would want them? (Ewa Bednarowicz, 
Personal Communication: 1990) 
This was confirmed by young women themselves. When I 
asked University students about their thoughts on 
feminism and their own roles they found it difficult 
to call themselves feminists because of the engagement 
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with the socially inherited memory of feminism as 
something restrictive or man-hating (See Chapter 2). 
One student said for example: "for some years I 
thought feminists were some kind of nuns, ' (Kasia 
Muszynska, Personal communication, 1991). Another 
student said: 'feminism is a total liberation for a 
woman, who starts living by her instincts, obviously 
with dose of rationality otherwise she would be too 
wild.... they reject maternal instinct though' 
(Isabella Kaczan, Personal Communication: ' 1991). 
Another student in her fourth year at University said: 
II think feminists are losing out on something, some 
aspect of their sexuality' (Joanna Sobczak, Personal 
Communication, 1991). Yet the same student went on to 
express, firstly, dissa'tisf action with her socially 
inherited role; 'secondly, imagining something 
different, and finally denial of remembering that 
there are other'possibilities for a woman: 
I'd like my husband to see me as a good wife, 
mother and lover. I also hope that af ter the next 
two 
, 
or three years, after we have the child 
something will change, that I would stop being 
a Polish Mother only. It would be good if 
something changed in this respect in our 
conservative society. If nothing changes in my 
own family I think that I'd have to leave my 
husband and live alone, but I cannot really 
imagine that either. (Joanna Sobczak, Personal 
Communication: 1991). 
The young woman who thought that feminists were some 
kind 'of nuns had also said that to her The word 
feminist sounds very pejorative in Polish'. But she 
had no difficulty in recognising that this sense of 
feminism was just one version. She went on to recall 
another long established version of feminism in 
Poland: 
Later I realized that it - can be a way of liberating ourselves and developing in areas 
which were once considered to be the reserve of 
men ... I realized that feminism shows you how to 
make decisions about yourself, by yourself, and 
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when I started doing it in my life I understood 
what feminism is really all about: it's a way of 
doing what we want to do, but also knowing what 
we want to do. (Kasia Muszynska, Personal 
Communication: 1991) 
What we see, therefore, is a complex picture 
emerging in the 1980s between a government attempting 
to recall the socially inherited memory of Mother 
Poland in propaganda and policy and the continuation 
of this in, for example, education. Yet, this does not 
mean to say that women themselves were not engaging 
with this inheritance and struggling to recall 
something different. 
6.7 Women in the Workplace 
This was also the case in the workplace. Despite 
statutory mechanisms to ensure pay equity established 
by the 1952 constitution, gender bias under the state 
capitalist system in the 1980s was still evident. 
Women, 's public -work was low in status and poorly paid. 
Government research that looked at 17 areas of the 
Polish economy in 1980 shows that women did earn more 
than men in the lowest pay category of 6000 zlotys per 
month. But the proportion of women who then earned 
more than men fell significantly in the middle and 
higher income brackets. In the highest pay category of 
16000 zlotys per month women were virtually absent 
(Kobiety W Polsce, 1980). Women in the 1970s were paid 
on average 30 percent less than men (Kobiety W Polsce, 
1975: 44). This pattern remained stable through the 
1980S. Research shows that women from 1985-88 were 
generally paid 30 per cent less than men. The biggest 
disproportions were in industry, physical culture and 
tourism, science, technical administration and 
justice. The smallest disproportions were in forestry, 
agriculture, trade, finance and insurance. The 
disproportion was nowhere less than 10 per cent, 
except in a small number of highly paid jobs, such as 
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lawyers in which there was 2 percent difference, and 
mathematicians in which there was 2.9 per cent 
difference (Plakwicz, 1992: 85). Despite these 
differences there were no cases between 1983 and 1988 
challenging in the courts wage scale discrimination on 
the basis of sex (Morgan, 1984: 556). 
The horizontal divisions in the political sphere were 
also evident in other work place structures. Overall, 
men dominated top positions. Ninety percent of senior 
teachers were men, despite the fact that women 
constituted 70 percent of the teaching profession 
(Morgan, 1984: 556). This picture was confirmed by 
interviewees working in all spheres of employment. one 
women M. P suggested that it was the social 
inheritance of women's domestic role which was partly 
responsible for their public exclusion: 
equal rights are constitutionally guaranteed, but 
no one can take from our shoulders the duties of 
mothers and wives, and Polish women value those 
primary duties of women very highly. Women get 
promoted at work around the age of 35, after the 
children have been taken care of and are more 
independent. There are few women in top positions 
in comparison with other countries' (Irena 
Choynacka, Personal Communication, 1990). 
The head of the English Department at the University 
of Lodz also indicated that there was a link between 
the socially inherited memory of women as vessels of 
'Polishness' and the home and hearth that held them 
back at work: 
I do think that men have greater opportunities. 
The main reason for this is that ours is culture 
which is largely based on emotions. And it's been 
the role of women to cultivate that emotional 
bond within the family, between families, 
friends. It limits womens lives in terms of 
career.... if one of the main values here is time 
with the family, that means sitting around the 
table and that means cooking all the 
time. (Agnieszka Salska, Personal Communication: 
1990) 
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Another MP said, however, that the inherited public 
invisibility of women meant that they had to "work 
really hard to be noticed and promoted' (Miroslawa 
Grabarkiewicz, Personal Communication: 1990). This was 
confirmed by artist Joanna Wiszniewska: 
It's easier for men. A woman if she wants to be 
noticed and get her work exhibited must work for 
years. She must prove that what she does is not 
something that happened by coincidence or chance. 
Women are not treated as seriously as men. 
(Personal Communication, 1990) 
Business Woman, Magdalena Niewadomska, saw her lack of 
promotion as a combination of different forces: 
The importance departments are dominated by men, 
even new employees are mainly men; women are not 
hired; the less important sections are full of 
women. The highest positions held by women are 
vice-managers and if there is choice between a 
man and a woman, the man is preferred, no matter 
what qualifications he have ... it is generally thought that business talks are handled better by 
men. Also, women bring up children, they take 
leaves, have more house duties; men can stay at 
work overtime, prepare themselves better ... when I started my work in this company my child used 
to get ill quite often - that was the cause of 
conflict between me and my bosses - and a lower 
salary and slower promotion ... they didn't 
notice that no one did my work for me, that I do 
make up for the time when I was absent from work. 
(Magdalena Niewadomska, Personal Communication: 
1990) 
Women, as Magdalena Niewadomska observes, as in the 
West, were also vertically segregated in work place 
structures. Women were predominant in book-keeping, 
insurance, health services, social work, education and 
the food, pottery and clothing industries (Glowny 
Urzad Statystczny, 1985). The one exception to 
vertical segregation common throughout industrialized 
countries, was the medical profession. This is a 
common feature of other Eastern Bloc countries. In the 
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eighties in Poland more than half of medical graduates 
were women (63.2 percent). The medical profession was 
regarded as a female domain. The history behind this 
is significant. After World War Two the Polish United 
workers Party gave both material and ideological value 
to particular professions, considered essential to the 
growth of the economy. At that time more men entered 
technical rather than service professions: 
The profession of engineer was considered more 
important than that of physician on the grounds 
that the f ormer is productive while the latter is 
a service profession (Sokolowska, 1977: 367). 
Technical professions in comparison with doctors were 
also better paid. A senior cardiologist stated that 
the one area of the medical profession which was paid 
well was that of surgery and most surgeons tended to 
be male * In the rest of the medical profession women 
dominated. The cardiologist said: 
our salaries are very low and it's not sufficient 
for men. Thus a lot of women enter the 
profession. It's a universal problem. ( Maria 
Krzeminska-Pakula, Senior Cardiologist, Lodz: 
Personal Communication, 1990) 
6.6 Gender Mechanisms at Home 
In the home the socially inherited memory of women's 
domestic role seems to have lead to the continuation 
of gendered mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion in 
terms of domestic arrangements and duties. It is true 
that in particular sections of Polish society, notably 
the intelligentsia, couples often shared domestic 
duties equally. A study in the 1980s of Warsaw couples 
where both partners were engineers showed that both 
men and women were equally responsible for domestic 
duties and child care. A study amongst scientific 
workers showed similar patterns: 
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Remarkable in the responses was the lack of sex 
differentiation in the descriptions of tiresome 
and time consuming chores - Sunday washing and 
cleaning, shopping after working hours, lunches 
prepared for the next day, standing in lines for 
consumer goods, washing diapers, walking the 
children to school, done by ... wives and husbands alike. (Sokolowska, 1977: 367) 
Amongst my interviewees it seemed that members of the 
intelligentsia certainly shared domestic 
responsibilities more equally, particularly where 
couples did_ not have children. However, many of the 
women whilst perceiving or perhaps wanting to project 
during the interview an equal relationship in the home 
actually then went on to say that for various 
'reasons' (time, work location, the dislike of certain 
tasks by their menfolk) they did the majority of 
tasks, especially shopping and cleaning: 
My family and many other families in Poland are 
partnership families... af ter work I do shopping 
and the cooking. (Magdalena Niewadomska,, Personal 
Communication: 1990). 
Another interviewee stated: I do the shopping, 
because of the convenient hours of work, both of us 
cook' (Ewa Bednarowicz, Personal-Communication: 1990) 
Both partners actually worked full time. The other 
alternative involved women recruiting other women for 
low pay or no pay to do their share of domestic tasks 
rather than their husbands: 
I've been very fortunate to get a lot of help in 
running the family from my mother and my mother- 
in-law.. My husband was always tolerant of my 
career and he does a lot in the house. Well, 
technically we have divisions, like he doesn't 
like cooking, but he can clean up and do the 
shopping. Not the laundry though. (Agnieszka 
Salska, Personal Communication, 1990) 
Both partners have full time jobs; the woman in this 
case was more senior than her husband. But because of 
the socially inherited memory of women's private role 
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the husband's equal participation in the household is 
accepted by the woman as contingent on his desire: 
Any contribution by the husband is perceived as a 
bonus, hence he is 'tolerant of my career' and " does 
alot' (but not the laundry or the cooking) around the 
house. The woman assumes that she is 'lucky' to have 
help and accepts that it is other women, not really 
her husband, who should then take the responsibility 
to pay for her career in the public sphere. Later on, 
it is not the man, but the woman who through her 
social inheritance 'remembers' the debt, despite the 
fact that it is in reality the inheritance of both, if 
not more so the man's because he did not do his full 
share in the first place. The denial or chosen 
forgetfulness by him of this means that it is the 
woman, not her husband, who then becomes responsible, 
or feels responsible for re-paying the socially 
inherited debt for her public participation: 
there are older people in the f amily now and they 
need more care, so that's something that I have 
to assume responsibility for, at least in times 
of crisis. (Agnieszka Salska, Personal 
Communication, 1990). 
Whilst the average man spent about one hour 13 minutes 
on housework a day, women spent up to f our hours 
forty-five minutes. For every single meal prepared and 
cooked by a man, a woman prepared and cooked 12 meals. 
For each shirt a man washed and ironed under the state 
capitalist regime, a woman washed and ironed twenty 
(Sokolowska, 1977: 372). Furthermore, the proportional 
difference in time use of women and men in selected 
domestic activities in terms of hours per week 
remained significant between' 1965 and 1984 although 
the overall hours spent decreased for both sexes 
according to UN statistics (The World's Women, 1991 
cited in Einhorn, 1993: 264). In 1965 women spent 33.5 
hours on domestic chores and 5.3 hours on child care. 
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In 1980 women spent 30.5 hours on household chores and 
4.4 hours on child care. This compares with just 9.7 
hours spent on household chores by men in 1965 and 2.7 
hours spent on child care by men in the same year. In 
1984 the contribution of men to domestic duties had 
decreased to 7.7 hours spent on household chores and 
just 2.0 hours spent on child care. Both men and women 
experience an increase in personal care and free time 
but the disproportionate share went to men. In 1965 
men had 103 hours per week of free time. In 1984 this 
had risen to 116 hours of f ree time. Women in contrast 
had 99 free hours in 1965 which increased to 108 hours 
in 1984. (The World"s Women, 1991 cited in Einhorn, 
1993: 264). This pattern also prevailed in Hungary. ' 
What is also significant in Poland, as in other 
Central and East European countries, under late state 
capitalism were the material conditions people endured 
which made womens role within the domestic sphere 
much harder than in the West. Af ter World War Two 
Western countries were given a significant boost with 
Marshall Aid. The countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe were denied such aid and also had to enter into 
unequal trade arrangements with the USSR. The emphasis 
in Polish economic policy after World War Two was to 
build Poland's industrial base. The priority was large 
industrial projects, capital investment and export 
(see Chapter 4). Production of consumer goods which 
may have acted as mechanisms to lighten women's load 
were severely limited for the Polish population. For 
' However it seems that this pattern of gender representation in domestic arrangements was not the 
same throughout Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Einhorn shows in her use of UN 
statistics that in Bulgaria, for example, the domestic duties of women and men increased between 1965 and 1984 
with men participating more in domestic duties than any where else in Central and Eastern Europe or Western 
Europe. The pattern for Western Europe, particularly the UK, is the inverse of that in Poland. In the UK 
between 1965 and 1984 the representation of men doing unpaid housework increased from 4.8 hours per week 
to 11.4; for women in the same years they did 33.9 hours and 30.0 hours respectively. (Ile Worlds Women, 
1991 cited in Einhorn, 1993: 264) 
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a limited period under Edward Gierek's five year plan 
(1971-75) consumer goods were given greater priority 
in new manufacturing plants. In addition, the 
importation of Westerný consumer goods such as 
refrigerators, cookers, vacuum cleaners and washing 
machines were paid for by borrowing from Western 
banks. The results were catastrophic for the Polish 
economy and women in particular. Poland's accumulated 
foreign debt rose from $ 764 million in 1971 to $ 7381 
million in 1975 (Harman, 1988: 254) and to $10,680 
billion in 1976 (Harman, 1988: 255). As a result, by 
the late 1970s consumption was again curtailed . Under 
Martial Law between 1981-1983 rationing was 
introduced. Coffee, cigarettes, soap, shoes, clothes, 
alcohol, and butter were all rationed until 1983. Meat 
was rationed until 1988. The result for women living 
under state capitalism was that: 
to cook meant starting from scratch with few 
tinned or packaged short cuts; to clean meant 
heaving a rug down ten flights of stairs to beat 
it on the rail outside; to shop meant standing in 
lines every day for goods that might not arrive. 
And it was women, mostly, who performed these 
tasks (Reading, 1992: 42) 
A Senior Cardiologist stated: "the economic crisis 
hits mainly women too ... there are no ready-made 
products so cooking takes a long time. ' The Reception 
Manager of The Grand Hotel in Lodz said: 'women work 
8 hours and have to deal with the shopping and 
housework which takes much more time than in other 
countries' (Barbara Aroniszydze, Personal 
communication: 1990). The Manager of Poland's first 
sex shop added: 'Polish women work professionally and 
run the house. It's not easy: shopping problems, city 
transport problems add to the greater physical and 
emotional effort women have to make than that of men 
(Bozenna Pruszynska, Personal Communication: 1990). A 
textile worker said: I Shopping and the such like - 
It's very difficult here, queues - and you can't get 
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what to you want. ' 
Further, research by Hauser, Heyns and Mansbridge 
shows that much of life in the domestic sphere in East 
and Central Europe revolved around the informal 
arrangement or fixing of things which very often fell 
to women: 
The logic of socialist countries also supported 
a way of life that placed a high premium on 
personal ties, social networks, caring relations 
and the capacities to shop, trade, barter and 
manage through informal means - the skills the 
Poles ref er to as 11 Zalatwiac I (arranging things) 
. Women were responsible for creating and 
maintaining these patterns of informal exchange, 
which had become culturally if not economically 
a way of life (1993: 266) 
Boys and girls then socially inherit Izalatwiac' in 
different ways. Einhorn, for example, shows how where 
children were expected to help at home their roles and 
duties were gender segregated. Girls on the whole had 
more set chores to perform than boys. Boys she 
maintains had more time to themselves. Girls tended to 
do cleaning, cooking, child care of younger siblings 
whilst boys did one off repair jobs or outdoor duties. 
In other words, boys learned neutral or technical 
skills, but girls were initiated into social and 
caring roles. This is born out my study of secondary 
school girls in Lodz in 1990. Girls stated that of the 
tasks they were expected to perform at home these were 
disproportionate in relation to male siblings and 
fathers. Girls performed tasks such as washing-up, 
shopping, cooking, ironing and clothes washing. Again 
it seems that if adult men in the household choose 
not to do their full share of responsibilities it then 
falls to the girls, rather than the boys to do their 
tasks. School girl, Agata, aged 16, said: 
At home I often have to do what others don't - 
like my dad is too lazy to move and he makes me 
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mad. I'm very unhappy when I come home after 
classes and I have a lot of housework to do on 
top of my homework. (Personal Communication, 
1990) 
The emphasis by the Polish state on developing heavy 
industry also impacted on women differently from men 
in other ways. Four areas of Poland in the 1980s were 
declared 'ecological disaster areas'. This meant that 
those regions, in which 11 million people, or 30 
percent of the population permanently lived (and still 
do) , were so contaminated with chemical and industrial 
waste that they were no longer fit for human 
habitation (Rosenbladt, 1988: 16)'. For women it added 
to the battle to keep dirt and dust at bay. In Lodz, 
for example, the black dust from the industrial power 
plants situated in the city itself meant that 
virtually every day surfaces would become covered in 
fine coal dust and need to be wiped; it was virtually 
impossible to dry clothes out doors without them 
getting dirty again. The Vice-Mayor of Lodz, Elzbieta 
Hibner, and chairperson of the Green Party, said that 
although, obviously, the ecological threat to men and 
women was equal it was women who bore the brunt of the 
extra burden placed on them by this, in terms of extra 
domestic cleaning and care for children and family 
members whose health had been effected by pollution 
(Personal Communication, 1990). Most major cities in 
Poland did not have water reprocessing plants. 
Greenpeace journalist Sabine Rosenbaldt wrote: 'they 
still call what comes out of Polish taps "drinking 
water" but only for reasons of nostalgia' (1988: 16). 
Even a simple drink of water was and is gendered: one 
of the extra tasks performed by Polish women was the 
daily ritual of boiling water. Thus, because of 
Poland's gendered socially inherited memory the public 
' 17here was a joke in Poland in the late 1980s: what is the fastest way to develop your holiday snaps? 
Dip the film in the Wisla, river down stream from Kracow 
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inheritance of environmental damage caused by state 
capitalism was to become part of a woman"s private 
role in a different way from a man's, which in turn 
further limited women's equal public participation. 
6.8 The Official Women's Movement 
However, just as on an individual level socially 
inherited memory was not simply handed down as part of 
an inevitable historical process, on a social level 
women's spaces in the official public sphere in the 
period of transition recalled another aspect of 
Poland"s story of political right. As we know from 
Chapter 4, the women's movement in Poland after World 
War Two did not simply vanish. Whilst it is true that, 
on the whole, until the 1970s the main area of women's 
public activity took place within official women's 
groups and organizations, some alternative women's 
spaces did remain, although transformed and transmuted 
to fit with the new regime. 
Of the official women's public spaces the most active 
was the League of Women. The League was essentially an 
organ of the Polish United Workers Party; it was 
financed by the party and its aims and objectives 
were, on the whole,. to support broader Party doctrine. 
Yet, the League and its agrarian counterpart the 
Rural Housewives Circle were not, in my opinion, 
simple vehicles for Communist Party propaganda and 
ideology. This was because it was not the case that 
there was a radical break between pre-War and post-War 
women's spaces as commentators insist. In one sense 
this was due to the continuities in Polish society and 
the capitalist system (albeit a state capitalist one, 
with the exception of the majority of peasants who 
kept their land). In addition continuity came from 
the social memory of pre-war women activists and their 
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ideology. The strength of the Polish feminist movement 
bef ore World War Two meant that the League drew as 
much on that tradition as that of the Polish United 
Workers Party and its socially inherited memory of 
Soviet gender relations which it rearticulated. A 
comparison of the aims of the post-War League of Women 
in the 1980s with those of the pre-War National 
Organization Of Women (NOW) in 1928 illustrates this. 
The aims of NOW in 1928 included the abolition of all 
statutes that limited women's rights. NOW sought the 
promotion of women to all public positions, the 
establishment of equal pay, and the development of 
training and education for women. NOW also sought to 
implement programmes to curtail alcoholism and 
venereal disease. It established cheap housing for 
homeless women, a system of home-helps for disabled 
and elderly women; nurseries and crbches for children 
of working women; homes for orphans and children's 
holiday camps. It also ran a lecture programme, 
evening classes and provided financial assistance for 
unemployed women (Narodowa Organizacja Kobiet W Lodzi, 
1928) 
The League of Women after World War Two had'the same 
priorities. It concentrated on key areas of the public 
(rather than domestic or private) sphere by 
campaigning for improvements in legislative rights, 
housing and financial aid to women, as well as 
education and training. In class terms, both the pre- 
War and post-War organizations involved educated 
middle class women usually linked through family or 
marriage to the parties which gave them political 
support. Before the War the National Organization of 
Women was allied with the right wing National 
Democracy Party and after the War the League was 
allied with PUWP. Both movements used pragmatic 
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methods to ease present conditions for women, rather 
than stressing longer term radical goals, or, 
empowering women themselves particularly from the 
manual and working classes. An essential corollary to 
the stress by both organizations on the public sphere 
was their support for the family and women's dual role 
as Mother and Worker to contribute to the good of the 
(public) Nation. There was of course one significant 
difference. Whilst the pre-War NOW promoted women's 
public representation for the good of the Polish 
Catholic Nation, the post-War League of Women promoted 
the representation of women publicly for the good of 
the Socialist (People's Democratic Republic) Nation. 
In practice how this was done was virtually the same. 
Immediately following World War Two the main aim of 
the League of Women was education and finding work for 
women. By the late 1970s the emphasis was much more on 
assisting working women within the domestic 
environment to perform their roles as mothers and 
wives. The Secretary of the League in Lodz I 
interviewed emphasized that in the 1980s the main aim 
was to prepare women for house-keeping so that this 
could be combined with their professional roles. 
Nearly 40 000 household management centres were 
operating in Poland in the mid-1980s, which organized 
courses an rational nutrition, needlework, cosmetics 
and household and personal hygiene (Niedzielska, 1985: 
43). By the end of the 1980s women's training included 
courses for women to establish their own businesses 
and to adjust their labour skills to meet the changing 
economic environment which was beginning to make the 
shift in Lodz from textile manufacturing to micro chip 
technology and service sectors (Gasiorowska, Personal 
communication, 1990). The League, as with 
organizations in the West, , also established various 
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help lines for women. These included a free legal help 
line which dealt with rape and domestic violence 
issues, as well as 500 consulting centres and 200 
legal offices (Niedzielska, 195: 41). As with the pre- 
War NOW, the League women stressed that work relating 
to alcohol abuse was particularly beneficial to women 
who were often on the receiving end of violent drunken 
men, as well as suffering alcohol abuse themselves 
(Suska-jankowska, Personal Communication, 1990). 
However, it is important to note that the League 
actively challenged the social inheritance offered by 
the Polish United Workers' Party and in doing so did 
not simply rearticulate the tradition that NOW had 
established of allying itself with the ruling Party. 
On several issues the League challenged the public re- 
presentation of women and gender relations themselves 
in ways which were against Party policy of the time. 
For example, in the 1980s the League, in the face of 
discussions concerning abortion, called for sex 
education in schools to be made a compulsory part of 
the curriculum. The League published a handbook of sex 
education for young people which was used for two 
years between 1986-88. The Chair of the League in 
Lodz stated that the handbook was then strongly 
attacked by the Roman Catholic Church and under this 
pressure the government acquiesced and withdrew the 
handbook from all Polish schools. The emphasis by the 
League, in contrast to the Church and the Party at 
that time, said Janina Suska-Jankowska, was on a 
broad family planning strategy, which included the 
right to abortion, but also a programme of 
contraceptive information, free contraceptives for all 
and an educational programme which steered people 
towards reproductive responsibility rather than 
abortion as the main contraceptive option (Personal 
communication, 1990). In other areas the League also 
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went against the government. During Martial Law (1981- 
3) when many women were imprisoned for their political 
activities the League provided bail' and support for 
women of all political persuasions including those in 
the opposition movement of Solidarity. -Consequently, 
many of those women were released (Gasiorowska, 
Personal Communication, 1990). 
In addition to the League of Women there were a number 
of other official women's organizations that, provided 
space for women in the public sphere and-stressed 
women's role within it. The Rural Housewives Circles 
in the mid-1980s had one and a half million members in 
villages across Poland. The Organization's main, goals 
were, to assist , in the agricultural worký'Ifor which 
most 'often women are responsible'- (Niedzielska, 
1985: 43) such as dairy production, animal- husbandry 
and- vegetable growing. The circles ran courses on 
nutrition, food storage and preserve making. They also 
ran lectures on child care and general health care, 
including hygiene. I-- 
The third - main , strand of the Polish Women's 
organizations under state capitalism was the'National 
Committee of Woman Cooperative Members. Women made up 
34 percent of Cooperative members in 1985. As with the 
other organizations, although initially the stress was 
on furthering women's civil rightsý and economic 
knowledge,, by the 1980s Women's Cooperative 
organizations put special stress on helping women in 
rational management of their' households, training 
women at "modern housewife" and "practical woman" 
centres. -The overall coordinating body for the 
official women's movement was established in 1983 with 
the Polish Committee for Cooperation of Women's 
organizations. 
214 
6.9 Concluding Remarks 
The official public sphere in the 1980s was marked by 
both continuity and contradiction in terms of gender. 
The overall picture is one in which Poland's economic 
crisis compounded by the waning confidence of the 
ruling Party led to contradictions in (en)gendering 
mechanisms followed by increasing exclusionary 
convergences. In propaganda we see the operation of 
socially inherited memory in the form of familial and 
nationalistic discourses and the recuperation of 
Mother Poland as the formal egalitarian content of 
policies became increasingly lost. In the political 
arena women's public role had become delegitimized as 
a result of the quota system. In education and the 
workplace we saw socially inherited memory resulting 
in ghettoization, gender stereotyping and the 
continued tension for women between their expected 
domestic roles and their public participation. 
Nevertheless, as in previous periods socially 
inherited memory and its impact on the public (en) 
gendering of representation both in terms of 
individuals and social movements for women was 
contradictory. Women MPs themselves stated that the 
quota system had made them feel increasingly confident 
of their public roles. Young women in education 
engaged with the social memory of feminism and Mother 
Poland in complicated and unf oreseen ways. In the 
official women's movement, notably The Women's League, 
we saw marked continuity in terms of the reproduction 
of the social memory of pre-War feminist discourses 
and policies, and how the League at times also 
actively challenged the government of the day in terms 
of its public representations of women. 
However, this analysis only takes into account what 
we could call the official public sphere of the 
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transitionary period. At the same time, the emergence 
of Solidarity resulted in the formation Of another 
sphere of public engagement in which women were also 
represented. Thus in the next chapter I examine the 
extent to which the increasing exclusion of women from 
the official public sphere seemed to converge with 
what was also happening in Poland's unofficial public 
sphere, with both PUWP and Solidarity seeking to 
recover the most exclusionary aspects of Poland"s 
repressed story of political right, despite the 




Solidarity, Gender and the Public Sphere 1980-92 
In Lodz now there is an office hung with 
Solidarity banners, and a large V sign: V for 
victory, V for voting, V for two sides converging 
- converging in agreement to make abortion 
illegal and women liable to three years 
imprisonment (Personal Diary 1989: May 3). 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter examined the contradictions that 
developed in Poland's official public sphere during 
the 1980s. In this chapter I look at socially 
inherited memory in relation to the movement which 
developed an alternative public sphere in Poland, 
Solidarity. I argue that just as there were 
convergences in the representations of women by the 
ruling Party in the official sphere, so too were there 
convergences within the unofficial public sphere on 
the same aspects of Poland's socially inherited 
memory. Solidarity, like the Polish United Workers 
Party, sought to use certain aspects of Poland's 
social memory to legitimatize its power base. But what 
it recalled in cultural and political terms was 
inherently gender biased. This then served to 
reproduce the exclusion of women from the public 
sphere after the so-called revolution of 1989. The 
consequence of this is that, despite the triumph of 
Solidarity, the transition in Poland did not result in 
greater inclusion for women in the public sphere. 
Whilst it is true, as in previous periods, that 
women's exclusion did not go unchallenged, the 
retreats in gender terms by all parties made it 
actually more difficult in some ways for women during 
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the transition than before. 
I begin by describing the events of the early 1980s in 
order to provide the necessary background to the 
development of the Solidarity movement. I then examine 
women's participation and re-presentation in these 
events and the mechanisms against them entering the 
newly developing public spaces. In the second part I 
examine how this precipitated the beginnings of 
alternative women's spaces and re-presentations in the 
form of committees and print media. This provides the 
link to the following chapter in which I narrow the 
focus to analyze in greater detail the impact of these 
events on television. 
7.2 The Advent of Solidarity 
one of my early political memories on British 
television was of crowds gathered in 1980 outside the 
Lenin shipyards in Gdansk. In that moment I sensed 
both the power that such a crowd could use and the 
irony of our own Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher's 
support. The news feature was intercut with footage 
from 1971 when workers had been shot dead on the same 
spot. I had been six then and I was fifteen with the 
advent of Solidarity. Eight years later in 1989 as 
events across Eastern Europe hotted up I went to 
Gdansk on May Day to demonstrate. I was flung against 
a shipyard wall by a wound-up member of the ZOM 0 
(riot squad) who prepared to beat my brains out with 
a long handled baton. Two years later, armed with a 
press pass from The European, I was ushered through 
the shipyard gates: 
Metal clangs on metal through the growing 
darkness. Angular cranes tower above us like 
giant green storks. Suddenly, like a vision of 
the Virgin Mary in the depths of hell, there's a 
dazzling white and blue ship with its name in 
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gilt. "It, s called Nadzehall (Russian for hope) 
mutters the chauffeur. "In Poland we say that 
hope is the mother of a fool. 10 The ship was 
ordered by the Soviet Union but now he believes 
it may never be bought (Reading, 1991) 
The profound awe and sadness I felt that first time in 
the Lenin Shipyards never left me. I have returned in 
dif f erent guises and each time If eel the same. The 
shipyard is one of the largest in Europe covering 146 
square hectares. In the 1970s 18 000 employees built 
34 ships a year. Since then 11 000 workers have been 
sacked (Personal Communication, Hans Szyce, Director, 
cited in Reading, 1991). The building of these 
gigantic ships to me embodies everything that is 
magnificent about the potential of humanity and 
despicable about the destructiveness of slave labour. 
There on a huge scale in the building of an ocean 
going vessel is human technology at its most 
beautiful; with thousands of highly skilled people 
making something far greater than ourselves. There on 
huge scale is also utter squalor, pollution, injury, 
sweat, toil and early death for poverty wages. There, 
as a memorial to the yard's near liquidation, arrested 
at the shipyard's heart, are the bones of a revolution 
in which the struggle over public representation was 
at its core: 
'* rows of metal posts stick up f rom the ground like the fossilized remains of a beached whale's 
ribs. They are the skeleton of a new TV station. 
Building was suspended once closure plans were 
stopped (Reading, 1991). 
The beginnings of that struggle began, ostensibly, in 
1980. Yet as other scholars have shown in different 
ways (Goban-Klas, 1994; Harman, 1988) the Solidarity 
movement was prefigured by acts of resistance against 
the Communist regime in 1956, March 1968,1970 and 
1976. The strikes of 1976 were crucial. in that they 
led to the formation of KOR, the Worker's Defense 
Committee which established an underground link 
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between opposition intellectuals and workers, whose 
demands at that time were limited to shorter working 
hours and higher wages. In 1980, however, from the 
mass movement which became Solidarity came demands 
which were both political and economic, although the 
extent to which political necessarily meant radical or 
gender positive was, as I shall argue, limited. 
The initial spark for the strikes in the summer of 
1980 was provided by the government in the form of 
price hikes on July 1. In the f irst of the strikes 
which followed workers demanded wage increases. These 
the government granted in an attempt to quell rising 
discontent. The effect of this, however, was like 
opening a door in the event of fire. People sensed 
that the strikes had an impact. On Thursday 19 August 
the Lenin shipyard demanded pay rises. They also 
demanded the reinstatement of Anna Walentynowicz who 
had been dismissed by the shipyard management for her 
activities in the unofficial union. Workers then 
occupied the yard and other workers at shipyards in 
Gdansk and Gdynia followed. The Party by the end of 
August decided to forge an agreement with the strike 
committee at the Gdansk shipyards. The agreements made 
at Gdansk and Szczecin and signed by the Interfactory 
Strike Committee included demands which, as we shall 
see, were to have a crucial impact on the (en) 
gendering of representation. They included the 
establishment of paid up bringing leave for parents 
and more state provision for nurseries and creches 
(Reading, 1992: 62). There was also a demand for 
freedom of speech and information, with the 
possibility for all social groups to participate in a 
reform programme (Goban-Klas, 1994: 168). This as we 
shall see in the penultimate chapter had important 
implications in terms of women, s representation in 
Poland's television system. 
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The signing of the Gdansk accords did little to stamp 
out the impending revolt, however. Strikes continued 
on an ever greater scale country-wide. Miners in 
Silesia stopped work. Workers extended their demands 
to challenge the legitimacy of the state; there were 
calls for the end to Party privileges and corruption 
by the nomenclature. Solidarity grew from a local 
union to a national movement of 10 million members by 
the end of September (Harman, 1988: 262). By mid 
October 4,800 work-places had stopped work (Harman, 
1988: 263). A student movement was established starting 
from Lodz and an agrarian movement was established 
(Hann, 1986). The leadership began to fragment, unsure 
of what to do to calm the populace. The police acted 
of their own accord assaulting Solidarity supporters 
and beating up 200 people in Bydgoszcz. This led to a 
general strike on March 27 (Harman, 1988: 267). 
The strike pushed the government into giving more wage 
increases and a reduction in working hours. 
Economically, the situation in the country worsened: 
Poland's foreign debt spiralled and there were 
shortages of basic goods. In Solidarity a split 
developed between members of the executive, including 
Lech Walesa, who sought compromise with the ruling 
Party elite, and those who wanted to use the mass 
power of Solidarity to push for more radical self- 
management of factories and enterprises. Walesa began 
negotiations with the two key leaders of the power 
blocs in Poland: Archbishop Glemp of the Roman 
Catholic Church and General Jarulzelsi for the 
Communists. At the grassroots level people called for 
an active strike with factories to be run by their 
workers and goods to be distributed more evenly. Such 
a possibility was crushed with the implementation of 
martial law: 
On the morning of 13 December 1981 people awoke 
to find Chopin playing on the radio instead of 
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the usual comedy programme. The military were in 
power: the number of buses and trams were cut by 
half, there were random beatings-up on the 
street, passes were required for internal travel 
and the telephone system was jammed. The leaders 
of Solidarity were arrested and interned; the 
ZOMO riot squads broke up occupations, and 
strikes were banned (Reading, 1992: 62). 
A curfew was established between lipm and 6 p. m.; 
telephones were cut off for two weeks; people queued 
for two to three hours for essential goods; the 
Christmas vacation was extended for schools and 
universities (Lodz English students, personal 
communication: 1990). The television was taken over by 
military personnel; ninety percent of journalists were 
fired and radio and television were 'normalized'. 
Publishing houses were reorganized; and books already 
published were withdrawn and re-censored. Martial law 
officially ended in July 1983, but in February 1984 
publishers were given new directives by the Party to 
uphold Social ist-Real ism. Literature yet again was 
supposed to put forward 'socialist' values and ideas 
and literary editors were given special ideological 
training (Nycezeck, 1984: 20; Short, 1982: 8-12; 
Pszenicki, 1983: 8-11). 
Yet, Solidarity did not disappear: It continued its 
activities underground, with networks operating 
throughout Poland in factories, schools and 
universities. Underground literature was still 
published and throughout the 1980s resistance to the 
communist regime continued (Diehl, 1986: 24-27; 
Bartowszewski, 1985: 21-24). The economic situation, 
though, was chaotic. Many consumer goods were 
rationed: by 1988 there were shortages of paper, 
contraceptives, soap, tea, coffee, chocolate, 
cigarettes, sugar, cheese, flour and toilet paper. 
Meat was still rationed. Imported goods, such as 
bananas, oranges and lemons were very expensive and 
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beyond the means of ordinary people. ' 
The situation came to a head in August 1988. At this 
time there were strikes in a number of enterprises; 
these continued throughout the Autumn and into the 
Spring of 1989, along with student and worker 
demonstrations, manifestations, sit-ins and 
occupations. The tone on the part of the government 
was, initially, confrontational: 'I have just heard on 
French radio. The government has decided to close the 
port of Gdansk because of unrest. Rakowski is going 
for confrontation, not discussion as we thought. ' 
(Personal diary, 1988: October 22). Czeslawa 
Jerzykowska, a textile worker at the Poltex factory 
since 1971 in Lodz also described the differences 
between the strikes of 1980 and 1988: 
I took part in two strikes. During the second one 
I worked on the strike committee. The first 
strike in 1980 was in the whole of Poland. I was 
younger then and it was the f irst strike and 
everyone wanted to be involved in it. The second 
one was more spontaneous. I came to work in the 
morning and If ound that the f actory was on 
strike. It was February\March 1989. It was about 
financial matters. We were here for 12 days. I 
left only to take care of my child. It was an 
important thing for me and it was very difficult 
- no one wanted to talk to us; the General 
Manager thought that one should sleep at night, 
not talk. Minister Wilczek ignored us saying if 
we didn't like the work here we could go 
elsewhere. He didn't care about the people who 
had worked here 30 years or more. It's not easy 
for them to go to another factory, especially 
because after 30 years of work here your health 
is ruined. But now the situation is worse because 
we don't even know how long we're going to work 
' If one saw a queue one stood at the end of it, since any queue signified the presence of something 
in short supply and hence special. I once stood in a queue for what two hours later turned out to be East 
German car valves. I decided to buy two even though I didn't have a clue about cars or even have one. Such 
items proved useful for the unofficial exchanges required for the daily zawatwiac (fixing) of things. I used the 
car valves with my ration coupons to buy a Russian bicycle. 
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(Czeslawa Jerzykowska, Personal Communication). 2 
Throughout the Autumn of 1988 the political tension 
increased. Solidarity demanded the promise of 100,000 
new jobs before it met for discussion. one hundred 
people occupied a church in Katowice and went on 
hunger strike until the people who were arrested on 
demonstrations in Warsaw and Katowice on November 12 
were released. Priests were openly speaking out 
against the government. Churches became regularly 
packed with people meeting to hear words of political 
encouragement from the clergy. It felt as if the 
government was teetering on the edge of control: 
Today there was a manifestation in town.. Not a 
demonstration: that is something organized, a 
manifestation is something that appears like 
magic, unexpectedly. People appeared out of doors 
and vans and out of shops and of f ices. They 
gathered in the square linking their 
frustrations. (Personal diary, 1988: November 
13). 
It was during the Spring of 1989 that the Round Table 
Talks between the Polish United Worker**s Party and 
Solidarity began. The talks defused the tension in the 
country and led to disillusionment amongst Solidarity 
activists who became increasingly dispirited as the 
leadership ignored its grassroots demands: 
The city was covered in flags for May day. 
Fighting Solidarity held a small demonstration 
outside the town hall. Anna Walentynowicz, whose 
sacking lead to Solidarity in 1981, spoke at the 
meeting. People looked tired and demoralized. 
Fists were raised and Victory signs made, but the 
songs were sung half-heartedly. An era seems to 
have gone. The Anarchist students then took to 
the steps as Solidarity marched off up the 
street. They waved red flags and performed a 
parody of a government rally,, and handed out 
' According to workers at two Lodz factories apart from the antiquated machines being dangerous, 
women suffer from hearing loss due to the noise, contorted spines from standing all day, blood circulation 
problems and breathing difficulties caused by the cloth fibres in the air (Visits to Lodz factories, October 1991). 
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leaflets saying 'Communism Must Be Revitalized'. 
Later on some students barricaded the road with 
bins and stones were thrown. ZOMOS in their vans 
screeched up and tumbled out in full riot gear, 
shield and helmets and long bendy batons, bendy 
so they make most contact with skulls and backs 
scuffles and sirens continued all afternoon ; 
mongst mothers with push chairs and strolling 
fathers, hobbling old men mumbling vodka slurred 
curses; they turned their faces away from the 
violence and steered on to the goods in the 
shops. (Personal Diary, 1989: May 1). 
The Round Table talks resulted in a power-share 
agreement: The Communists would retain the ministers 
for Defense, Foreign Trade and Internal Affairs, and, 
Solidarity would gain the rest. The leaders decided 
that a new representative second house, the Senate, 
would be created with democratic elections to elect 
its members. There would also be elections to thirty- 
five percent of the lower house, the Sejm. Triumphant, 
Solidarity opened offices on high streets throughout 
Poland and the new banners proclaimed: 
"Choose Solidarity", in large red letters on 
white; but now with a splash of blue. Red and 
white: the colours of Solidarity, the colours of 
the Polish National flag. Blue the bridge between 
them. And so the choice and the vote has replaced 
the word fight now. Though there are still a few 
who continue to write Solidarity with a fist on 
the walls of the barracks, whilst anarchists show 
the Solidarity flag carried by a snail sliding 
down supermarket doors. (Personal Diary, 1989: 
May 3) 
For the first time in nearly a decade Solidarity was 
able to operate openly. Candidates were chosen f or the 
National Civic Committee (NCC). This body was to act 
on behalf of not only Solidarity candidates but all 
opposition candidates. In the first free elections of 
July 1989 Solidarity won 98 percent of the seats in 
the newly created Senate. Tadeusz Mazowiecki became 
the first non-Communist Prime Minister in the Eastern 
Bloc since 1945. The Polish United Worker, 's Party 
225 
split and shif ted and lost power in its remaining 
departments. Lech Walesa remained outside the 
government for the period 1989-90; but, he suggested 
in the summer of 1990 that Presidential elections 
should be held. Initially, it seemed unlikely that he 
would enter the presidential race , but at the last 
minute he put himself forward against Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki and an outsider Timinsky. Mazowiecki 
despite all predictions was defeated with only 16 
percent of the vote. He resigned with his government 
on 26 November 1990. In the second presidential round 
Lech Walesa was elected as President of Poland; he 
appointed a new Solidarity led government in 1991 
(Reading, 1992: 63-4). 
7.3 Women and Political Activity 
In the account of the rise of Solidarity given above, 
gender is excluded. Indeed, most accounts of 
solidarity in Poland (Ascherson, 1981; Davies, 1990; 
Harman, 1987) are gender blind. Those which do take 
gender into account in the changes in Eastern Europe 
concern events in the Soviet Union (Buckley, 1993) or 
treat Solidarity and Poland as simply another Eastern 
Bloc country (Einhorn, 1995; Funk and Mueller, 1993). 
However, I would argue that although Poland certainly 
may be compared with the experience of other countries 
in the Eastern Bloc in the 1980s, it is crucial to 
recognize the ways in which the structure and ideology 
of Solidarity drew on Poland"s socially inherited 
memory to exclude women. In addition, there were, of 
course, exclusion mechanisms at work which could as 
easily be found in any political movement elsewhere. 
These areas I discuss in the following reappraisal of 
women and Solidarity in the 1980s. 
7.4 WomenJ's Early Participation in Solidarity 
Solidarity, undoubtedly, gave workers and peasants 
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alike the strength and confidence they needed to shake 
the regime. A leading woman activist throughout the 
1980s, Danuta Nowakowska, said for example: 
What Solidarity achieved then, during those 
sixteen short months of its official existence, 
was and still is something so far reaching that 
its results are being felt and will continue to 
be f elt f or a long time to come. (Nowakowska, 
1988: 54-55) 
Yet, by 1989 at the time of the Round Table Talks, 
there was a joke which asked: 'Why are the Round table 
talks round a round table? Answer: because the Polish 
United Worker's Party, Solidarity and the Church - are 
all on the same side'. A feminist version was to add 
that there was only one woman on that side. There were 
57 men (Anna Szymanska-Kwiatkowska, M. P and Editor-in 
Chief Women and Life Personal Communication: 1990). 
Unusually, though, for any political movement in 
Poland, women to begin with constituted half of the 
membership. This was very different from the strike 
action of the mid-seventies in which women's 
participation was minimal (Siemienska, 1986: 28). 
Yet, women's representation within the structures of 
Solidarity was little different from the vertical and 
horizontal gender divisions seen in the rest of Polish 
society (see chapters 4 and 6). This is illustrated 
by the fact that women were less represented at the 
top levels of the newly developing public spaces and 
women were rarely elected to the union's committees. 
There were two women present on The Interfactory 
Strike Committee, in comparison with 16 men. No women 
signed the Gdansk accords between the government and 
Solidarity. No women signed the accords at Szczecin. 
In the Solidarity elections held in 1981 women were 
frequently excluded from being representatives: In 16 
out of the total 41 areas no women were chosen as 
delegates. The delegates were to represent people at 
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the first National Solidarity Congress. The total 
number of women elected was 7 percent of all 
delegates, or 63 women (Solidarnosc, 25.7.81: 26). The 
gender balance on the National Commissions was little 
better: on the Conciliatory Commission there was one 
woman in comparison with 18 men. On the Auditing 
Commission there were three women and 18 men. And on 
the National Commission there were 82 men and only one 
woman (Solidarnosc, 31.9.81: 30). Siemienska argues: 
In the elections of the new authorities it is 
hard to speak of pure coincidence; the situation 
clearly reflected some deeper mechanisms and 
preferences. (Siemienska, 1986: 30). 
Yet what were these mechanisms and preferences? And 
how did they operate? 
7.5 Socially Inherited Memory: Mationalising women 
First there is the f act that women in these newly 
developing public spaces did not see the need for an 
additional voice for themselves. Women considered 
their struggle as the same as that of their menfolk. 
Gender was not an issue. All were united against a 
common enemy - the Communist state. (Later, this was 
to change). As we have seen in previous chapters the 
precedent f or women conf lating their own needs with 
those of men has a long history in Poland. The 19th 
century pattern of a male biased popular front against 
an alien state was reestablished in the 1970s by the 
Committee for the Defense of Workers and other core 
intellectual groups, as Siemienska notes: I Women who 
participated in these organizations did not represent 
a woman's point of view. They did not demand 
additional rights for themselves (siemienska, 
1986: 28). 
Despite the strong presence of women in solidarity in 
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terms of membership, a similar pattern emerged. Women 
did not, initially, push for their own representation 
in the new public spaces: 
At the time,, we didn, t consider on any basis 
whether someone was a man or a woman - the only 
thing that mattered was our cause, our hope for 
a free and independent Poland. We wanted to win 
back that which had been taken f rom. us f orty 
years before. (Nowakowska, 1988: 51) 
These political values remembered by women activists 
themselves prevailed within Solidarity so that later 
attempts to forward the rights of women were made very 
difficult. One of the newly elected members of 
parliament in 1990 said that she had tried to draw the 
attention of the newly democratically elected Sejm to 
the particular problems faced by women: 
I tried to create something like a women's lobby 
or a special commission to deal with the social 
and professional status of women. Unfortunately, 
it was not accepted, especially by Solidarity. 
Women Solidarity MPs thought that there were more 
important things to be dealt with first. (Anna 
Szymanska-Kwiatkowska, M. P, Personal 
Communication). 
These attitudes were prevalent not only in Solidarity 
but in the other underground groups operating to 
disrupt and oust the state capitalist regime. One of 
the first members of Solidarity in Lodz and, later a 
leading woman in the right wing Confederation for an 
Independent Poland (KPN), Jadwiga Goryszewska, stated 
that whilst one fifth of their members were women very 
few women were on the Central Committees of the 
organization. She did not consider this a problem, 
however: 'our position is the same as that of men. We 
don't have any special positions just because we are 
women. Both men and women have one aim 
independence'. For the elderly Jadwiga Goryszewska 
(she is the daughter of one of Pilsudskils soldiers) 
independence meant the abolition of any influence or 
control by the Soviet Union on Polish affairs and the 
229 
expulsion of the Soviet Army: I Our main aim is to 
regain absolute independence f rom any partitioner, 
because that"s what the USSR has been for years., ' 
Independence also meant the eradication of 'Communist' 
ideas which were seen to have corrupted people by 
forgetting the traditional role of women as bastion of 
the national culture: 
I was brought up in the tradition in which a 
woman was a mother and brought up her children in 
a patriotic spirit. She educated her children to 
love their country above all else. Historically, 
women who were brought up in Polish households 
and who knew Polish history and literature 
transmitted their knowledge to their children. No 
one could do it better than they. No one can 
teach one to love one's country and God better 
than a mother can. Children brought up under the 
Communist system - they don't know about such 
things (Jadwiga Goryszewska, Personal 
Communication, 1990) 
The future that Goryszewska saw, based on such 
convictions, was highly contradictory in gender terms: 
I'd like total privatization to take place to 
improve the conditions of life in Poland. I want 
to add that I'm not someone who thinks a woman's 
place is in the kitchen. Education and 
professional work are very important for women, 
but first of all a woman should take care of the 
children. (Jadwiga Goryszewska, Personal 
Communication: 1990) 
Neither should it be assumed that such views, and, 
ultimately, Party policies, were only to be found in 
groups on the right of the political spectrum. 
Ecological and green groups propounded similar views. 
In some places, such as Lodz, the Greens even formed 
alliances in 1990 with nationalist groups such as the 
Confederation for an Independent Poland and the 
National Christian Federation. Green Party chair and 
the vice-mayor of Lodz, elected in 1990, Elzbieta 
Hibner said: 
It's very difficult to give a general picture of 
women who work in the Greens. There are not many 
of them - as in other parties. ... They are 
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active in associations dealing with healthy food, 
environmental protection, vegetarianism and so 
on. But only af ew women are involved in the 
strict sense of political activity. (Elzbieta 
Hibner, Personal Communication: 1990) 
As with other political activists, Hibner saw no need 
for particular policies to encourage women into the 
public sphere or to improve'women's situation more 
generally: 
A concept such as "women's politics" does not 
exist in Poland. ... I cannot favour women ... the threat is equal for both men and women; it's 
impossible to make sex distinctions. (Elzbieta 
Hibner, Personal Communication: 1990) 
Despite this, however, Hibner was certainly able to 
perceive certain sex distinctions in the public realm: 
The vice-mayor of Warsaw is a woman and the mayor 
of Gdynia is a woman and af ew others. But the 
activity of women may be illustrated by a 
pyramid: women are active at the lower levels, 
the higher you go, the f ewer women there are. 
It's apparent in the Sejm. A career is the domain 
of a man's life: a woman's career is just one 
element in her life (Elzbieta Hibner, Personal 
Communication) 
7.6 Socially Inherited Memory: Domesticating women 
The language and arguments of these opposition women 
activists during the period of late transition are 
remarkably similar to those articulated in the 19th 
century by women struggling within the nationalist 
movements for an independent Poland, free from the 
partitioning powers (See Chapter 4). This is further 
born out by the fact that from August 1980 onwards the 
manner in which women's practical participation in 
the struggles changed: women fought less and less on 
the front lines and more and more as part of the home 
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front (Nowakowska, 1988: 51)3. Effectively, what we see 
is a pattern of women acting more as supporters of 
their menfolk, working in the private sphere to 
support the efforts of men to shift the boundaries of 
the public realm. Consequently, one of the key 
mechanisms that works against women's equal 
participation in the public sphere continued to be 
their over representation in the private sphere, 
legitimatized by the socially inherited memory of 
women's domestic role: 
Even if the family is a partnership family, women 
still have bigger duties. Men help by taking the 
children for a walk and such like. Men have got 
used to the fact that their mothers did 
everything at home, so, they're not eager to help 
their wives. Women would like to be helped but 
sometimes they just get fed up with trying to 
f orce men to help them, so they give up and do 
everything themselves. (Magdalena Niewadomska, 
Personal Communication: 1990) (my emphasis). 
The public advent of Solidarity did little to alter 
women's private responsibilities, and, in fact, in its 
ideology and policies, as we shall see further on, it 
reinforced women's domestic role. 
Martial Law itself also had a genderedimpact forcing 
many highly active women into the private sphere. 
These included women whose spouses had been top Party 
officials and who had been Party members themselves, 
such as Wroclaw journalist Elzbieta Adamczewska. Her 
husband had been a leading official and her arrest in 
1981 broke up her marriage. This had particular 
' It seems that this process of exclusion in revolutionary moments is not uncommon. George Orwell 
notes, for example, in Homage to Catalonia that in Spain amongst the anarchists in 1937: 
There were still women serving in the militias, though not very many. In the early battles they had 
fought side by side with the men as a matter of course. It is a thing that seems natural in time of 
revolution. Ideas were changing already, however. The militia men had to be kept out of the riding- 
school while the women were drilling there because they laughed at the women and put them off. A 
few months earlier no one would have seen anything comic in a woman handling a gun. (Orwell, 
1981: 11). 
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consequences in terms of her taking on traditional 
feminine domestic responsibilities and put a stop to 
her public role as a journalist: 
I was a member of the Party too - until Martial 
Law. But I was not an active member who agreed 
with everything. ... The paper I'd been working for was closed: we were forbidden to publish it. 
I didn't work for many years - since 13 ; 
ecember 1981, since Martial Law. The children 
got used to the idea that Mother was at home and 
did the shopping, cooking, cleaning and so on 
(Elzbieta Adamczewska, Personal Communication: 
1990). 
The consequence of this was that women, as in the 
past, had less time to participate actively in the 
newly developing public spaces. Every woman I spoke to 
agreed that one of the main factors working against 
women's public representation was time. Women have 
less time than men because of their dual roles. A 
Solidarity activist and textile worker said: 
It"s easier for men to make a career because they 
have more time. They're not so involved in the 
children's upbringing, doing the shopping and so 
on ... the man is the head of the f amily, the 
woman is the neck that has to lift it (Czeslaw 
Jerzykowska, Personal communication: 1990) 
Consequently, when it came to the f irst democratic 
elections in Poland established gender bias was 
replicated4. In 1990 there were 80 women M. Ps out of a 
total of 460 (Krystyna Eysmont, M. P for Lodz, Personal 
Communication). There were nine women ministers and 
vice ministers out of 116 people in the government 
(Krystyna Sienkiewicz, Minister for Health, Personal 
Communication). Statistics provided by the Women's 
Unit of Solidarity in Gdansk in 1991 showed that six 
" The increased exclusion of women from political public office after 1989 is a pattern found 
throughout Eastern Europe. An article in The Guardian ' Eastern Europe's Revolution Fails to liberate the 
Women' in 1990 notes that the most pronounced gender bias was in Romania where, according to the Inter- 
Parliamentary Union, women held one third of seats in parliament before 1989 and in 1990 held only 3.5 
percent. In the former Czechoslovakia there was a registered drop from 29.5 percent before 1989 to 6 percent 
in 1990 and in Hungary from 20 percent in 1989 to 7 percent in 1990. (Eyal, The Guardian 25.7.1990) 
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percent of those elected on the National civic 
Committee slate were women, which was significantly 
lower than the percentage under the communist regime 
in previous years. In local committees, administrative 
authorities and production managements the political 
changes of 1989 resulted in women being pushed out of 
publicly representative bodies: women's representation 
fell from 15 to 10 percent (Siemienska, 1986: 32). 
Sociologist, Renata Siemienska, concluded: 
although the upheavals of the early eighties saw 
the mass participation of women, their 
representation among activists and executives 
actually dropped. (Siemienska, 1986: 29) 
The Chairperson of the Women's League in Lodz in 1990, 
Janina Suska-Jankowska, had also observed the public 
absence of women: 
There are almost no women in the top positions of 
Solidarity and ten out of 80 members in the local 
government [ are women]. ... millions were invested in the education of women and now their 
knowledge is not being used. They just don't do 
anything for women. (Janina Suska-Jankowska, 
Personal Communication: 1990) 
As Anna Szymanska-Kwiatkowska, M. P and Editor of 
Women and Life, put it: 
There were many women in Solidarity at the 
beginning, but only a few became candidates for 
the elections and only af ew were elected. The 
same is true for local government elections: in 
City councils there are two or three women out of 
28 members. Women have turned away from political 
activities. The reasons are complicated And I'd 
not want to go into them all. (Anna Szymanska- 
Kwiatkowska, M. P and Editor in Chief of women and 
Life, Personal Communication: 1990). 
A basic gender headcount supports these views. Out of 
460 MPs in the 1994 Polish Sejm only 60 were women. 13 
of the senators were women. This, however, is a 
marginal improvement on the gender balance of the 
first post-Communist Sejm and Senate. In that term 
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there were 42 women Deputies and 8 Senators (Voice of 
Warsaw, 1994: 5). In the successive post-Communist 
cabinets the gender balance has veered from bad to 
better to very bad to bad. In the Solidarity cabinet 
of Tadeusz Mazowiecki there was just one woman, 
Izabella Cywinska, the Minister for Art and Culture. 
When the liberal, Jan Bielecki, headed the government 
there were two women appointed to the cabinet: Henryka 
Bochniarz was Minister for Industry and Anna 
Popowicz was appointed as Government Representative 
for Women and the Family. The right-wing cabinet in 
which Jan Olszewski was Prime minister fired Popowicz 
and created an all male cabinet. This was followed by 
an all male cabinet headed by Poland's first woman 
Prime Minister, Hannah Suchocka. In the coalition 
government of Waldemar Pawlak, Barbara Blida was 
Urban Planning and Construction Minister, while Danuta 
Waniek was Deputy Defence Minister (Voice of Warsaw, 
November 6,1994). 
7.7 Socially Inherited Memory: Criminalizing women 
Another reason given by women themselves for their 
progressive exclusion from the ', unofficial' public 
sphere was the way in which women activists in the 
early days of Solidarity were treated differently from 
men; differently on the whole meaning more harshly, 
both by other family members, and, the authorities. 
Artist Joanna Wisniewska said in respect of her 
f amily: 
The traditional place for a woman is at home, her 
main aim - to take care of the children, the rest is simply an addition. When this order gets 
reversed the rest of the family can't cope with 
it. (Joanna Wisniewska, Personal Communication: 
1990) 
The same was true for the authorities in their 
treatment of women activists. In the case of the 
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activist, Krystyna Stachowiak, for example, she began 
her work by organizing a strike committee in the shoe 
factory in which she worked in 1980 in the small town 
of Wschow. Like many others, with the advent of 
Martial Law she was taken away by the police: 
On the night of the 12\13 December 1981,1 was 
arrested and interned. There were five women 
including me. We were taken to Ostrow 
Wielkopolska and put in prison. But it was a 
prison for men and the warders didn't know how to 
handle us. So the next day we were transported to 
Poznan. (Krystyna Stachowiak, Personal 
Communication). 
Krystyna went on hunger strike whilst in prison, 
losing 14 kilograms of her body weight making half of 
her hair go white. Her protests secured her release. 
on her return home she was effectively doubly punished 
for her political activities: She found that her 
husband had moved in another woman into their flat and 
the court had granted him custody of their two 
daughters. Krystyna was classified as an 'unfit 
mother' because of her prison record, which then made 
her homeless and jobless. She suffered a nervous 
breakdown and was hospitalized. She spent two and half 
years in a Polish mental hospital. When she finally 
came out she resumed her work with Solidarity in 
Poznan. Krystyna Stachowiak believes that if she had 
been a man it was more likely that her spouse would 
have been more supportive during imprisonment (her 
husband didn't visit Krystyna at all). She also 
believes that the court would have given her time to 
find work and a home before granting custody of her 
children. It was as if the court saw her as more 
worthy of punishment because she had abandoned her 
socially inherited role as Mother and Wife for a 
public and political role (and an illegal one at that) 
(Krystyna Stachowiak, Personal Communication: 1990). 
This is supported by research by journalist Eileen 
Macdonald with women terrorists and police authorities 
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in Europe and the Middle East: The authorities treat 
women terrorists much more harshly than men. Police 
are instructed to shoot the women first in situations 
of civil conflict since women who have crossed the 
dividing line between what is legal and illegal are 
deemed to have forfeited their femininity and are 
therefore seen to be more dangerous than men 
(Macdonald, 1991: 231-241). Research on women 
criminals also confirms the gender bias of the justice 
system: Women are imprisoned more often than men for 
the same crime, longer than men f or the same crime and 
very often are committed to prison for minor property 
offences for which men would get a fine or community 
work (Padel and Stevenson, 1988: 1-12). A report on 
women, crime and prisons in Poland in the 1980s 
confirms this. It shows that 76 per cent offences 
committed by women were property offences with only 
12.3 percent of women's offences involving violence. 
The inverse pattern was true f or of f ences committed by 
men. Although women committed fewer crimes than men 
and were less violent, more Polish women than men end 
up in prison (Przestepczosc Kobiet - Aspekty 
Krminologiczne i Pentilencjarne, 1984). Studies of 
sentencing in juvenile courts show that Polish girls 
are sentenced to reform institutions f or running away, 
missing school and nights away from home. Judges and 
social workers always tried to see whether the girl 
had had sex, and with whom. Boys were not asked about 
their sexual practices and were given institutional 
sentences only for serious crimes (studies by 
Malgorzata Fuszara at the Centre for Social and Legal 
Research on the Status of Women at the University of 
Warsaw, cited in Voice of Warsaw November 6,1994) 
Having said this, however, not everyone would agree. 
Danuta Zatay, Solidarity Secretary in Gdansk in 1990, 
had been arrested in 1981, she subsequently lost her 
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job and her son was prevented from entering 
University. She stated: 
I was discriminated against, but not because I 
was a woman, but because I was a member of 
Solidarity. (Danuta Zatay, Personal 
Communication) 
7.8 Socially Inherited Memory: Violating women 
A further reason women themselves gave for their 
public exclusion from Solidarity was socially 
inherited acceptance of male violence in Polish 
society. The Minister for Health stated: 
Our courts are biased - they believe in such folk 
wisdom that if a man doesn't beat his wife, he 
doesn't love her and if he beats her a little 
it's nothing unusual. (Krystyna Sienkiewicz, 
Minister for Health: 1990) 
The women I spoke to said that their movements were 
restricted because they did not feel safe in public 
after dark: 'I am afraid of the streets at night. I 
try to get back before 10 pm. It"s more prudent " 
(Maria Krzeminska-Pakula, Personal Communication: 
1990). Effectively, said one woman, the curfew of 
Martial Law had gone but a gender curfew remained 
(Dorota Canert, personal communication: 1990). 
Furthermore, there was the sense that after 1989 the 
amnesty on criminals had resulted in a number of 
violent sex offenders being released back into Polish 
society who had then gone on to commit the same 
crimes: this psychologically effected women's sense of 
confidence in the public realm (Czeslaw Jerzykowska, 
Solidarity Activist/ Textile Worker, Personal 
Communication: 1990). This was compounded by the fact 
that women had little faith in the authorities acting 
on their behalf against male violence: 
Women are ashamed to bring such cases to court 
and even if she does it's difficult for her to 
prove she was raped, especially if she knows the 
man who did it Dorota Canert, Personal 
Communication: 1990) 
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The connection between the psychic and physical 
invasion of women by men has been shown by a number of 
Western feminists to damage women emotionally, 
physically and intellectually (see for example Ward, 
1984; Clark, 1987; Brownmiller, 1975 ). Dworkin, for 
example, calls rape " an act of political terrorism' 
(1983: 196). This I would argue militated against 
women's full participation in the alternative public 
sphere in Poland. 
Combined with this there continued to be problems with 
women having full control over their sexuality and 
bodies. Grazyna Zawi, Head Nurse, Polish Hospital for 
Mothers in Lodz stated: 
Contraception is a big problem. We are way behind 
in comparison with other countries; knowledge 
about contraception is very unsatisfactory; often 
abortion is treated as a form of contraception 
(Grazyna Zawi, Personal Communication: 1990) 
Inadequate contraception does not ef f ect women and men 
equally: it is women who must bear alone the physical 
impact of abortion and the biological burden of 
pregnancy, childbirth and breast-feeding all of which 
were both in Communist and post-Communist Poland still 
incompatible with full participation in the public 
sphere. This is not to say that it is inevitable that 
such things are publicly incompatible: it is the value 
given such things and the Way society is structured 
which creates the friction. 
7.9 Socially Inherited memory: Economising women 
The women I interviewed said that one of the deciding 
factors working against equal representation was the 
economy. In particular, Poland's relative poverty: 
These problems are not connected with one or 
another system - centralization or 
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totalitarianism - they're connected with our 
standard of living; Poland is a poor country; it 
takes time to build up the material base ... I think Polish people sometimes have a primitive 
view of the future - change the system and 
everything will be all right, we'll be rich, 
we'll have democracy. It's not true. (Maria 
Krzeminska-Pakula, Personal Communication: 1990) 
But it seems that the underlying economic mechanisms 
worked with an aspect of socially inherited memory to 
exclude women from full representation in the 
alternative public sphere. For example, one of the 
problems facing Polish society in the early 1980s was 
hidden unemployment. Solidarity addressed this issue 
not by suggesting the creation of worthwhile and 
fulfilling jobs for all but by suggesting that if 
women moved out of the workplace this would make space 
for men. This, according to Solidarity, was justified 
since then women would be more capable of fulfilling 
their 'pre-destined' domestic role. This position was 
not simply one put forward by men: Many women also 
supported it. Magda Reja, in an article headlined I 
Instead of Unemployment Benefits' in the Solidarity 
newspaper Solidarnosc in July 1981 argued: 
A million women bringing up small children would 
gladly leave their work places. Society would 
benefit in that those women would make way for 
men redundant due to economic reforms (Reja, 
1981: 16) 
In May 1990 1,434,506 people were registered as 
unemployed in Poland, of which just over half 
(742,902) were women (Voice of Warsaw September 8, 
1991: 38). By 1991 the numbers of unemployed women 
outweighed the number of men by 53 to 47 per cent 
(Minister for Health, Personal Communication: 1990). 
In 1990,270,073 Poles were eligible for unemployment 
benefits and most of these, 142,516, were women 
(Voice of - 
Warsa September 8,1991: 38). As one 
textile worker said, under the new government: "women 
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are afraid of losing their jobs (Czeslawa Jerzykowska, 
Personal Communication. ) Behind this fear was the 
reality of the Balczerowicz plan. As Teresa Sasinska- 
Klas points out, the shock therapy approach of the 
plan, initiated by the first non-Communist government 
in Poland, was regarded by many as signifying progress 
towards a new order of equality of opportunity in the 
public sphere, yet: 
Polish women have become increasingly vulnerable 
and of ten the f irst victims of I progress I. Indeed 
women are the majority of the new unemployed and 
have already lost their right to long-term 
parental leave. (Sasinska-Klas, 1993: 6) 
Following on from this, one woman said that the 
exclusionary mechanisms in the (en)gendering of 
representation came therefore from the material 
effects of this poverty, rather than socially 
inherited ideas within Solidarity: 
Solidarity has changed people's mentalities, 
although it is traditional in its attitudes 
towards women; Solidarity is a social movement 
and I think it has some influence on women's 
attitudes, but don't exaggerate this, because 
generally in everyday life the things which limit 
your freedom are lack of money, lack of housing 
... it is these things which limit one's 
mentality, rather than ideas themselves. The 
ideology of Solidarity is important for 
politicians and for independent women who have a 
good material situation - they can think about 
ideology (Maria Krzeminska-Pakula, Personal 
Communication: 1990) 
7.10 (En) Gendering mechanisms at Work: Idolising 
Women 
Yet if we look more closely we find Poland's socially 
inherited memory in relation to Solidarity was 
crucial. As Teresa Sasinska-Klas points out, 
accompanying the economic impact of Solidarity's 
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liberal capitalism was also a "moral conservatismO, 
with the Roman Catholic Church establishing Christian 
values as the foundation of the post-1989 Polish 
nation. Thus Poland's new Constitution stressed a 
relationship of cooperation (rather than formal 
separation) between the Church and state (Konstytucja 
Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej). This was reinforced by the 
introduction of Christian religious education in 
schools, thereby denying other religions a voice 
(Sasinska-Klas, 1993: 7-9). The outcome of this 
conservatism is highly detrimental in terms of gender 
bias in the public sphere, with the Roman Catholic 
Church forwarding a Christian notion of procreative 
sex, linked with 'women's special mission as wife and 
mother' (Sasinska-Klas, 1993: 6). 
The roots of this go back to Poland's socially 
inherited memory of its response to partitioning in 
the 19th century. Within Solidarity the socially 
inherited link between women and the Christian Polish 
Nation was there at the movement's inception. The way 
in which women were re-presented in Solidarity 
publications for example was indicative of this. The 
weekly newspaper published by the movement, 
Solidarnosc, between early April 1981 until Martial 
Law on December 13, virtually ignored issues 
concerning domestic problems, children, contraception, 
male violence, occupational gender bias, unequal pay, 
and women's double burden, despite the fact that women 
constituted a significant number of the editorial 
positions. Some editions did deal with issues 
concerning motherhood which was dealt with as an 
extension of women's roles (Siemienska, 1986: 29). This 
view continued throughout the eighties. Anna 
Walentynowicz wrote for example: 
Sisters, I turn to you as a mother and a worker, 
who has laboured f or many years in Poland. I know 
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the everyday concerns of mothers and wives: the 
endless hours spent obtaining food and basic 
necessities. I know what it is like to stand in 
shop queues, to wait in doctors surgeries, to 
struggle with the official bureaucracy. I am one 
of you, worn down by the everyday reality of 
Polish socialism. (Walentynowicz, 1987: 18-19) 
The emphasis was on women's identity as mothers and 
wives. What of those women who are neither? The re- 
presentation by Walentynowicz places the concerns of 
women firmly in the realm of the private sphere; 
furthermore, women are the ones re-presented as solely 
responsible for obtaining such necessities; for caring 
for the ill. And, the blame is laid firmly at the feet 
of 'Polish socialism' rather than men and capitalism. 
Further on, Walentynowicz makes a claim which could 
have been articulated by a woman nationalist of the 
19th century: 
Women have a duty to def end health and lif e, 
Polish women have a right to speak their minds on 
matters important to Poland (Walentynowicz, 1986: 
19). 
This publicly engenders women as the sex responsible 
for health, for life. Combined with this is the sense 
that women may have their voices publicly included on 
these matters; but, publicly excluded if they attempt 
to speak on other matters such as the economy or law. 
Ultimately, women in solidarity could represent the 
nation, but not their own interests. 
These mechanisms articulated within these examples of 
Solidarity print media are also evident in 
Solidarity's popular cultural forms, particularly 
cartoons and underground stamps. In Polish Women. 
Solidarity and Feminism (1992) 1 argued that a common 
re-presentation of women in underground satirical 
cartoon forms was woman as Mother Poland. A typical 
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example was one back cover of the Voice of Solidarity 
which showed a line drawing of a monument to Mother 
Poland, in which a wreath of barbed wire is laid at 
her feet, rather than flowers. The female figure is 
large and sexless dressed in rags and holds a banner 
which proclaims: ', zbusowalismy socjalizm ( building 
socialism) a typical slogan of the regime in use in 
the eighties. Underneath the cartoon an inscription 
reads: 'to the Polish Mother to who we did everything 
and will do more: signed The Party'. The implication, 
I argue, is similar to that of underground literature 
by intellectuals analyzed in Chapter 5. The cartoon 
states what has been done to Polish women, thereby 
casting them as victim-objects. Women, the cartoon 
implies, have been made sexless and ugly and the state 
is firmly to blame. (Reading, 1992: 68) 
In re-presentations of women on underground stamps 
used in Poland's unofficial postal system' in the 1980s 
it was Mother Poland that dominated re-presentations. 
Mother as Virgin Mary holding Jesus; Mother holding 
shopping bags and child; Mother touching the face of 
a young baby (Reading, 1992: figs 6,7,8). In the re- 
presentation of Mother with shopping bags and child: 
the woman is strapped to the child; she has no 
free hands. She cannot go beyond the 
representation of herself as monument because of 
the wall of black letters: POLSKA, 50, Pomnik 
Matki Polski - monument, mother, Polish - object, 
appendage, Nation. (Reading, 1992: 68) 
one stamp was different. In this stamp a woman is re- 
represented without children or husband. She is shown 
as static, seated, powerless, unable to stand, because 
'In the 1980s an underground postal system developod as an alternative to the official network in 
which letters were censored, went missing or were simply rippod open. In contrast to the official stamps which 
elevated Party figures and Communist heroes the underground stamps celebrated Solidarity activists and the 
Roman Catholic Church. Such stamps were printed on ancient presses or by political prisoners in the internment 
camps from pieces of cut linoleum using vegetable inks on tiny scraps of paper. The stamps were smuggled 
out of the prisons and became symbols of resistance against the regime. (Editorial, Triquarterly, 1983: 6) 
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of the weight of the words above her head: Kobieta 
Samotna, lonely woman. The implication is that a 
woman without a man, or, children must be needing 
company, needing others, must be lonely (Reading, 
1992: 68; fig. 9). 
After 1989 the public representation of Mother Poland 
in official and unofficial discourse was joined by 
pornographic images of women, building on the socially 
inherited memory of the underground equation in the 
1970s and 1980s of pornography with Western Freedom 
(see Chapter 5). Pornography, as in the West is 
subject to legal restriction, but, it soon spread 
rapidly in Poland's developing market economy. 
Jonathan Eyal in The Guardian in 1990 noted: 
Liberalization, and an almost automatic imitation 
of anything Western, also transformed the image 
of the woman into a sex object. Engaged in a 
fierce battle for survival, most newspapers adorn 
their articles with nudity. Poland's news stands 
are full of badly printed pornographic material, 
and the American Playboy monthly sold out its 
first Hungarian language edition within days. 
Beauty contests are held in every state. (Eyal, 
1990) 
By 1990, Poland had a number of sex shops which 
because they were considered to be enterprise 
initiatives were given financial aid from local 
councils (Reading, 1992: 70). In these shops, sex was 
overtly connected with violence. In the first sex shop 
in Poland in central Lodz the sign outside was of a 
woman's breasts with a pistol resting across them and 
the words 'Sex and Gun Shop' in bloodied red letters. 
Inside, inflatable women and pornographic magazines 
were displayed next to guns, knives, nerve sprays, and 
gas guns. The manager and owner of the shop, Bozenna 
Pruszynska, when asked in 1990 why she wanted to run 
a sex shop said: 
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Everything in Poland is returning to normal. 
We're to be a part of Europe. All the world has 
sex shops and we thought that something like that 
should appear in Poland too. (Bozenna Pruszynska, 
Personal Communication: 1990) 
Thus what we see is the justification of this in terms 
the socially inherited equation of pornography with 
freedom and Europe. In response to the question 
why she sold sex toys, pornography and guns together 
she replied: 
it's just a coincidence. But we find this 
conjunction quite sensible. This shop is for 
selected clients. Not many people buy guns one 
or two clients a day. Weapons were to be the 
primary goods here. The idea for a sex shop came 
when the room was being refurbished and adopted 
for trade activity. We could do it legally and we 
thought it would be interesting for Polish 
people. That explains the conjunction - gun 
shop/sex shop. (Bozenna Pruszynska, Personal 
Communication: 1990) 
The conjunction is taken to be simple coincidence yet 
it recalls the socially inherited memory of the 
equation of violence with sex (see Chapter 5). The 
combination thus proved to be highly popular and 
successful, especially with the assistance of positive 
media coverage: 
Its popularity has been very big - the press, 
radio and TV visited us often and they gave us a 
lot of publicity. ... There is now another sex 
shop in Lodz, similar to this one. They sell toys 
and guns, like we do. (Bozenna Pruszynska, 
Personal Communication) 
According to Pruszynska she provides a positive 
service for both men and women. And, ultimately, for 
women "shops like this one meet their ambitions; they 
make women more liberated. ' (Bozenna Pruszynska, 
Personal Communication: 1990). 
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7.11 Socially Inherited Memory: Illegalising women 
Another mechanism of exclusion to women in Solidarity 
from 1980 onwards are the policies of Solidarity 
itself and gender biased laws passed by the successive 
post-communist governments since 1989. As we already 
know, the Gdansk accords included the extension of 
parental rights by establishing the principal of paid 
upbringing ýleave. This in effect reinforced the 
policies of the Polish United Worker's Party and 
resonated with the ideology of the Roman Catholic 
Church. Apart from this one stipulation, however, the 
accords contained nothing to ameliorate the working 
conditions for women. In its sixteen months of 
official existence at the beginning of the eighties 
women's issues were not raised. Sociologist Siemienska 
states: 
The agreements did not contain any specific 
postulates to increase women's participation in 
political decisions or their say in running work 
enterprises. (Siemienska, 1986: 29) 
But it was not the case that gender issues were simply 
neglected after 1989. In forming. Poland-*s new 
'democracy' the new regime overtly attempted to 
legally limit women's freedom, recalling the nation's 
social memory of excluding woman in the political 
realm in order to justify its actions. This exclusive 
public (en) gendering of representation was thus not 
accidental but crucial to the reconstitution of the 
new ruling class after 1989. For example, 
reorganization of divorce procedures made divorce a 
lengthy and complicated process. In January 1990 the 
state subsidy to the Family Development Society was 
cut (Polish Feminist Association, 1990). This was the 
only family planning organization in Poland which 
received a state subsidy. Cuts to public spending sent 
crbche and nursery fees sky-high, with many women 
opting to leave work and care for their children 
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because childcare costs were greater than their weekly 
pay (Polish Feminist Association, 1990). The rightist 
Union for Real Politics argued that women should have 
limited access to education since they would 'be 
unlikely to use their qualifications. A member of 
parliament suggested that women should be 
disenfranchised. Jacek Debski publicly stated: "the 
place of women is in the home, with her family. 
Without women in the home, there is no order in 
society. ' (Debski in Lodz Feminist Association 
Collection 1989). He was publicly supported by Maciej 
Jankowski who stated: "this society has no future 
because it produces too few children. ' (Jankowski in 
Lodz Feminist Association Collection, 1989) *. On the 
cusp of Poland's moves to democracy Debski argued: 
Of course in the present conditions in Poland to 
return women to the home is not possible. It will 
be possible in a liberal society which allows a 
man an hourly wage in order to maintain his whole 
family. (Debski, in Lodz Feminist Association 
Collection, 1989) 
When Korwin-Mikke was questioned as to how single, 
divorced or widowed women should support themselves in 
Debski's ideal liberal society he replied: 
And why are they alone? ... Because they are 
allowed to exist so, because of the protective 
system of society ... women are falsely alone, they choose to be alone, they are enabled by the 
system. This lonely phenomena appears in America. 
The more protection of society all the more 
divorces. (Korwin-Mikke, 1989) 
The overall consequences of these socially inherited 
beliefs was the introduction of a number of 
legislative measures which run counter to those of 
European Union legislation and International Acts such 
as the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women (ratified by Poland in 
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1974), the International Declaration of Human Rights, 
The Declaration on Social Progress and Development, 
The UN Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Covenant, 
The Philadelphia Declaration and the European Social 
Charter. A study by The Institute For Labour and 
Social Affairs in Warsaw entitled "State Policy on 
Women, Family and Children. Poland Vs Europe' showed 
that there was the tendency in Polish law since 1989 
was towards the territorialization and objectification 
of women and the infringement of the principal of 
equal rights for men and women and equal duties in 
marriage and family life. The gender biased effect of 
laws does not necessarily result from statutes overtly 
relating to men or women's issues, but from the 
socially inherited androcentricity of legislation. 
The impact of privatization legislation, for example, 
has been to reduce social benefits and state-funded 
childcare contrary to European Union Standards. (Voice 
of Warsaw, August 21,1994: S1-3). 
The key area of women's objectification and 
territorialization concerns Poland's Abortion 
legislation. With this the efforts by the new regime 
to restrict women's public representation were 
articulated through attempts to establish a 
restrictive anti-abortion Law. It was through this 
that the debate concerning the differences of women 
and men and the restrictions to public space that 
should be accorded women became manifest. In the 
early 1970s the Roman Catholic Church had made efforts 
to criminalize abortion: By 1988 anti-abortion 
legislation was seen as part of the necessary process 
of 'Destalinsation' (Uminska, Plakwicz, Odrowaz- 
Pieniazek, Siwek, Fiszer, 1994: 199-200) with the 
Roman Catholic Church organising public Pro-Life 
exhibitions in major Poish cities (Personal Diary,, 
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1988-9)6. The then illegal Polish Feminist Association 
publicly called for tolerance in the women's magazine 
Kobieta i Zycie in December 1988 and organised its 
first (illegal) anti-criminalization protests. In 
Solidarity the male dominated executive of Solidarity 
sought overtly to exclude women's representation from 
public debate over abortion. At the meeting of the 
Solidarity Congress in 1989 it was decided to carry a 
motion about the protection of the fetus. Activist, 
Krystyna Stachowiak, said: 
I realized that it would limit women's freedom in 
the future and women would be the victims. There 
were only ten percent who were women at the 
Congress and they were men who decided to carry 
that motion. I don't think a trade union should 
deal with such things at all, but if it does why 
should men decide? (Krystyna Stachowiak, Personal 
Communication: 1990) 
Stachowiak subsequently began a fight against the 
anti-abortion bill going through parliament which 
would make women who had terminations liable to three 
years imprisonment and the doctors who performed them 
liable for up to two years in prison. She was, 
however, prevented by Solidarity from carrying out 
necessary research with working women to establish 
their views on abortion and the forthcoming bill. She 
said: 
I wasn, t allowed to dist: 
because it contained the 
had an abortion? If so 
regional commission in 
against it. (Krystyna 
Communication: 1990) 
ribute the questionnaire 
question: have you ever 
why? The men f rom the 
Poznan were strongly 
Stachowiak, Personal 
But Stachowiak was determined and in 1990 distributed 
through alternative networks the questionnaire, 
" 'In the main Church in the Rynek, there is an anti-abortion exhibition. Displays of the unborn fetus, 
of aborted babies, of pictures of couples lovingly holding hands. And all against a backdrop of glittering gold 
and rich sculptures and paintings, the wealth and might of the Vatican' (Personal Diary, 1988: Doc 29) 
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despite Solidarity's continued resistance. Such overt 
resistance to women's participation in the democratic 
process was also voiced by the Chamber of Physicians. 
Watson (1993) in 'The Rise of Masculinism in Eastern 
Europe' New Left Review argues that the Chamber 
believed that the participation of women in the 
abortion debate was highly undesirable: 
One of its representatives equated the 
possibility of their - participation to asking thieves to have a say as to whether they should 
be punished for stealing (Watson in 
Tsagarousianou, 1994: 12) 
The original anti-abortion bill put forward in 
February 1989 was drawn-up by a group of'male experts 
on behalf of the Catholic Episcopate and presented by 
the Roman Catholic Union (Polish Feminist Association, 
1990). The bill underwent a number of alterations 
before being reintroduced in January 1990. The bill 
was shelved because of the presidential elections. The 
Polish Chamber of Physicians then adopted a Code of 
Ethics in 1991 stating that doctors should only carry 
out abortions if the pregnancy was life-threatening to 
the mother or if the pregnancy was the result of rape 
(Fuszara, 1993: 249). As Rosa Tsagarousianou notes 
(1994: 12) between 1991-3 there was a contradiction 
between the Medical Code and the Law of 1956 which 
still permitted abortion. In January 1993, however, a 
law was passed which permitted abortion only when 
pregnancy threatened the health or life of the woman, 
or, if the pregnancy resulted from a crime, such as 
incest or rape. The Sejm then introduced an amendment 
to the law which was passed in June 1994 which would 
allow women to have abortions due to difficult living 
conditions or "difficult personal situations". The 
Senate also passed the amendment in a 40-36 vote one 
month later. But the President, Lech Walesa, vetoed 
the amendment a month later, stating: 
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Human life is the highest good protected by law. 
An attempt at human life may only be justified by 
a state of higher necessity. No economic premises 
can legalise an attempt at human life, and 
especially not the personal conditions of a woman 
which cannot be objectively verified. (Walesa 
quoted in " Abortion Yes, Walesa No", Warsaw 
Voice 1994: 3) 
The Sejm then had the option to override the 
President's veto with a two-third majority. In a vote 
on September 2,1994, the Sejm failed to overturn the 
veto. The law remained highly restrictive, allowing 
abortion to be performed in public hospitals only if 
her life was endangered, the fetus was seriously 
deformed, or the pregnancy was the result of rape or 
incest. Thus, one man, just as the socially inherited 
grammar of the Polish language commands, effectively 
outweighed the views of 16 million women and girls who 
in public opinion surveys in Voice of Warsaw 
(September 11,1994: 5) were shown to be in favour of 
a law which permits abortion in private clinics if the 
woman is in a difficult life or personal situation. A 
top medical practitioner, whilst agreeing that 
abortion was not ultimately good for women's health, 
stated: 
I am absolutely against the new anti-abortion 
bill. It is a massive regression and if it is 
passed then women are no longer free. Women 
should have the freedom to decide and women 
should be treated like human beings. If this law 
is passed women will stop being human beings. 
This law should be discussed by women. Women 
should decide. (Maria Krzeminska-Pakula, 
Personal Communication: 1990) 
Roza Tsagarousianou argues that this struggle over 
reproductive rights has been a common feature of post- 
communist Eastern and Central Europe societies and 
amounts to the I national isation of female bodies" 
(1994: 2). Laws which criminalize the termination of 
a pregnancy effectively give the state rights over 
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women's bodies which they do not have over men*s 
bodies. The woman who chooses not to continue with a 
pregnancy is rejecting the nationalization of her 
body; rejecting the penetration of the law; but, is 
also by definition unpatriotic, unchristian, a traitor 
and a criminal. 
These examples indicate that the policies of 
Solidarity and its first 'post-Communist' government 
actively worked against women or ignored gender all 
together, thereby continuing the exclusion of women 
from the public sphere. The one right accorded people 
which could, perhaps, have corrected public gender 
bias - Paid up bringing leave - essentially pushed 
women back into the home, since the wage gap between 
men and women was left untackled by Solidarity: for a 
man to take paid upbringing leave this would result in 
greater financial hardship for families. consequently, 
the percentage of men taking leave was minimal. 
Further, not only did Solidarity seek to silence 
women's voice on abortion, they also attempted to 
prevent women establishing an organisation for women 
within Solidarity itself. The Executive and Congress 
were determined to-resist women's efforts to establish 
a National Womens Unit after 1989 said Malgorzata 
Taraszewic. She had worked for the underground group, 
Freedom and Peace, in the 1980s and later became the 
head of the Women's Unit in Gdansk. She, with other 
women activists, nevertheless, put out publicity to 
establish the womens section and came up against 
resistance on the part of Solidarity: 
Many people said, 'we don't want another League 
of Women. And, Communism is finished, so why 
should we have a women's organization? 
(Margorzata Taraszewicz, Personal Communication) 
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As in previous eras, though, the attempt to exclude 
women did not go unchallenged. Ironically, it seems 
that it was partly the struggle over women's 
reproductive rights which spurred women's own 
political organizations into action in the public 
sphere. 
7.12 Socially Inherited Memory: Including Women 
As we have already seen, women's organizations have a 
long history in Poland. The Communist regime set up 
its own League of Women which continued the pre-World 
War Two Middle class aims of the National Organization 
of Women and working class women also developed their 
own spontaneous forms of protest, even before the 
advent of Solidarity (see Chapter Four). Women in the 
eighties retained their tradition of spontaneous 
street rebellion. In December 1988 inflation was rife 
and particular goods were scarce. Women in a meat 
queue had stood for three hours waiting for a 
delivery. When the van finally arrived, the women were 
so enraged that a group surrounded the driver whilst 
others entered the van and then distributed the meat 
free to all the waiting women. In addition, those 
women imprisoned for political reasons under the 
previous regime formed strong networks of their own, 
according to ex-prisoner and Minister for Health, 
Krystyna Sienkiewicz (Personal Communication: 1990). 
These networks sometimes resulted in the production of 
re-presentations which challenged the usual 
stereotypes of Mother Poland. One underground stamp, 
for example, produced by women in Goldap Women"s 
internment, camp in the mid-1980s uses the image of the 
witch, Baba Yaga, but in a new form. The witch, whose 
power to reshape the universe threatened the 
established order of the Roman Catholic Church 
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throughout Europe7, is depicted as f lying over a forest 
and the words poczta (post) and Goldap (the name of 
the camp). Effectively, a re-presentation was created 
of af ree-f lying woman beyond the nation (f orest) 
traditional communication (post) and beyond state 
imprisonment (Goldap). (Reading, 1992: 194). 
The overt resistance by the all-male executive of 
Solidarity to gender equality in the 1980s pushed a 
number of key solidarity women activists to seek 
special representation. The efforts of Malgorzata 
Taraszewicz resulted in a week long seminar at the end 
of January 1989. The seminar was funded from abroad 
after the women appealed for help by the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions. The seminar 
examined the mechanisms working against woments 
equality and identified the double burden, followed by 
the pay gap and discrimination at work. The seminar 
outlined a number of resolutions which it presented to 
solidarity. These included flexible working hours and 
part-time work for women; the provision of more day- 
care centers, equal domestic responsibilities, equal 
pay, a commitment to training for women returning to 
paid work and the establishment of the right to 
parental leave f or both men and women to care f or sick 
children. The seminar also established within 
Solidarity a Women's Commission with the main aim of 
promoting women's representation in the union. 
The Women's Commission was interesting in the way they 
themselves re-deployed aspects of Poland's socially 
inherited memory concerning feminism to ensure 
eventual recognition by Solidarity. Although in 
reality both the Women's League and the Solidarity 
' Witchcraft was consistently opposed by the Roman Catholic Church and between the twelfth and 
seventeenth centuries 9 million people, mostly women suspected of witchcraft, were tortured and executed with 
the approval of the Church (see Warren, 1980: 489-90). 
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Unit did in fact co-operate (see Chapter 6) the 
Solidarity women argued publicly that their concern 
with women's rights was in no way a social legacy of 
the Women's League, or of the previous regime. 
Instead, they argued that their concern stemmed from 
trying to win back the disinherited memory of Europe, 
the West and that which was 'modern': 
Poland is looking to the future. It is trying to 
imitate Europe. This is also in terms of the 
women's section: the women's section is to show 
that we are European. (Malgorzata Taraszewicz, 
Personal Communication: 1990). 
In this respect the women returned to the story of 
political right, where the women of Poland during the 
Enlightenment had been said to imitate the women of 
France (see chapter 3) and turned it round to use it 
in that historical moment to their advantage. Women's 
representation in the public sphere, in the form of 
the Women"s Unit, was thus was made possible but 
through the denial of its own inheritance of a long- 
standing feminist tradition in Poland itself that goes 
back to the Enlightenment at least. Only by equating 
itself with the West, by representing itself as a 
Western import during the peak of the transition in 
1990 could it be acceptable within Solidarity. At the 
same time this was given actual material weight by the 
financial and personnel support provided by unions 
from the West. Taraszewicz said that initial funds for 
the Commission, as well as trainers and training 
materials were provided by a number of Western sources 
(Malgorzata Taraszewicz, Personal communication: 
1990). In this respect, therefore,, the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, did not simply provide for the resurgence 
of nationalist ideologies and the reconstitution of 
the patriarchal ruling class but resulted in 
particular contradictions that allowed for new 
possibilities for working class women's political 
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representation. In real terms this meant the 
development by the Unit of f our key areas to combat 
gender biased mechanisms: research, consciousness- 
raising, legislative equity, economic parity. more 
specifically, the Unit began a research project to 
find out the numbers of women in Solidarity and the 
positions they held; further, a questionnaire was 
distributed on a national basis to establish the 
opinions of women on abortion. (Taraszewicz, Personal 
Communication: 1990). In terms of consciousness- 
raising the Unit put its emphasis on training for 
women to become chairpersons, to learn how to make 
reports of sessions and working groups in Solidarity 
so that they could work through the whole process of 
organizing meetings and setting up seminars 
(Taraszewicz, personal communication: 1990). The Unit 
took on the legislative battle concerning abortion and 
its experience of that battle indicates the attempts 
by men in power to block women's attempts at 
representation. Taraszewicz stated that the Unit 
demanded a hearing with the Senate in 1990 concerning 
abortion legislation. The chairman of the Senate 
meeting criticized the Unit'for being out of line with 
the Solidarity executive. After that the government 
became'increasingly secretive about its proposals for 
abortion legislation. The Unit was, however, given 
verbal assurances that it would be informed of any 
steps that the government wished to take to limit 
women**s right to abortion. But the Senate did not 
invite representatives from the Unit again and, 
consequently, the information that the Unit was to 
receive all came via the media. (Taraszewicz, personal 
communication: 1990). This, is a key example of the 
ongoing struggle for equal representation and the 
means used to prevent it. 
Another strategy introduced by the Women's Unit was to 
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try and shift economic mechanisms of exclusion by 
using the Canadian idea of mobilizing women to start 
up their own business enterprises, with tax 
incentives in favour of women establishing their own 
nurseries, kindergartens and household equipment 
factories. A scheme was established to provide 
training and financial credit to start up such 
businesses. And a number of small regional units were 
set up, such as one in Poznan headed by Krystyna 
Stachowiak whose main aim was for Poland I to be a 
fully democratic country' ( Krystyna Stachowiak, 
Personal Communication: 1990). 
At the same time that the women within Solidarity 
during the 1980s had begun to forge their own 
representative public spaces, women in intellectual 
circles began to establish new spaces too. The impetus 
for this came, initially, from the Department of 
Sociology at the University of Warsaw, where Renata 
Siemienska offered an option in feminist studies. 
This inspired a group of women at the University in 
the 1980s, who were disillusioned with both the sexism 
of Solidarity and the gender bias of University 
courses. The women set up separate lectures and 
seminars addressing women's issues and delivered 
leaflets round factories and schools (Beata Ficzer, 
Personal Communication: 1990). However, after Martial 
Law, the group, as with every other opposition group, 
went underground. It continued with its work but on a 
cultural rather than overtly political level. The 
women organized screenings of films made by women; 
compiled a bibliography of feminist texts from the 
West; translated key Western feminist texts; held 
seminars on Polish feminist history. They also wrote 
editorial for the underground presses. In such 
articles, which addressed Solidarity supporters, the 
women had to tread a tightrope between Solidarity and 
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the regime. To challenge the mechanisms of exclusion 
within the discourses of both was a hard task. Yet 
writers did this by using strategies of humour and 
irony to undermine the socially inherited memory of 
women's traditional role deployed by Solidarity and 
the regime, as the following extract from 'What Are 
Polish Women Fighting For? ' illustrates: 
As f or motherhood - Polish women can be proud 
that they perf orm the role traditionally assigned 
to men since pre-historic times - obtaining meat. 
We all know that it is women who hunt down the 
scraps and f ight in the queues for a piece of 
rationed ham (Gazeta, 1987). 
By 1990, in response to the attempts by the new regime 
to rescind women's public rights further, about 30 
small groups of women had begun to operate in 
different towns and cities. These included the Polish 
Feminist Association in Warsaw, Cracow and Lodz; the 
Movement for Protecting Women's Rights in Bydgoszcz; 
Women's Honour in Torun and the Women's Clubs of 
Poznan. With sponsorship by the British Council I was 
involved in a small way in helping to establish some 
of these groups in 1991. A British Company, Strip 
Search Theatre, toured with my second play Want which 
was based on the lives of three Polish women. The play 
provided an initial focal point for new women's spaces 
and we also made of a series of videos which were 
subsequently shown at a number of British and Polish 
Universities. The play itself showed in dramatic form 
the mechanisms working against women entering on an 
equal basis the public sphere in Poland, including the 
endemic sexism of male Solidarity workers. Each show 
was then followed with a discussion, and very often 
the establishment of a new group. 
The Women's Unit itself in 1991 began to tackle the 
question of media and gender representation. They set 
up a magazine and a small training scheme to teach 
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women how to use the less media. As Taraszewicz said: 
'setting up a magazine and teaching women how to use 
the mass media is so important. It's giving women the 
tools to express what they think. ' (Taraszewicz, 
personal communication). 
7.15 Concluding Remarks 
Undoubtedly, the changes since 1989 have allowed for 
discussion of issues once suppressed by the former 
regime. As one peasant farmer's daughter said: 
Solidarity gained freedom for people. Now you can 
say what you want to about politics and other 
things. People can learn about many historical 
events that were kept silent and were not taught 
in school. (Danuta Jakubczak, Personal 
Communication: 1990). 
Yet the "politics and other things' that may be 
discussed are circumscribed by a gender bias that (en) 
genders public discourse and representation. Again 
and again the women I spoke with confirmed their 
disappointment with the possibilities for their voice 
to be heard under Poland's post-Communist regime. The 
store manager of one of Poland's largest department 
stores said simply 'the new government hasn't brought 
any changes for women or at work' (Stanislava 
Dworzynska, Personal Communication: 1990). Poland's 
then Minister for Health reiterated this: 
Under communism there were - there still are - 
many problems for women. Nothing much has changed 
(Krystyna Sienkiewicz, Minister for Health, 
Personal Communication: 1990) 
Despite the efforts by the women's groups in Poland to 
represent women through new spaces their impact seems 
limited (Taraszewicz, Personal Communication: 1990). 
There certainly were contradictions particularly at 
the peak of the transition in 1989 which allowed for 
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such resistance, but what we see on the whole is that 
as the 1980s progressed both the Polish United Workers 
Party and Solidarity, along with the Church, each 
sought to legitimatize their power by recalling 
aspects of Poland's socially inherited memory that 
excluded women from the public sphere. This may be 
more clearly illustrated through a specific analysis 
of the processes of transition and socially inherited 
memory within one medium, television, over which 
debates concerning I the public' and representation 
have been most concentrated (Goban-Klas, 1994: 244). 
This is the subject of the penultimate chapter. 
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Chapter 8: 
Socially Inherited Memory and Polish Television 
1980-1994 
', You can't have a revolution that is velvet' 
(Milan Bauman, Former Director of The 
International Organisation for Radio and 
Television - OIRT, Personal Communication, 1992) 
8.1 Introduction 
So f ar I have examined the broader mechanisms of 
exclusion to women's equal representation in Poland's 
public sphere, through various mediated aspects, such 
as print media and literature, and attempted to 
explain the continuity and contradictions of this 
process in terms of the concept of socially inherited 
memory. However, one of the most fought over media in 
Eastern Europe during the transitions in the 1980s and 
1990s, as studies on Hungary (Hankiss, 1994) Poland 
(Jakubowicz, 1992) and the former Czechoslovakia 
(Smid; 1992) have since shown, was that of 
broadcasting, and television in particular. Television 
not only provides us with a useful microcosm of the 
wider (en) gendering processes of society, as Mary 
Ellen Boyle (1993: 1) points out, but was also a key 
contested area of public representation in the 
transitions in Eastern Europe from state capitalism to 
capitalism (Corcoran and Preston, 1995: 8; Boyle, 
1994: 183-216 ). In some cases, as in Moscow 1993, 
state television proved to be the chief prize between 
the rulers and ruled for which some were even prepared 
to kill (Reading, 1995: 176). Although there was no 
such violence in Poland, it is television, rather than 
literature or the press, which has been most debated 
in relation to what is meant by 'public' 
(re) presentation since 1989; it is thus the medium 
which best illustrates the problems of socially 
inherited memory in (en) gendering the public sphere. 
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In this penultimate Chapter I bring to bear the 
theoretical and empirical evidence developed thus far 
on socially inherited memory and the public sphere on 
the (en) gendered changes which occurred in television 
in the 1980s and early 1990s. I begin by arguing that 
the impetus in Poland was towards public service 
television. I then look in more detail at attempts 
since 1980 to broaden the basis of public 
representation within Polish television. Next I 
examine the place of women in Polish Television' and 
(en)gendering mechanisms which, despite these efforts, 
were, nevertheless, reproduced structurally and 
ideologically, and reinforced, as in wider society, 
through new policies informed by Poland's socially 
inherited memory of the development of exclusive 
political right. Finally I make some brief comparisons 
with other countries in Eastern Europe. 
8.2 Polish Television and Democracy 
The struggles over television control in the societies 
of Eastern Europe have focused mainly on the attempts 
to change the television systems from ones under state 
control to public service systems. There was an 
underlying assumption that a shift from state control 
to public service television would equate with a shift 
from totalitarian rule to democracy. The model most 
often used to describe the 'totalitarian' media 
systems of Eastern Europe bef ore 1989 is that of 
Siebert's Four Theories of the Press (1963). In this 
the media system of the former Soviet Union was 
explained in terms of a propagandist model in which 
the press acted as a transmission belt for the ideas 
of the Communist Party. The Soviet press was 
described as a biased and didactic proselytizing 
organ of the state (Siebert et al, 1963: 137). As 
Elena Androunas put it: 
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This system served the interests not of the 
audience, not of the society as a whole, but of 
the party-government elite. With its total 
control over the country, it alone determined the 
media's well-being and prosperity. The major 
function of the media system has always been 
promotion of ideological uniformity as dictated 
by official doctrine. (Androunas, 1993: 108) 
However, as Colin Sparks and I point out (1994a: 250), 
this may have been a useful description of the 
situation in the Soviet Union", but actually bears 
little resemblance to reality in post World War Two 
Central and Eastern Europe. Polish writer, Karol 
Jakubowicz, suggests that in Poland the breakdown of 
the Stalinist model of communication began virtually 
from the moment of the Polish People, s Republic"s 
inception. After 1971, the departure from the 
Stalinist model rapidly increased, with the 
implementation of Martial Law as a temporary and short 
term hiccup in this more general process of decay 
(Jakubowicz, 1992a). 2 Colin Sparks and I identify 
three areas of departure from the Stalinist model of 
the press in Polish Television from the 1980 onwards: 
types of programmes shown; advertising and openness to 
foreign signals (Sparks and Reading, 1994: 250). 
Jakubowicz states that by 1986 42.8 percent of feature 
f ilms and 47.1 percent of series shown on Polish 
Television were imported from the West (Jakubowicz, 
1989: 154). The amount of advertising carried in the 
1980s was tiny at just 2 per cent ( Polskie Radio i 
Telewizja Foreign Relations Department, 1987: 20) 
compared with Western Europe, but, nevertheless 
" Even within the Soviet Union there were marked differences between different republics. In 
11thuania, for example, recent research notes that after 1956 broadcasting became more lively and diversified: 
'stilted and submissive speaking styles were replaced by normal everyday human discourse. Reports were no 
longer read out from previously prepared scripts. ' (Lauristin and Vihalemm, 1993: 205). 
' Sociologists Kovats and Tolgeysi present a similar argument for the breakdown of the Soviet media 
system in Hungary. They maintain that the system began to decay after the uprising of 1956 and that this 
process accelerated after economic reforms implemented in 1968 (Kovats and Tolgeysi, 1990) 
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'signified a very small but real adjustment of 
broadcasting away from political and cultural ends 
towards those dictated by its economic position' 
(Sparks and Reading, 1994a: 251). The geographical 
location of Poland meant less access to Western 
terrestrial signals in comparison with other Central 
and Eastern European countries, but, evidence suggests 
that there was some broadcasting plurality provided by 
access to video recorders and satellite from 1987 
onwards (Sparks and Reading, 1994a: 252). 
At the same time, however, Polish Television remained 
under the control of the Polish United Workers Party 
via the Radio and Television Committee under the 
Broadcasting Act of 1960 (Sabbat-Swidlicka, 1994: 40). 
Since the 1970s, according to Goban-Klas, television 
was placed under the direct rule of the Department of 
Press, Radio and Television (Goban-Klas, 1994: 149). 
This was renewed by the Resolution of the Council of 
Ministers in December 23,1987, which stated that the 
Committee was a central government office with the 
exclusive right to produce radio and television 
programmes (Resolution of the Council of Ministers, 
No. 202\87). 
Thus the impetus amongst those in the opposition 
centred on the attempt to loosen these direct state 
controls and develop a television system based on the 
principles of public service (Reading, 1994: 176-77). 
In one of its first drafts for a new broadcasting law 
in 1980 Solidarity stressed that the move towards 
public service television would be a crucial part of 
the process of democratization (Jakubowicz, 1990: 15). 
Even within the government itself there were those who 
sought to reform Polish Television in the direction of 
a Western public service model. In 1985 the government 
appointed a Commission to investigate ways in which 
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television could be made more like the BBC (Goban- 
Klas, Personal Communication: 1992). 
Since 1989, the key area of conflict arising over the 
drafting of new broadcast laws in Eastern Europe, 
including Poland, concerned the balance between a 
public service model for television and commercial 
imperatives (Reading, 1994: 177). The Polish 
Broadcasting Act of 1992 embodies the principles of 
public service television in a manner accepted by 
scholars such as Paddy Scannell in that it covers most 
of the Poland, 's national territory and provides a 
mixed menu of programmes (1992: 318). 3 Furthermore, 
the Polish Parliament accepted the recommendations of 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 
22 April 1991 to establish broadcasting on the 
principles of plurality, independence and balanced 
content (Druck, 1991: 112). The resolution stated that 
the broadcasting systems of countries should not be 
left to market forces. This suggests that there was 
a strong commitment to public service broadcasting in 
Poland. Even where there was not direct support for 
public service broadcasting but calls for a shift to 
commercial television, as by writers such as Dougan, 
Dennis and Heuvel soon after 1989, there was, 
nevertheless, the assumption that the emergence of 
broadcasting free from government control would 
articulate the plurality of voices necessary for the 
functioning of democracy and, thereby,, extend the 
public sphere (Dougan, 1990; Dennis and Heuvel, 1990). 
However, the evidence suggests a different picture in 
terms of gender representation. The gender bias in 
Poland's socially inherited memory (en) gendering the 
public sphere prior to 1989 was reproduced in 
3 Scannell defines public service broadcasting as that which is capable of covering most of a national 
territory and that which provides a mixed menu of programming (1992: 318) 
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television. Furthermore, it seems that this gender 
bias continued after 1989 even with the shift from 
state run to public service television along with 
limited commercial organisations. 
8.3 Socially Inherited Memory and Broadcast Space 
Before 1989 
The mechanisms of exclusion and inclusion f ound in 
wider Polish society as described by social scientists 
such as Jancar (1978), Wolczik (1985) and Heitlinger 
(1979) were, before the changes of 1989, equally 
endemic in broadcast space. As in North America and 
Western Europe, the numbers of women entering the 
media as journalists did actually increase from 1960 
onwards: 25 percent of journalists were female in 
1960; 32 percent of journalists were female in 1970; 
and by 1980 35 percent of journalists were female 
(Goban-Klas, 1985: 27). According to Goban-Klas this 
increase was, proportionately, greater in Polish 
Television and Radio during this period (Goban-Klas, 
1985: 27). There tended to be more women journalists 
working in foreign news bureaux (27 percent); even 
more on radio programmes for abroad (30 percent) and 
in documentaries (50 percent) (Institute of 
journalists, 1976: 187). As in the USSR the 1970s also 
saw a general rise in the number of women students 
studying journalism. 
Yet, despite this, empirical research shows, firstly, 
that the number of women at management level in 
television and other media was small (Goban-Klas, 
1985: 27) and, secondly, that 'to get promotion they 
[women] must always or in general behave like men' 
(1985: 27). Goban-Klas concluded from his research in 
the 1980s that there were several factors working 
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against the equal participation of women in Polish 
Radio and Television. The first was that as women came 
to represent 50 per cent of those working in the media 
generally, concerns about gender bias were not seen as 
important. Secondly, the lack of promotion of women 
within television structures was attributed to 
inherent biological differences between men and women 
with women viewed stereotypically as responsible for 
mothering and the home. Goban-Klas argued that the 
situation could only be improved by including women in 
management structures (1985: 28). His research is 
supported by three television studies by Maciej 
Mrozowski. Mrozowski in his first study 'Status of 
Women in Television' found that the gender bias of 
wider Polish society was replicated in television 
structures, both vertically and horizontally 
(Mrozowski, 1985). A second study published in 1989 on 
men and women in Polish Television indicated the 
continuance of such patterns. His most recent study 
published in 1991 both extends and confirms the 
picture of the occupational status of men and women in 
Polish Television in the 1980s. In this study, 
Mrozowski conducted a small scale survey in 1988 of 
100 individuals drawn from the staff of Polish 
Television to see how their perceptions of their 
occupational status conformed to gender stereotypes. 
Mrozowskils work confirmed that as in wider society 
women were under represented at management levels in 
Polish Television. They were over represented in 
cultural, education and children's programmes, whilst 
they were under represented in economic, business and 
technical spheres. Women as in wider society earned 
less than men for the same work; promotional prospects 
were better for men than for women. Respondents 
perceived clear differences between the psyches of men 
and women which they said led to predispositions for 
different programme types and hence assignments based 
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on sex. What we see is the operation of the social 
inheritance in television of women's and men's places 
in society. This was then reinforced by the 
institutional context of the television workplace: Its 
organization, promotional mechanisms, pay scales, 
vocational training and general climate of relations 
amongst television workers were set up in a way which 
benefited men over women. Women, argued Mrozowski, had 
to compete 'on men's terms' or not at all (Mrozowski, 
1991: 88-110). This created a situation of role 
dissonance between competing on men's terms in the 
public sphere and the demands of women's socially 
inherited roles within the Polish family. Mrozowski 
also saw, as in other areas of Polish society, that 
the social memory of Mother Poland acted to 
legitimatize the exclusion of women (Mrozowski, 
1991: 104). Further, he argued that television as a 
profession is different from other professions in 
terms of its impact on personal time and family life 
and respondents agreed that this further worked 
against women (Mrozowski, 1991: 10ý). Finally, in 
Mrozowskils study men considered that women's 
promotional prospects were worse because of their 
domestic obligations and the naturally 'weaker 
physical and psychological stamina of women' 
(Mrozowski, 1991: 100). But, women themselves stated 
that the primary exclusionary mechanism working 
against them was not their socially inherited role but 
the male political cadres in management (polityka 
kadrowa kierownictwa) who favoured men (Mrozowski, 
1991: 99). What this suggests is that for men in the 
television workplace the socially inherited memory of 
woman's domestic role is used by them to justify their 
own dominance; women in contrast resisted this image 
of themselves and used their own observations of the 
machinations of state capitalism in their present 
situation to explain their oppression. This is also 
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supported by a study in the 1980s which revealed that 
although Polish State Television was dominated by male 
ethics, women workers did agitate for improvements in 
their status in terms of equal pay and promotion in 
accordance with the law. It was not lack of resistance 
to their social inheritance but overt pressure on the 
part of the union and management which resulted in the 
failure of their efforts (Witkowska, 1990: 10). 
Further, when women instituted a campaign to establish 
child care facilities within the television 
organization; this again was not given full support by 
the Union (Witkowska, 1990: 10). 
The structural bias of Polish Television also 
reproduced bias in the gender content of television 
programming (Mrozowski, 1991: 99). This is supported by 
a content analysis of television in the early 1980s 
which showed that whilst the employment of women was 
taken for granted in media images, this was combined 
with an ideal of women's family duties often shown as 
more important than their work (Siemienska, 1985: 
307). 
8.4 Socially Inherited Memory Within Broadcast Space 
After 1989 
Since 1989 most evidence suggests that the 
representation of women in broadcast structures has 
changed little. The Head of Polish Television's 
Channel 1, Leszek Wasiuta, said: 'The structure is the 
same as under Communism because it's a very good 
structure that works equally well under Communism or 
capitalism' (Personal Communication, 1992). The 
question is, though, good for whom? The Director of 
Coopers and Lybrand, David Thomas, in Warsaw stated 
that Polish Television since 1989 functioned like a 
secretive male club and "as one man is pushed out 
another moves in, (Personal Communication, 1992). 
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Between 1989 to 1992 there were five different 
Director Generals. All were men (Maciej Strzembosz, 
Personal Communication, 1992). At the media sub-table, 
which was part of the Round Table talks between the 
Communist Party, Solidarity and the Roman Catholic 
Church in 1989 no women were included (Goban-Klas 
1992: Personal Communication). Women have been 
consistently denied representation on the new 
Broadcasting Council created since 1992. As Anna 
Szymanska-Kwiatkowska, leader of the cross-Party 
Democratic Union of Women and then editor of Women and 
Lifg magazine said in 1990: 
There is discrimination against women. Statistics 
clearly show it. About 50 percent of working 
people are women but only 4 percent hold 
positions as managers or higher (Reading, 
1992: 141). 
In 1992 out of a total of 3,894 Polish Radio and 
Television workers in Warsaw there were 2182 men and 
1712 women. The number of women graduates were 459 
and the number of male graduates were 464 (Andrzej 
Wojnach, Head of Staff Training, Polish Television, 
Personal Communication, 1992). Thus although there 
were fewer women employed overall, proportionately, 
there were more women graduates employed in relation 
to graduate men. Despite this, however, in the same 
year, Polish Television had only 2 women directing 
programme departments, in comparison with ten men 
directing programme departments. Further, the gender 
ghettoization of wider society was also evident within 
Polish Television: Women headed departments that were 
extensions of women's socially inherited role - the 
children and education departments (Polish Television 
Yearbook, 1992). Danuta Celeyska-Bejger, Head of 
Programming for Channel one, said that although 1989 
marked a watershed in terms of general attitudes, 
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programming and increasing commercialism, the one 
constant that remained was gender bias. Of the six 
new key executive appointments made in January 1991 
only one was a woman, Barbara Pietkiewicz (derived 
from Polish television and radio personnel department 
information, 1994). In 1992 the head of programming 
for Channel 1 was male, the head of Channel 2 was 
male, the head of advertising was male, the head of 
finance was male, the head of training was male, the 
head of technical facilities was male, the Director of 
the Polish Television Theater was male, the Director 
of the film production department was male, the head 
of the Television Information Agency was male. One key 
department, International Relations, was headed by a 
woman, Marta Suchodolska (Marta Suchodolska, Personal 
Communication: 1992). She was replaced by a man in 
1993 when the department was restructured. The head of 
personnel was also a woman. 
By 1994, there were still very few women in positions 
of power in the organization. There was 1 woman 
Director of Live Production Staff, 1 woman responsible 
for the Archives; one Deputy Controller of Channel 1; 
1 Deputy Controller responsible for artistic 
production in Channel 2. All the 9 regional 
Television Director Generals were men in October 1992 
(Tomasz Trabic, Editor, Media Section Nowe Eurgpg, 
1992: Personal Communication). This exclusion was then 
reproduced at the highest board levels: A report for 
the Austrian government stated that the Parliamentary 
Committee of Culture and Media of the Mazowlecki 
government in 1990 comprised the Editor-in-Chief of 
Polityka, the Editor-in-Chief of the Catholic 
periodical, Gosc Niedzielny; a Professor of Law, and 
a legal representative from the Polish Journalist's 
Association. None of these were women and, yet, one of 
their considerations was to protect the rights and 
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interests of print and broadcasting employees (Giorgi 
and Pohoryles, 1994: 105). Of the 9 strong Radio and 
Television Council appointed in 1993 all were men. 
Thus a broad headcount reveals that the sexual 
discrimination described by Mrozowski in his studies 
in the 1980s continued to be reproduced in the Polish 
Television system in the 1990s. Neither was it the 
case that attempts were made to counteract this with 
education or training. The training department in 
Polish Television after 1989 sought to deploy Western 
training methods for programme makers and journalists. 
Trainers such as Rick Thompson from the BBC in Wales 
and others from London were brought in to provide 
training both at the centre in Warsaw and in the 
regions. None of this training involved training in 
equal opportunities for key personnel (Andrzej 
Wojnach, Head of Training, Personal Communication, 
1992). The new training booklets produced since 1989 
which included information on ethics for journalists 
and international law did not include training in how 
to deal with gender bias. Similarly, an established 
course in Polish language for the media (Poradnik 
Jezkowy Dla Kazdego) includes nothing on verbal gender 
hygiene (Andrzej Wojnach, Head of Training, Personal 
Communication: 1992). 
The mechanisms of exclusion thus continued to be 
reproduced after 1989, according to the Head of Czech 
Television, Ivo Mathe: 'the actual attitudes and 
mechanisms of Polish Television are exactly the same' 
(Ivo Mathe, Personal Communication 1992). Dobrochna 
Kedzierska-Trusuzynska, Vice-chair of the Committee 
for Culture and Media in 1990, also described the 
situation in terms of the socially inherited memory of 
women's 'proper place' working against their 
promotion: 
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When the boss has a choice between a very good 
woman employee and three worse men, he will 
choose a man - because women take leave to care 
for children and on top of that, her place is in 
the kitchen (1990, Personal Communication). 
Danuta Celeyska-Bejger, Head of Channel One, added 
that in her opinion, it is not simply that women were 
accidentally forgotten or excluded since 1989 but that 
certain values or attitudes concerning women or the 
socially inherited memory of a woman's place in the 
public sphere was actually used by men to justify the 
overt exclusion of women from key television positions 
(Celeyska-Bejger, Personal Communication: 1994). An 
example of this was the case of the woman newsreader, 
Malgorzata Szelewnicka, who had worked for ten years 
on prime time Polish television news. She was sacked 
in April, 1994, and moved to Polish Radio (Celeyska- 
Bejger, Personal Communication: 1994). Professor 
Walery Pisarek, Professor of the Institute for Media 
Research at the University of Kracow, who followed the 
case, stated that it was a clear case of sexual 
discrimination, since they would not have had the same 
objections if she was a man (Walery Pisarek, 1994: 
Personal Communication). The Director of News had 
sacked Szelewnicka for being " too young, too 
beautiful and too stupid' (Teresa Sasinska-Klas, 1994: 
Personal Communication). 
The Polish Television and TV Reform Commission which 
was established to report on proposed structural 
changes to the organization made no reference at all 
to female staff, despite the large proportion of 
female staff working at Polish Television (Witkowska, 
1990: 10). In 1990 the station had a beautician and a 
hairdresser, but still had no child care facilities 
for the children of its workers. Shift work and the 
unsocial hours of television production, combined with 
with social cuts to state childcare provision after 
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1989 meant that women with children were hit 
particularly hard. As Witkowska put it: 
Given the national childcare crisis with state 
creches closing down due to lack of funding and 
the special situation in television work, where 
hours are long and often irregular, establishing 
a crbche would seem to be the ideal solution 
(1990: 10). 
Further, after 1989 Polish Television experienced 
not only a continuation of party political 
interference but also interference on matters of 
sexuality and morality. At a conference to celebrate 
the 40th anniversary celebration of Polish Television 
in October 1992, the organization promoted the image 
that the new public service station would address 
issues relating to a broad spectrum of people 
including documentaries on pornography, prostitution 
and child sexual abuse (Polish Television Video, 40 
Lat, 1992). However, the Vice-Director of Gdansk 
Television, Ryszard Grabowski, which contributes 
programmes to Central Polish Television, said that in 
reality journalists were very cautious about tackling 
subjects which might result in them being publicly 
accused of undermining the moral authority of the 
Church. Abortion, he said, was one issue which 
journalists felt very uneasy about representing 
publicly on television. Consequently, the "television 
picture is a safe picture. We haven't even tried to 
make anything on such controversial topics. The shadow 
of the centre reaches us even here' (Ryszard 
Grabowski, 1992: Personal Communication). The Head of 
the Department of Radio and Television in the Ministry 
of Telecommunications, Marian Kislo, admitted in 1992 
that whilst the government was still preparing the new 
Broadcast Bill which would allow for the establishment 
of commercial Radio and Television stations, that the 
only legally operating stations were essentially 
Church stations (Marian Kislo, Personal Communication, 
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1992). At that time there were already 20 Radio 
stations f or the Roman Catholic Church, but only three 
other commercial Radio stations: Solidarnosci, 
Warszawa, and Radio Fun in Kracow with one local 
commercial TV station - Televizia Echo (Ministrem 
Lacznosci, 1992) The then chairman of the Polish 
Journalist's Association, Maciej Ilowiecki, speaking 
at the Warsaw based European Centre for the Media, 
stated that the power of the Church over the media 
presented journalists with a major problem (Warsaw, 23 
September, -1992). A member of the Polish Feminist 
Association, -in 
Warsaw, in response to the effects on 
broadcast space by the Church said: 'Catholic priests 
have always used their churches to preach against 
reproductive freedom. Now they have the mass media and 
are invited to take part in virtually all state 
events' (Plakwicz 1992: 91). 
This conservative moral climate which prevented 
discussion of key gender issues such as abortion was 
accompanied by af ear of returning to the days of 
prior restraint and the little 'Black Book' of 
censorship. Such fear of legal censorship was used to 
open the gates to pornographic material which 
exploited and objectified women and girls. Women's 
bodies and body parts: 
are used to advertise virtually all kinds of 
goods from soap to building equipment ... porn 
films are distributed on video tapes ... the 
general trend implies that freedom means, among 
other things, free access to women's bodies. 
(Plakwicz, 1992: 91). 4 
Underlying this, as we shall see, were legal sanctions 
which provided for gender-biased intervention in the 
form of priority provided for Catholic representation 
in broadcasting, as well as the 1992 Broadcast Law and 
' In Hungary, young women are able to make an average of two months wages for sexually explicit 
acts on video. The fastest growing industry in 1991 was the set to business (Corrin, 1992: 67). 
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supplementary media laws which recalled the most 
exclusionary elements of Poland's socially inherited 
memory of the development of political right. 
8.5 Socially Inherited Memory (En) Gendering Media 
Policy 
The fulfilment of public communication needs were 
important to movements across Eastern Europe in the 
seventies and eighties: one of the central demands of 
opposition groups in Central and Eastern Europe in 
1989 was for a more open media. Charter 77 in 
Czechoslovakia demanded freedom for the dissident 
playwright Vaclav Havel; in the Soviet Union, 
Gorbechev took Glasnost an old Russian word meaning 
'giving voice, to promote a new wave of communicative 
freedom. The degree to which at the policy and legal 
level this occurred in Poland, however, is 
questionable. Even more questionable is the degree to 
which this communicative freedom included women. 
A number of commentators maintain that when Solidarity 
drafted its first media laws and policy directives 
during 1980-1 it stressed the concept of social 
control over the media (Jakubowicz, 1990: 3; 
Galczynski, 1991). Indeed, the Final Resolution 
'Thesis 321 adopted by the Solidarity Congress in 1981 
stated: 'the media of social communication are social 
property and must serve the whole of society and 
operate under its control' (Cited by Galczynski, 1991: 
27 ). In this original proposal all major parties, 
movements, political and social organizations were to 
have access to air time. one activist stated: 
We believe that radio and television belongs to 
the people. We pay for it with our taxes. If the 
Party wanted to have control of them, they should 
use their dues of their 2.5 million members to 
build their own television system. This one 
belongs to be people. (Solidarity activist, 
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Polityka July 25,1981: 15 cited by Galczynski, 
1991: 36)) 
Furthermore, the endorsement of the principal of 
social representation was articulated in broadcasting 
in the early drafts of a broadcasting law prepared by 
Solidarity. The drafts challenged the monopoly 
granted to Polish Radio and Television and the rights 
granted to the Committee for Radio and Television as 
a central administrative organ of the state (Law on 
Radio and Television, 1960: 2 December). For the 
governance of television some form of social 
representation was suggested. For example, the First 
Draft in 1980 provided for fifty percent of seats on 
the governing body of Radio and Television to be given 
over to representatives from political and social 
groups, artists' organizations and trades unions. The 
other fifty percent would be given over to 
representatives from television and radio. In the 
Second Draft Law, also in 1980, the governing body was 
to include in equal parts parliamentary delegates, 
broadcasting workers and representatives from civic 
associations such as women's groups and youth clubs. 
The Third Draf t Law gave f orty percent of seats on the 
governing body to broadcasting staff, thirty percent 
to parliamentary delegates and thirty percent to 
social organizations, including women's groups. Karol 
Jakubowicz argues that in these early drafts 
Solidarity 'sought to reclaim for the people the 
existing centralized and monopolistic broadcasting 
system' (1990: 13-14). 
Such an initial commitment to social representation, 
which included some sense of the representational 
needs of women, was in keeping with the broad 
definitions of the right to communicate outlined in 
the MacBride report and adopted as 11 principles of 
the Belgrade Resolution by the 32nd General Conference 
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of Unesco in October 1980.5 This included the 
principal of greater social access to and control of 
the means of communication (Ansah, 1992: 53). It is 
also keeping with UN gender policy to which Poland was 
a signatory. 
It is now well documented, however, that the initial 
impetus for empowering the citizens of Eastern Europe 
through social representation and media access 
enshrined in media policy was quickly dropped in 
favour of elite forms of control ( Jakubowicz 1994; 
Splichal 1993; Sparks and Reading 1995). My own 
analysis of Solidarity news letters and documents 
shows that early on a split developed between how the 
grassroots of Solidarity and its leadership thought 
media freedom should be codified (Reading, 1994: 7- 
12). If we take that further we also see that within 
the genesis of elite control and thus exclusion 
inherited from the memory of political right was also 
the beginnings of gender exclusion in opposition 
discourse concerning the media. 
The Solidarity leadership began to argue by the Autumn 
of 1980 that information output in the opposition 
media should be controlled by the Solidarity 
executive. The internal Union newsletter Informator 
Wewnetrzny (Internal Informant) in November 1980, for 
example, stated: 
In matters of access to the central mass 
communications networks, the National Executive 
of Solidarity (NSZZ) represents most diligently 
the needs of the union's public information and 
publication needs. Union representatives confirm 
that NSZZ will make the best use of access to the 
press, radio and television, as well as 
publishing shares, in the interests of workers 
5 Point II of the MacBride Report states that a key principal of communication needs should include: 
'respect for the right of the community, of social and ethnic groups, as well as individuals to have access to 
information sources and actively participate in communication flows. ' (Marques de Melo, 1992: 15) 
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and union members and with full respect to legal 
obligations. (my emphasis) (Informator 
Wewnetrznv, November, 1980: 15). 
Like the exclusionary ethos developed in the public 
sphere in the interwar years the executive of 
Solidarity began to forget its original statement that 
all citizens should have the right to communicate. 
Instead, the National Executive Council of Solidarity 
was said to be capable of representing the interests 
of workers and union members. The problem with this 
was its in-built gender bias. Despite laws to the 
contrary, as Parts Two and Three have shown, under 
state capitalism men were workers in the public 
sphere, whilst women were workers in the public sphere 
but also unpaid domestic workers responsible for 
nurturance of household members and reproduction of 
the workforce (See also Einhorn, 1994; Funk and 
Mueller, 1993). Women therefore did not occupy in the 
same way as men the term worker. Therefore, even if, 
for the sake of argument, the Executive were able to 
represent and articulate the interests of male workers 
it would be unable to represent the interests of 
female workers in the same way. Similarly, as we 
already know, women union members in Solidarity were 
vertically and horizontally excluded (Siemienska, 
1986). Such a media policy replicates the socially 
inherited memory of the marginality of women in the 
public sphere and in public debate. 
By October 1981 an analysis of Solidarity 
documentation shows that the Gdansk leadership began 
to make public its change of direction in media policy 
(Reading, 1994: 7-12). The Executive expressed that 
the unrestricted model of social access originally 
hoped f or by union members would be replaced by a 
model in which the media, including television, was to 
be controlled and articulated by the chiefs of the 
Union. Lech Walesa stated that although access to 
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airwaves could be given to some groups, such as the 
Roman Catholic Church, different groups would find 
representation through the Executive since 'their 
essence has dutifully emerged from us' ( Servis 
Informator - Biuro Informacji Prasowej KKP NSZZ 
Solidarnosc 10 October, 1981: 28). In effect what 
Solidarity did was to use the social memory of the 
media policy of the Polish United Worker's Party, 
which in law articulated itself as the vanguard of the 
people. Walesa added that social control of and access 
to television would not be practically feasible. 
Furthermore, he stated that although Solidarity should 
not support censorship he did envisage that certain 
restraints would be necessary in order to retain the 
political line of the Executive. He said that whilst 
some editors would be given the support of the Union 
others would be expelled ( Servis Informator - Biuro 
Informacji Prasowej KKP NSZZ Solidarnosc 10 October, 
1981: 28). In an interview for Solidarnosc in the 
Autumn of 1981 Lech Walesa said: 'This is not 
censorship but we are obliged to frame somethings' 
(Walesa, 1981: 14). 
The advent of Martial Law on 13 December 1981 crushed 
Solidarity's attempts for communication freedom. The 
membership of Solidarity did not try to establish 
social control again over broadcast space. By the time 
of the Round Table Talks in 1989 virtually all 
concepts of social control over broadcasting had been 
lost. The tug of war between factions wanting social 
control and those wanting elite control witnessed in 
Hungary after 1988, for example, was not present in 
Poland. 6 
" In Hungary early drafts of the new Broadcast Law such as that of October 1991 included a radical 
provision along the lines of the German broadcast model for up to half of the supervisory board to be nominated 
from 13 spheres of interest (Hungarian Broadcast Draft Law, 1991, November: Articles 42-44). A later version 
suggested a system of rotation to achieve greater representation on the supervisory body to avoid it beco ig 
too unwieldy. (Edit Papaczy, Deputy Minister for Justice, Hungarian Government, 1992: Personal 
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In the Draft Broadcasting Law of 14 December, 1990, 
the supervisory body for broadcasting was to consist 
of 11 members nominated and appointed by the 
president, subject to parliamentary approval (Draft 
Broadcasting Law, 14 December, 1990: Ch 2. Art 7.1 and 
7.2). Two remnants of the philosophy of social 
representation remained. Representation of workers was 
to be provided by a union representative from 
broadcasting on the supervisory body (Ch. 4. Art. 9.3). 
Both public and private broadcasters were enjoined to 
provide programmes for special interest groups (Ch 5', 
Art. 18.8). 
By 1991, however, even these remnants of the memory of 
social control had gone. Chapter 2, Article 8 of the 
1991 draft law states that members on the regulatory 
body should suspend membership with outside bodies 
such as trades unions. In terms of content the draft 
law had become increasingly contradictory. Article 18 
states that programmes of public broadcasters 'shall 
not propagate actions, attitudes or use contrary to 
the lawl morality and public good'. Whilst Chapter 4, 
Article 20 enjoins broadcasters to: 'Facilitate 
participation by citizens and their organizations in 
public life by presenting diverse attitudes and views 
and exercising their rights to criticism and public 
control. ' 
The clause recalls the early tradition of greater 
gender balance in public life. However, it is 
somewhat contradicted by Chapter 4, Article 21: 
'Public broadcasting stations shall enable political 
parties, National trades unions and employers 
organizations to present their views on the crucial 
problems of the country,. The sense here is that 
Communication). 
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representation in broadcast space should be given to 
political parties (which are gender exclusive) trades 
unions (which are gender biased) and employers 
organizations (which are gender exclusive). The 
socially inherited memory of framing political 
representation within the nation is then recalled, 
which excludes any views other than those expressed 
within the context of 'problems of the country'. 
The draft laws drawn up after 1989 set the scene for 
the final broadcast law accepted by the Polish 
Parliament on 29 December 1992. This goes further in 
its endorsement of gender biased mechanisms of 
exclusion to the public sphere. It is also supported 
by the Post and Telecommunications Act of 1990 which, 
as we shall see, enshrined gender bias within the 
public (en)gendering of representation in broadcast 
space. 
All notions of social control and access were erased 
in the 1992 Act. Thus the Broadcasting Council , the 
main supervisory body f or broadcasting in Poland, 
consists of delegates appointed and chosen by 
Parliament. Since Parliament is, as we have already 
established, structurally gender biased, this excludes 
women. 
In addition, there are three areas which provide a 
legal basis for gender biased control over the content 
of programmes. The first concerns the social 
inheritance of the privileged rights of the Roman 
Catholic Church. As we have seen, the role of the 
Catholic Church in the mass media greatly increased 
after the imposition of martial law in 1981 and during 
the 1980s it entered radio and television (Prevratil 
and Goban-Klas, 1993: 50). This was a crucial shift in 
media policy from one which was essentially inclusive 
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to one which was exclusive. In the 1992 Broadcast Act 
it became law that programmes should uphold Christian 
values: 
Programme items shall respect the religious 
feelings of the audience, particularly the 
Christian system of values. (Article 18, 
paragraph 3). 
In addition, Chapter IV, Article 21, paragraph 2 
states that broadcasters must 'respect the Christian 
system of values-*. This is problematic in terms of 
ethnicity and gender. Firstly, whilst the tradition in 
Poland of people's religious feelings are remembered, 
the non-religious, secular or atheist feelings of 
audiences are denied. The social privileging of 
Christian values excludes the non-Christian minority. 
Such discourse is based on socially inherited 
assumptions about what it means to be both Polish and 
European. As Charles Husband points out, our notion of 
what it means to be European and its development in 
the 1980s, which East European states have recalled 
during their periods of transition, is based on ideas 
about a 'common heritage' stemming from ancient 
Greece, Roman Law and Christendom (Husband 1995: 200). 
Yet no European state is, in terms of ethnicity or 
religion, homogeneous. In addition to its 12 000 
remaining Jews, Poland has three quarters of a million 
people of German, Ukrainian, Byelorussian and Slovak 
origin (Plakwicz, 1992: 76). Neither is compulsory 
adherence to the Christian system of values gender 
neutral. Christianity has traditionally represented 
women as either virgin or whore; women as inferior to 
men; mystery; the source of evil in the world; the 
cause of the fall from innocence; secondary and 
marginal to the work of Christ. In the Christian 
system of values public authority is male (GOD, the 
father). Reproduction\creation is both male and 
public. It is a system of values based on the 
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endorsement of incest I (see Warren, 1980: 97; Rich, 
1983: 175). Furthermore, in Poland, Christianity 
essentially means Roman Catholic Christianity. As we 
have already seen (Chapter 7) this means that the key 
medium of the new 'democratic' public television must 
support the Vatican with its accompanying belief in 
the territorialization of not just women's minds but 
also their bodies through the abolition of abortion 
and contraception. It is thus not simply that there is 
a reluctance on the part of journalists to tackle 
issues which might go against the Church (see above) 
but that this is enshrined in law. This is reinforced 
by a number of other key laws. 
The first of these is the Law on the Relations between 
the State and the Catholic Church of 17 May 1989. 
Article 48 of this act states that the Church has the 
right to broadcast on the airwaves. This was further 
strengthened by Article 88 of the 1990 Post and 
Telecommunications Act. This states: 
(1) The Church has the right to broadcast 
through the media the Holy Mass on Sundays 
and holidays and programmes, particularly 
on religious-moral, social and cultural 
issues. 
(2) The manner of exercising the rights of point 
one is governed by an agreement between the 
Polish Radio and television Committee for 
radio and television and the Secretariat of 
the Polish Episcopate Conference. 
(3) The Church has the right to install and 
operate radio-Communications equipment for 
broadcasting radio and television programs 
and to allocation of the necessary 
frequencies for this purpose. 
(4) The manner of exercising the rights of point 
one is governed by an agreement between the 
Minister of Post and Telecommunications and 
'7 A male God (the father) creates a man, Adam who creates a woman, Eve, who is Wectively thus 
his daughter whom he then marries (Ward, 1984). 
285 
the Secretariat of the Polish Episcopate 
Conference. 
No other organizations or institutions are provided 
with the right to broadcast or technical means of 
access to the airwaves in this statute. 8 As Karol 
Jakubowicz points out: "access by other parties to 
Polish Radio and Television has proved less easy than 
might be expected' (1992: 91). The Church has its own 
weekly religious programmes and its own department 
staffed by the Jesuit Order (Jakubowicz, 1990b: 24- 
29). This growing influence over the public airwaves 
by the Church was reinforced by a new communication 
doctrine of the Roman Catholic Episcopate which aimed 
to 'embrace by its pastoral care media people' 
(Statement by the Roman Catholic Church, May, 1992 
cited by Goban-Klas, 1993: 9) through the 
establishment of Roman Catholic schools for 
journalists founded by a former Minister in Lech 
Walesals cabinet (Goban-Klas, 1993: 14). The 
Broadcasting Council members since 1992 have not only 
been all men but also predominantly supportive of the 
Roman Catholic Church. Of the nine male members, the 
two chosen by the Senate and three chosen by the 
president were known supporters of right-wing 
Christian values (Warsaw Voice, 1993: 4). Reports show 
that this body influenced decisions to remove 
television programmes against the Church. In 1993 a 
' It should be noted, however, that the 1991 Constitution of the Republic of Poland retains the 1952, 
Article 71, statement on citizens rights in connection with access to the media: 
(1) The Polish People's Republic of Poland shall guarantee its citizens freedom of speech of the press, of 
assembly and gatherings, of processions and demonstrations. 
(2) To put these freedoms into effect the working people and their organizations shall be given the use of 
printing shops, stocks of paper, public buildings and halls, means of communication, the radio and 
other necessary material means. 
The 1992 Broadcast Act thus contradicts this. Theoretically, a range of social organizations and individuals, 
including women's groups could contest their lack of access and representation in broadcast space but by 
September 1993 no such protests had occurred. 
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television programme was banned because it did not pay 
enough respect to Christian values (Radio Free Europe/ 
RL Report, No 16,1993). Thus, 'democracy' in 
broadcast space since 1989 has been informed by the 
socially inherited memory of the rights of the Roman 
Catholic Church, which has in turn, been at the 
expense of equal gender representation in broadcast 
space. 
The second key point of interference in programming 
concerns the social inheritance within media policies 
of national f raming and the built-in gender bias of 
this. Giorgi and Pohoryles in their analysis of 
broadcast restructuring noted: I the former ideology of 
Communism has been replaced with that of nationalism' 
(Giorgi and Pohoryles, 1994: 8). Other scholars such 
as Slavko Splichal also see the 'nationalization of 
the media' and 'nationalistic editorial policies' as 
warranting particular attention (Splichal, 1992: 171). 
Thus in the 1992 Broadcast Act enjoins commercial 
broadcasters to uphold national culture: 
2. A license shall not be granted if the 
applicant's programming could: 
(i) infringe on the National culture, public 
decorum, National Security and def ense or violate 
state secrets. 
(Article 26, para 2, subsection 1) 
The law states that the license may be withdrawn from 
commercial broadcasters who infringe the interests of 
National culture (Article 38). Consequently, the new 
commercial station, POLSAT, was awarded its license on 
the condition that it used 30 percent Polish 
programmes. At the core of this policy is the idea of 
media dissociation, the principal that it is desirable 
to halt the deleterious effects of the transnational 
market by enshrining the right of nations to some 
cultural autonomy. Yet, as Leslie Steeves points out, 
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it is important to ask, 'whose culture is being 
protected? To what extent are women, lower-class 
people, and minorities forgotten? (1989: 97). The 
concept of nationhood is in itself premised on the 
exclusivity, forgetting and lies of imagined 
communities (See Said, 1993). The socially inherited 
Polish 'national culture' tends to remember and recall 
an elite pale male culture which excludes women and 
ethnic minorities. This aspect of culture represents 
women as Mother Poland; the raped nation, the female 
Messiah (Reading, 1992; Einhorn, 1994). The emphasis 
in media policy on national quotas thus hides the 
internal inequalities of gender, race and class. As 
Steeves suggests: 'efforts to put quotas on imported 
films may well serve merely as a mask for greater 
profits to sectional local interests, no doubt 
controlled by upper class males' (1989: 97). Because 
Poland's socially inherited memory of political right 
developed around the centrality of the nation this 
then reinforces the 'naturalness', the I common sense' 
that national quotas should be included in media 
policy , but not gender quotas to (en) gender a 
sexually equal broadcast space. Thus the commercial 
company, POLSAT, was also awarded its license in 1994 
because its capital was essentially Polish rather than 
foreign. The Chairman of the Broadcasting Committee 
for Culture and Media, Juliusz Braun, which put 
together the Broadcasting Law said it was 'a big plus 
that Polish capital was behind POLSAT., ' (Personal 
communication, 1994). Why should Polish capital be 
privileged over foreign capital? Polish capital as 
well as Polish national culture is essentially elite 
pale male capital which excludes women and ethnic 
minorities. To back Polish capital simply perpetuates 
one male-dominated elite over another in the public 
sphere: it does nothing to (en)gender democracy. 
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The third area of media policy which enshrines gender 
bias is that of the family. The Polish Broadcasting 
Law of 1992 states: 
Programme services of public radio and 
Television should: 
7. serve the strengthening of the family, 
8. serve the combatting of social pathologies. 
(Article 21, paragraph 2, subsections 7 and 8) 
Underlying this is the social memory of the centrality 
of the family as the centre of Polish culture, 
remembered from the 19th century. This was recalled by 
the state capitalist regime in terms of the socialist 
family and also by the opposition who called on the 
memory of the family as the realm of freedom and 
liberty in contrast to the restricted public realm 
dominated by the Stalinist state. The I anti-politics' 
idea of this alternative 'civil society' was based, 
however, on a polity which was gender biased. Goven 
says for example: 
Anti-politics endowed the family with a key 
political role in recognizing it as the major 
locus of autonomy from the state. As the home 
became the site of democratic strivings, the 
power distribution within the family and private 
life also left its mark on the practice of anti- 
politics: women were expected to provide where 
possible, the emotional and material support for 
men's building of civil society (1993: 225) 
The family as we have already seen has been an 
established site of women-*s oppression in Poland. 
Women are over-burdened with the nurturing and 
reproducing responsibilities of the family. It has 
been the locus for male violence and the 
territorialization of women's bodies. Furthermore, the 
central role of the woman within the family has been 
represented as crucial to the public production of the 
nation in the 19th century and the public production 
of socialism in the later 20th century. Consequently, 
to enshrine in broadcast law that programme content 
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must serve to strengthen the family whilst combatting 
social pathologies constitutes an endorsement of the 
already established pattern of social gender bias, 
publicly and privately. The Law recalls the socially 
inherited dichotomy between the family (to be valued) 
and all I social pathologies' outside it - for example 
the Kobieta Samotna and Baba Yaga - which are thus to 
be devalued and marginalised in public representation. 
No definitions of what constitutes either 
strengthening or the family are included; neither is 
the term social pathology defined. Such a clause 
provides the regulatory body, appointed by the male 
president and predominantly male parliament with a 
mechanism to ban programs on subjects which they deem 
threatens the established capitalist-patriarchal 
order, such as sexuality, single parents and abortion. 
The law seems a far cry from the first non-Communist 
Prime Minister"s statement in 1989: **The right of 
access to television and radio must be equal to all. 
Television and radio will be pluralistic in 
character' (Mazowiecki, Address to Sejm, 12.10.1989). 
The Polish Broadcast Law of 1992 and related laws 
indicate that far from 1989 marking a revolutionary 
shift in terms of the (en)gendering of the public 
sphere it marked a realignment of the ruling class 
which rearticulated and legitimized its power through 
the socially inherited memory of exclusive political 
right. Solidarity activist Karol Modzelewski forsaw 
the situation as early as 1980: 
The Union has created a king which rules over it. 
Around the King is a court, and power lies in his 
court and then a parliament. And since the King 
is no dummy, power resides in his court. 
(Modzelski, 1981: 293) 
In the Polish case it seems that it is the King that 
rules. 
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8.6 Socially Inherited Memory in the Commercial 
Broadcast Sector 
The picture of Polish Television in transition from a 
state run system to a public run system thus f ar, 
unlike previous chapters looking at mediated aspects 
of the. public sphere, seems unrelentingly bleak. 
However, what of the development of the commercial 
sector? Will this, perhaps, provide new outlets for 
women's representation in the newly developing private 
television networks? 
So far, it seems that the representation of women has 
not been improved by the development of commercial 
television in Poland. By 1992 six unregulated private 
television stations had been established using non 
unionized labour in the cities of Warsaw, Wroclaw, 
Poznan, Lublin, Szczecin, and Lodz (Tomasz Trabic, 
1992: Personal Communication). The lack of union 
protection had serious consequences for all workers, 
and especially women. Women, already put in a weaker 
position in the labour market, found themselves often 
forced to take low paying jobs and in some cases give 
voluntary labour in the belief that there was the 
possibility of paid work in the future, once the 
stations were properly established. Basic rights such 
as nursery support, fully paid maternity leave, and 
paid child upbringing leave were ignored despite the 
fact that Lodz Pirate Television Station established 
for a short period in 1992, had substantial capital 
backing (Pirate TV Workers, Tele 24, Lodz, 1992: 
Personal Communication). The pirate stations were 
backed by Italian millionaire Nicola Grauzo (Chief of 
Nowe Televize, Miroslav Chojecki, September, 1992). 
The new deregulated labour market which underlies 
this developing economic pattern, already familiar in 
the West, has a built in gender bias. Temporary and 
short term contracts under the guise of 'flexibility' 
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bend against workers generally and women in 
particular. Such contracts are particularly biased 
against women of child-bearing age, who may already 
have or want to plan a family. Such women are forced 
to make a choice between family and work. Such con- 
tracts reinforce the (en)gendering of the public 
sphere by relocating what were established public 
responsibilities (paid maternity leave, child sickness 
leave, parental upbringing payments) within the 
private sphere. Within societies in which women are 
over represented in the private sphere, such as Poland 
this gender bias is then reproduced. The new national 
territorial commercial television station, POLSAT, in 
1994 did not in May of that year have childcare 
facilities (Boguslav Chrabota, Director of POLSAT, 
Personal Communication, 1994). Research shows that the 
trend in countries where casualisation is now 
established practice is for women to form the bulk of 
the temporary workforce (Holman and Ortiz, 1992). This 
could, as Margaret Gallagher argues, lead to a 
shifting female media workforce around a core of men 
with permanent contracts (1994: 102). The introduction 
of cable and satellite television is also unlikely to 
substantially change biased gender representation, if 
the situation in other countries is anything to go by. 
A state-by-state survey conducted in the United States 
found that in cable stations structural discrimination 
against women remained and television content 
continued to re-present women in stereotypical ways. 
Gallagher argues: 'It is doubtful whether even the 
public service applications of satellite technology 
will offer women scope to develop programming which 
challenges accepted definitions of reality' (1987: 28). 
8.7 Comparing Poland With Hungary and Czechoslovakia 
The situation for women television workers in Poland 
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in the 1980s was also similar throughout the Visegrad 
group of Central and Eastern European countries: women 
were mainly represented at the top levels of 
management structures in the Czech Republic and 
Hungary. In Czechoslovakia, for example, in 1985 there 
were 11 male departmental directors and no women 
(Ceskoslovenska Televizia V SSR Rocenka 1985: 63). In 
Slovakia, in 1980, there were 11 male departmental 
directors, and of the deputy directors, 9 were male 
and only 2 were women (Ceskoslovenska Televizia V SSR 
Rocenka 1980). In Hungary, in the 1970s, out of 5 
directors, all were men; out of 8 editors- in-chi ef s 
only 2 were women; out of 34 foreign correspondents 
only 2 were women (Jancar 1978: 219). 
The situation after 1989 was little different. In 
Hungary the talks between the government and 
opposition in 1990 on the media included only one 
woman, Dr Edit Papaczy, the Vice Minister for Justice 
(Edit Papaczy, Personal Communication: 1992). The top 
six positions after 1989 remained in the hands of men 
and of the 64 production chiefs only 4 were women 
(Moritz, 1993). In Czechoslovakia all the new 
directorial appointments made to the Czechoslovak 
Federal Television Channel between 30 June 1989 and 12 
March 1990 were men. The 11 foreign correspondents 
which the Channel boasted was reduced to 3 in 1989, 
none of whom were women. In Slovakia the situation was 
only marginally better with two women appointed for 
brief periods after 1989. But after 12 March 1990 the 
directorate was entirely male (Ceskoslovenska 
Televizia v SSR Rocenka 1989-90). 
Similar moral climates concerning the content of 
programmes were also observable in the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia and Hungary. In 1993 the National Television 
Council in the Czech public prevented Czech Television 
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from broadcasting the pop video Laska, je Laska (Love 
is Love) by Lucie Bila before 10 p. m. the Council's 
Vice-Chairman at the time stated publicly: 
the Council must be the flagship of morals ... 
sexual acts are shown which are taken out of the 
context of the general relations between man and 
woman. It creates a false picture to youth about 
sex and life and violates the paragraph of the 
law which states that TV should disseminate 
spiritual values ( Masson 1992: 11). 
Precise grounds for the intervention were not provided 
by the Council. However, a translation of the lyrics 
shows that they contain the passage: 'love is love 
when boys go out with girls, boys with boys and girls 
with girls'. In Hungary in January, 1993, a filmmaker 
said that he had experienced 'the worse totalitarian 
management style' by superiors who told him that his 
Christmas series lacked a sense of festive spirit 
because he had used "blacks, idiots and women with 
cheaply dyed hair. ' (Woodward, 1993: 9) 
However, some subtle differences in relation to Poland 
were also observable. The media policies themselves 
established after 1989 are marginally less closed than 
those of Poland. In Hungary one of the issues of 
contention after 1989 in drawing up the new broadcast 
legislation was the degree to which the supervisory 
board should be socially representative (Sparks and 
Reading 1995: 45). The law as it stands provides for 
a socially representative supervisory body to include 
members from ethnic minorities and religious bodies as 
well as women's organizations. For local and regional 
supervision the specification that women should be 
represented was dropped (Article 55,3). The law also 
states: I The audience must be warned if the programme 
contains visual sound effects which violate human, 
particularly female dignity, ... show violence or 
disturb one's piece of mind in any other way (Article 
14). The Hungarian policy therefore includes women as 
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special case: women are added on to gender-biased 
categories and working practices. In this respect the 
Hungarian policy is based on what Beverley Thiele 
(1992: 26) would call the tradition of pseudo- 
inclusion within political theory, as opposed to 
Poland's tradition of exclusion. 
In the Czechoslovak Broadcast Law of October 30 1991 
no mention of gender is made, but provision was 
included f or a representative ethnic mix of programmes 
(Article 9.2. c). It stipulated that broadcasters 
should cater to '*all strata of society-' (Article 
9.2. b) and reflect the pluralism of society (Article 
9.1). Further, it included the provision that 
broadcasters should uphold basic human rights (Part 
Two, Article 5, Paragraph a). In these respects the 
policy is based on what Beverley Thiele (1992: 28) 
would call the tradition of alienation within 
political theory. With the split of the country into 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia this trend continued. 
For example, the Slovak broadcast law requires that 
special programmes be made for national minorities, 
religious minorities and the disabled. No mention is 
made of gender equity quotas. In the license 
conditions for commercial broadcasters established in 
1993, broadcasters 'must not incite chauvenism' nor 
must they allow one religion to dominate or contain 
pornography (Slovak Appendix to Broadcast Licence 
001/1993: para 2,3). Chauvenism in Slovak means 
nationalism, rather than simple sexist bravado: 
although as we have seen in Poland, the two are 
historically connected. 
What this suggests, and which would make an 
interesting further study, is that within Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia were elements of pseudo-inclusion and 
alienation within their socially inherited memories of 
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political rightO. Certainly the overt exclusion found 
in Polish law as well as practice is not be found 
there in quite the same way. However, as with other 
aspects of the transition, it is not the case that the 
new elite has drawn solely on Poland's inheritance of 
exclusionary political right. In the case of media 
policy it is clear that throughout Eastern Europe 
countries inherited the gender-biased models already 
established by male-dominated international policy 
advisory bodies in the West. "O The Director General of 
Czechoslovak television admitted that they sought to 
replicate Western models: I We respect the European 
model in the Czech Republic' (Personal communication, 
1992). Whilst there was concern for women as 
(passive) recipients of culture they continue to be 
excluded from positions where they can be (active) 
makers of policies. " This suggests that to increase 
the democratic base, of the public sphere and the media 
is not enough, in psittacine fashion, to recall past 
laws, but crucial to (en) gender media laws and other 
policies anew. 
8.8 Conclusion and Contradictions 
Thus a more detailed examination of the key medium 
within the public sphere during the period of 
transition, television, suggests that the ways in 
which the public continued to be (en) gendered was 
still based on exclusion. 1989 did not provide the 
'In Czechoslovakia there is indeed evidence that women were included in opposition elites before 1989 
to a greater extent. In Charter 77, in the 1980s, out of the three delegates acting as representatives of the 
organization a woman was usually included. In May 1980 there were two women. (Funk and Mueller, 
1993: 93). In Hungary women too were very active as rank and file members of the many unofficial movements 
which chaUenged the authorities in the 1980s (Corrin, 1992: 42). 
'* The principle officers of the OIRT and the EBU in 1985 were all men (OIRT InterUnion Document, 
1995). With the merger of the two organisations in 1992 little changed. 
" Broadcasters and market research companies have shown a distinct interest in the gender of the 
recipients of culture in Eastern Europe. See for example, The BBC in Czechoslovakiao Ile Classic Engliah 
GentleMM International Broadcasting Audience Research, 1992. 
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yeast to prove the future of democracy. The state-run 
broadcasting organization in Poland before 1989 was, 
like Polish society, male-dominated. Since 1989, even 
though there have been some shifts towards what can be 
defined as public service broadcasting this has not 
constituted a change in terms of gender 
representation. Neither does the introduction of a 
commercial sector offer much change to this general 
picture of exclusion. As in the rest of Polish society 
this does not mean that this is an inevitable 
historical process. We also saw how, historically, 
within television women have made attempts to change 
the mechanisms of exclusion. Women in Eastern Europe, 
as elsewhere, continue to organise and develop their 
own media initiatives, such as the Czech and Slovak 
co-operative venture ASPEKT ,a feminist Journal 
established in 1995 (Grunell 1995,105). In Poland 
too, women continue to recall its long tradition of 
feminism and political inclusion through challenging 
at conference level the gender bias of democracy 
itself. Beata Grudzinska, who runs the Polish feminist 
magazine, Baba Polka, stated: 
We should go back to democracy and what we mean 
by democracy and equality in Poland ... in 
Eastern Europe what we need is gender democracy. 
And I this I been the acceptance of women in 
politics, in social life, in labour. (Beata 
Grudzinska, Personal Communication. (1990). 
Yet, the people in power in the nineties are mostly 
men, the mechanisms of production are androcentric and 
new policies have reproduced Poland's gender-biased 
socially inherited memory of exclusive political 
right. This suggests that not only is public service 
television empirically male-dominated, as substantial 
research in the West already shown 1.2 in the 1980s, but 
12 Whilst debates and government policy began to shift towards some notion of public service 
broadcasting in the regimes of Eastern Europe, including Poland, in the 1980s, commentators, in the West 
became increasingly disillusioned with the public television systems. Research showed that public service 
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that the concept of change in the public sphere which 
underpins it may be better understood in terms of the 
recollection and forgetting of socially inherited 
memory: This perhaps may help explain why the 
revolution in Poland was not so much a revolution as 
an organized coup under the f lag of democracy, in 
which the mostly male elites were temporarily 
reconstituted from one state centralized to capital 
centralized form. As Blackburn notes: 'the main effect 
of 1989 is that capitalism and the rich have, for the 
time being, stopped being scared (Blackburn, 1991: 
122). As the former'Director of the OIRT, Milan 
Bauman, once warned: 'You can't have a revolution that 
is velvet' (Personal Communication, 1991). 
broadcasting in Western democracies was dlitist and statist (Rowland and Tracey, 1990: 8); structurally 
gender biased (Gallagher, 1987: 28); serving best a pale male audience (Reilly, 1993: 124-34); its content 
marginalized and stereotyped women (Baehr and Spindler-Brown, 1987; Rakow and Kranich, 1991); 
minority women were either absent from representation or marginalized ( Manuel, 1987: 42-4); women 
script writers were squeezed out (Hyen, 1987: 151-63); and women oriented programmes allowed to fail 
(Coward, 1987: 96-106). Davies and Dickey asked: 
Public service broadcasting is a very fine notion but which public is currently being served? 
Broadcasting certainly does not serve the relatively powerless or disadvantaged groups in society 
well at all, and their means of access or redress are minimal (1987: 5). 
A number of attempts were made to rectify the situation with television companies seeking to redress gender 
bias. In the UK, Channel 4's remit when it was established in 1982 included the statement that it would 
forward the rights of women (Women's Advisory and Referral Service Action Group 1982: 104). But, 
patterns of structural gender bias continued into the nineties. The French public service broadcaster in 
Belgium, RTBF, had only three women out of 14 men on its administrative board In 1991 (RTBF 1991: 4- 
6), whilst the Italian broadcasters, RAI, had in the same year no women at all on its 12 man administrative 
board. The company makes provision for union representation at management level but all seven are men 
(RAI 1991-2: 475). The news rooms of public service broadcasters throughout the Western World also 
remained under the control by men; figures based on those provided by Television Broadcasting 
International in 1992 which included Australia, Canada, Japan and the United States showed that only 
Canada had a news service headed by a woman ( derived from TBI 1992: 44-46). Neither should one be 
deceived by the apparent increase in visibility in terms of female newsreaders. According to research they 
tend to be young and attractive in comparison with their old and ugly male counterparts (Baehr, 1981: 124- 
34). ultimately it seems that in periods of crisis even such surface changes are rescinded: research during the 
Gulf War on Israeli Television shows that women news readers were replaced by men in all but one instance 
(Lzmish, 1993). 
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
Long afterward, Oedipus, old and blinded, walked 
the roads. He smelled a familiar smell. It was 
the Sphinx. Oedipus said, "I want to ask one 
question. Why didnIt I recognize my mother? ' 
"You gave the wrong answer, I said the Sphinx. 
"But that was what made everything possible, I 
said Oedipus. I No, I she said. I When I asked, what 
walks on four legs in the morning, two at noon, 
and three in the evening you answered, Man. you 
didn't say anything about woman. ' 'When you say 
Man, ' said Oedipus, 'you include women too. 
Everyone knows that. ' She said, 'That's what you 
think. I Muriel Rukeyser *-Myth' (1987: 135) (My 
emphasis) 
Freedom (to move, to earn, to learn, to be allied 
with a powerful centre, to narrate the world) can 
be relished more deeply in a cheek-by-jowl 
existence with the bound and unfree, the 
economically oppressed, the marginalized, the 
silenced. (Toni Morrison Playing in the Dark 
1992: 64 
9.1 Introduction 
On the BBC's Radio Four (9.00 Wednesday, June 1996) 
Joy Hendry devoted a series to research and ideas on 
the concept of memory. The series developed a sense of 
memory as something both individual and social. 
Similarly, recent academic discussions in the U. S., 
such as that articulated by Toni Morrison in Playing 
in the Dark (1992), suggest that the suppression of 
the memory of slavery by white Americans has resulted 
in the internalization of hatred by African-Americans 
themselves and the continuation of exclusion from the 
public sphere. At the same time Black culture in the 
West continues to provide a cultural and social memory 
of inclusion: Hendry cites the example of the African 
rhythms recalled in the writing of James Berry. (Joy 
Hendry, BBC Radio Four 9.00pm June 24,1996). 
In the light of these debates and the evidence of this 
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study, it is suggested that the concept of what could 
be called socially inherited memory may also be worth 
considering in terms of gender and the public sphere. ' 
Thus in this final chapter I bring together the 
evidence on women in the public sphere in Poland and 
indicate how the hypothesis suggested in the 
introduction and the theoretical questions raised in 
Chapter One are illuminated and to some extent 
resolved. I conclude by indicating the ways in which 
this study suggests a reformulation of our 
understanding of the public sphere and the (en) 
gendering of change. 
10.2 Theoretical Questions and Answers 
In Chapter One it was argued that scholars addressing 
the changes in Eastern Europe could be divided in 
terms of those who perceived greater societal 
transformation or continuity. In Poland, as in the 
rest of Eastern Europe, after the initial euphoria of 
1989, many scholars in fact began to argue that there 
was greater continuity between the Communist and 
capitalist systems than was previously supposed. This 
also included gendered perspectives on the changes, 
such as those articulated by Funk and Mueller (1993) 
and Barbara Einhorn (1994). My study of gender and the 
public sphere in Poland would certainly confirm those 
theories of the changes in Eastern Europe which stress 
continuity in the societies of Eastern Europe and in 
their mediated aspects, rather than rupture or radical 
break 1*n 1989. This study also confirms the picture 
given by Einhorn (1994) and Rosenberg (1989) of 
women's continued exclusion from the public sphere, 
which some would argue has actually increased: 
'- Oral historians in the 1990s already consider memory as gendered in individual terms. Joan Sangster, 
for example, recently argued that in telling their stories peoples' memories of events are gendered (1994). 
Louisa Passerini has suggested a similar process in a study of car workers memories of the Second World War 
in Italy (1994). 
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Within the framework of the emerging masculinist 
cultures in East-Central European society, 
masculinity becomes increasingly identified with 
the public domain. As traditional ideas of 
difference, including gender-difference, are 
redefined\reconstructed in such a way as to 
advance exclusionary advantage in the new public 
sphere, masculinity is increasingly identified 
with citizenship. (Tsagarousianou, 1993: 8) 
Yet, if those theories that suggested continuity in 
Eastern Europe were correct in the case of women in 
Poland, I argued in Chapter one, this then raised a 
number of questions about the nature of the 
transitions in the region. How and why were the 
changes so limited? Why were exclusionary aspects of 
gender relations in the public sphere replicated 
during the period of transition? Accounts of the 
public sphere, particularly feminist theories, I 
suggested, might provide some clues. 
The first clue, I argued, to gendered explanations of 
the transitions in the public sphere in Poland might 
be found in Pateman's theory that: 'it is necessary to 
begin to tell the repressed story of the genesis of 
patriarchal political right which men exercise over 
women' (1981: 101) (my emphasis). Following this I 
asked what then is the repressed story of the genesis 
of political right in Poland? Does this repressed 
story explain how the public sphere continues to be 
(en)gendered? How far does this repressed story impact 
on the more recent transformations in Poland since 
1980, particularly in relation to television? And, 
finally, what indeed is meant by the phrase 'the 
repressed story'? 
The second clue to theorizing more fully the 
transition in Poland, I suggested, may lie in an 
understanding of the public sphere that allows for 
alternative spaces or spheres. This would then 
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indicate that the repressed story of the genesis of 
political right could be understood more clearly as 
multiple and contradictory, rather than singular and 
homogeneous. This idea of a contradictory repressed 
story might better explain the ongoing presence of 
alternative women's spaces and political movements. 
The third clue, I maintained, to understanding the 
transition in Poland, theoretically, came from the 
critique by some scholars of the underlying 
Enlightenment assumptions of the concept of the public 
sphere (Fraser, 1990; Van Zoonen, 1994; Phillips, 
1991). 1 suggested that the implication of such 
critiques was that the dichotomous and hierarchical 
concepts used to form the basis of political theory 
and used to frame our understanding of the public 
sphere may be unable to explain the (en)gendering 
processes because the concepts themselves are part of 
the problem. This then raised a number of further 
questions. What if the repressed story of the genesis 
of political right in Poland is formed and operates 
across what has been traditionally conceived of and 
understood as separate private\public realms? What if, 
historically, the mechanisms and processes of 
exclusion to the public sphere operates through the 
emotional, the sexual, the familial as well as the 
political, the cultural and the economic? What if to 
understand and explain the social processes of the 
transformations in Poland's public sphere it is 
necessary to formulate an abstraction enables us to 
stretch the usual conceptual boundaries of the sphere? 
These questions were then brought to bear on 
developing a formulation of socially inherited memory. 
Although, as I indicate above, the concept of some 
kind of social memory has been developed and discussed 
in terms of race in America, I suggested that earlier 
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precursors to the idea were to be found in the 
arguments of Ernest Renan (1990: 11) and the socialist 
Paul Federn (Jacoby, 1973: 85). It was Federn who 
suggested that some form of patriarchal "socially 
inherited feeling' may have prevented the complete 
victory of what he called a 'fatherless society'. 
However, socially inherited memory I argued was not to 
be confused with the idea of 'a collective soul' or 
a 'collective inner psyche'. It was better understood 
in the sense suggested by Mikhail Bakhtin (writing 
under the name of Volosinov) as operating not so much 
within us as without, through the word, the gesture, 
the act (Volosinov, 1973: 23). 1 argued that socially 
inherited memory could then be conceived of as an 
abstract concept to describe the way in which 
societies, in this case Polish society, repressed, 
recalled and changed the story of political right of 
its citizens. The social inheritance or socially 
handed down memory of this story of the political 
right of citizens could be seen to operate in both 
institutional structures and ideological 
representations. The collective remembering and 
forgetting of this story would be communicated through 
language, over a range of discourses. I proposed that 
socially inherited memory may be understood, 
ultimately, as an abstract concept for the sum of the 
dialectical struggle in class and gender terms 
embodied in language which may be used to explain the 
continuity (and disjuncture) in the gendered 
construction and transformation of the public sphere, 
and, which bridges the usual conceptual gulf between 
the public and private realms. The concept I said may 
provide us with a useful theoretical addition to our 
understanding of the (en)gendering of the public 
sphere in Poland. 
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9.21 Polandfs Repressed Story of Political Right 
What the evidence from Poland shows is that the 
continued exclusion of women from the public sphere in 
its recent transition to a capitalist society is not 
a recent phenomenon, but, may be better understood as 
the re-enactment of a longstanding problem within the 
public sphere and the ways in which it was 
historically (en)gendered. This view is also suggested 
by Lovendowski in relation to Western Europe. She 
argues that throughout Europe state structures in the 
19th century were established on the assumption that 
women were there to be controlled. Legal mechanisms 
were introduced which supported male dominance. The 
century and a half which followed has been the history 
of a gender struggle in which women have fought for 
the abrogation and dismantling of gender-specific 
legal apparatus (Lovendowski, 1986: 296). The evidence 
from Poland on women's representation in 19th century 
partitioned Poland would seem to support this. Jean- 
Jacques Rousseau in his Considerations -on 
the 
Government of Poland clearly regarded serfdom as 
illegitimate (see Okin, 1980: 126 and 142) but did not 
include women in his assertions for their political 
equality (See Rousseau's Emile). What was crucial in 
the case of Poland's repressed story of political 
right at this time was its troubled status as a nation 
state. The partitions in Poland resulted in particular 
formulations of women's public activity which crushed 
the earlier impetus for the inclusion of women. 
Polish women came to be the self -sacrificing vessel of 
Polish national culture and language, unable to have 
a voice except in terms of the Nation. The embodiment 
of this was Matka Polka, or Mother Poland. Evidence 
from the interwar years indicates the continuation of 
this story of exclusion built upon their public 
sacrifice for the nation. Under state capitalism the 
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social inheritance of the exclusion of women within 
the public sphere established during Poland's period 
of identity formation and during the interwar years 
combined with the social memory of Soviet style 
equality laws which gave priority to the public, the 
rational and the functional domains of human life. The 
result was the re-enactment of women's exclusion and 
ghettoization in the public sphere. In 
representational terms this resulted in the reworking 
of old stereotypes such as Mother Poland, Kobieta 
Samotna and Baba Yaga. During the transition 1980-1994 
in both the official and unofficial public spheres 
there was increasing convergence in the 
representations of women by the state capitalist 
regime and Solidarity. Despite the calls for 
democracy, the Church, Solidarity and the Polish 
United Worker's Party all used restrictive aspects of 
Poland's socially inherited memory to build and 
legitimatize their own power bases. The aspects they 
chose were those that were inherently gender biased: 
The result was the reproduction of the exclusion of 
women from the public sphere after 1989 and the 
perpetuation of gender stereotypes. Finally, the 
detail of these processes of exclusion was most 
clearly indicated in the transition of state 
television into a public service television in terms 
of the exclusion of women from its organisational 
structures and within media policy. 
9.22 Subplots of Political Right and Women's cultural 
Spaces 
At the same time, however, it is also clear from this 
study that within Poland's repressed story of 
political right are the sub-plots of women's struggles 
for political and cultural representation. From the 
19th century onwards (and probably before) there is 
evidence of campaigns by women for enfranchisement and 
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education in all three sectors of partitioned Poland. 
Connected to these were also a number of women's 
publications and key women writers presenting a 
different perspective on Polish women. This 
inheritance was continued through various 
organisations and publications in the interwar years, 
supplemented by the development of women's 
communities. Under state capitalism these womens 
organizations mostly became subsumed by the Polish 
United Worker's Party but in the spirit and actuality 
of their activities they had more in common with 
Poland's own pre-war feminist inheritance. In some 
instances Party organizations such as the Women's 
League went against the Church and the Party. Some 
organizations, such as the Women's House in Krakow, 
although losing some of its original political impact 
retained their autonomy from the Polish United 
Worker's Party, provided single women and lesbians 
with a positive community environment. Further, 
despite the gendered effects of censorship, there are 
examples, most clearly illustrated by the poetry of 
Anna Swir, of women challenging the dominant 
representation of women as Mother Poland, Whore, Baba 
Yaga and Kobieta Samotna. During the period of 
transition this sub-plot of the struggle by women for 
cultural and political representation continued, with 
women's units established within Solidarity and 
various groups set up by middle-class feminists in 
most major Polish cities. These too were accompanied 
by cultural representations in certain spheres, 
particularly print but less so in highly controlled 
areas such as television. 
In addition a further sub-plot to the repressed story 
of political right in Poland is the struggle by 
different ethnic groups and the women within these for 
political and cultural recognition. These provided 
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contradictory representations in political and 
cultural terms f or women in the 19th century and 
interwar years. The recollection of the nineteenth 
century Polish Mother representation by the Polish 
United Worker"s Party after World War Two and the 
inclusion of women in the workforce and education can 
then be understood as built around the repressed story 
of the annihilation of the Jews and other ethnic 
groups, rather as Toni Morrison suggests that the 
identity of white Americans was built around the 
repression of the story of slavery and society's 
historical denial of the presence of African-Americans 
in society (1992: 6). 
During Poland's transition, the Church, Solidarity and 
the Polish United Worker's Party chose to deny 
Poland's small but not insignificant ethnic community 
representation. The result was most clearly 
illustrated in Poland's recent broadcast legislation 
which seeks to deny its non-Christian minorities a 
voice. The result is the recollection of Poland's 
inheritance of exclusion developed in the 19th century 
and established in ethnic terms in the interwar years. 
This evidence would then seem to support those 
feminist theories of the public sphere which give 
recognition to the historical development of 
alternative public spaces, such as work by Fraser, who 
highlights the importance of alternative publics and 
stresses notions of difference and resistance within 
popular culture and media f orms. However, what this 
study also shows is that in Poland the fact that 
Polish women and women from different ethnic groups 
were able to develop their own spaces from the 19th 
century onwards does not mean that all these spaces 
were egalitarian and democratic. Some were and some 
307 
are not, as the recent examples of women in the KPN 
and the Green's illustrate, and the historical example 
of the Bais Yakov in the interwar years also 
highlighted. As McLaughlin warns us: We should be 
aware of accounts of the public sphere that idealise 
alternative publics. The National Front as well as Gay 
Rights activists mobilize around identity, she points 
out, yet not both are equally emancipatory 
(McLaughlin, 1993: 616). 
9.30 The Dialectic of the Private and Public 
What this study also conf irms is that it is not 
possible to understand public (en)gendering processes 
without also understanding their links with certain 
elements of private (en)gendering processes within the 
family and domestic spheres. Both the private and 
public domains are dialectically connected. This is 
especially important in terms of understanding 
Poland's story of political right, since the 
development of the nation state and Polish men's 
political intervention during the partition years 
relied on the private or domestic activities of women 
and was reinforced by the ideal image of the Polish 
woman as the centre of the home and hearth in the f orm 
of the self-sacrificing and patriotic Mother Poland. 
This was also the case under state capitalism, and, 
again during the period of transition in which women 
Solidarity activists increasingly took a back seat to 
support the public activities of their menfolk. 
At the same time the evidence from a number of women 
themselves highlights how the dialectic of remembering 
and forgetting gendered historical roles works to 
inscribe women and men differently within the private 
sphere. For example, we saw how women perceived their 
participation in the public sphere as being paid for 
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by an accumulating debt of domestic and family 
responsibilties. The women but not the men they 
suggested would remember to repay this debt at some 
point in their lives in terms of, for example, 
childcare given by grandmothers understood as an 
exchange for the later care of the same elderly 
relatives. In contrast, a man's role in the private 
sphere was contigent solely upon his desire; thereby 
leaving him free to participate in the public realm 
whilst his family - in terms of female children and 
his wife remembered to pay his accumulating domestic 
debts. 
9.31 The Contradictory Process of Socially Inherited 
Memory 
What this study thus shows is that the impact of 
socially inherited memory on the continuity of 
structures and ideologies of societies is a powerful 
force: During Poland's period of transition the 
ruling elite and the opposition sought to actively 
recover aspects of Poland's socially inherited memory 
to legitimize their own power. Because Poland's social 
memory was inherently gender biased this served to 
reproduce patriarchal structures and ideologies after 
1989. 
Having said this, however, empirical evidence also 
shows that this is not an inevitable process. We saw, 
for example, how when the ruling patriarchal class are 
confident spaces emerge for women to represent 
themselves differently, as with the poetry of Anna 
Swir. Further, socially inherited memory should not be 
understood as static or homogenous; the relationship 
between different elements in Poland, such as 
nationalism, feminism and socialism for example was a 
heterogeneous and dialectical one, resulting in gaps 
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and fissures for women to enter the public sphere, as 
illustrated by the example of 19th century feminists 
using nationalist discourse (Chapter 3). 
In addition what this study also suggests is that 
socially inherited memory should not be understood as 
a singular phenomenon anchored to the nation state: We 
saw how af ter the Second World War, the regime drew on 
Poland's political inheritance as well as that of the 
Soviet Union. Similarly in the period of transition 
both the opposition and the ruling party began to draw 
on aspects of Western inheritance, as well as its own. 
On the whole, this worked against women, as with the 
use of aspects of Western media policies in Poland's 
broadcast laws. But, in particular instances the 
inheritance of the West provided for greater support 
for women's issues, as shown by the example of the 
Solidarity Women's Unit after 1989 which was able to 
justify its existence on the grounds that to be 
modern, to be Western, meant accepting the need for 
women's units within the new Union (Chapter 7). 
Further, socially inherited memory I would suggest 
from this study should be understood as something 
which effects us simultaneously on an individual level 
as much on the collective level. We saw, for example, 
how socially inherited memory is used not just by 
ruling elites or movements to legitimatize their power 
but by individuals to justify or legitimatize the 
place of men and women in the public and private 
spheres. Women it seemed, from interviews, engaged 
with different aspects of socially inherited memory to 
understand, to justify and indeed to challenge their 
own positions in society. 
Further, what this study also suggests is that we 
should be wary of making the concept of socially 
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inherited memory itself an ahistorical concept. 
Phillips (1992) stresses this in relation to the 
concept of the public sphere, adding that we need also 
to avoid becoming overly functional in the development 
of feminist social theory. What is evident is that the 
concept of socially inherited memory should not be 
understood as a formulation for a static fixed realm 
with which like a ruler we may count out the legacies 
of cultures and historical epochs. Rather, socially 
inherited memory is a formulation that should be 
undertood as in itself fraught from the legacy of 
contradictions and over-articulations of our own 
historical epoch of the 1990s, re-enacting or engaging 
with in this case my own I memory of mother's memory' 
(Glendinning, 1996: 12). 
Further, the ways in which socially inherited memory 
is communicated it has been suggestd in this study is 
ultimately through discource and language; our social 
memory is stored and expressed in somatic f orm through 
representations - the presence or absence of men and 
women in public or private spaces, and in mental form 
through re-presenation - our collectively recognised 
symbolic manifestations. But the relationship between 
these and the way in which social memory may serve to 
operate on or inf orm the present and f uture in ways in 
which a society may not be fully concious should also 
be understood as subject to change. As Joy Hendry 
suggests, the role of individual and collective memory 
in industrialized societies has substantially altered 
with the advent of literacy (BBC, Radio 4,9.00 pm, 
June 24,1996). With predominantly oral cultures, as 
Hendry points out, memory is the people. With literate 
cultures memory becomes much more externalized, 
something out there. This points to an area which has 
not been resolved by this study: To what extent did 
women begin to engage with Poland's socially inherited 
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memory after the War differently because of rising 
literacy levels? The historical changes to people's 
engagement with and the ways in which socially 
inherited memory alters would provide the basis for 
interesting further research. 
9.4 The Broader Implications of The Thesis 
Finally, with the benefit of hindsight in the 1990s, 
we can now see that the challenges in the 1980s to the 
Enlightenment foundations of social theory coincided 
with the changes and revolutions in Eastern Europe and 
the fall of the Berlin Wall. The meaning we choose to 
give to the transitions in Eastern Europe therefore 
also may have broader theoretical implications in 
terms of the public sphere and what some intellectuals 
would call the post-modernist break. Indeed, the 
historical events in Eastern Europe have been used by 
some theorists to support their belief that the end of 
the Cold War signified the end of the great 
ideological joust of the 20th century: The battle 
between the champions of capitalism and the white 
knights of Marxism. Fukujama (1992), for example, made 
the claim that what we were witnessing at the end of 
the 1980s was the end of history and that the fall of 
Communism signified the end of modernity. Yet, in 
Poland, we have seen that historically the values and 
meaning of 'modernity' itself has been different for 
Polish women and different again for women and men 
from various ethnic groups in Poland in terms of their 
(re) presentation in the public sphere. The picture for 
Polish women, for example, has been one of continuity 
and replication of established gendered public 
relations: Despite the changes that Poland has 
undergone the features of over-articulated exclusion 
continued in slightly mutated form after 1989. Women's 
(re) presentation within a so-called 'post-modern' 
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society is thus little different from the "modern' 
that some theorists suppose went before. As Balsamo 
has pointed out: 
From a feminist perspective the crises which 
preoccupy post-modernism do not appear as such, 
largely because the break between modernism and 
post-modernism is indistinct and arbitrary; 
patriarchal relations of domination have 
continued undeterred. Women's voices are still 
actively suppressed. (1987: 69) 
What this study of the public sphere in Poland 
highlights in terms of wider social theory, therefore, 
is that whilst there is certainly marked continuity in 
the mechanisms and processes of exclusion to the 
public sphere, these, at the same time, should be 
understood as operating across conceptual boundaries; 
conceptual boundaries which have within certain 
aspects of 'modernism' tended to be understood as 
separate and distinct. We have seen how socially 
inherited memory, for example, works across the public 
and the private, the emotional and rational, the 
objective and subjective realms to reproduce 
continuity and disjuncture in gendered relations of 
dominance and marginality. Conversely, I would 
suggest that if in our understanding of the public 
sphere we remain imaginatively and intellectually 
stuck in the circumscribed dichotomies of 
Enlightenment assumptions this may obscure aspects of 
gendered reality and relations of exploitation and 
oppression. 
Increasingly, in fact, the workings of democracies are 
understood, as a result of feminist and post- 
structuralist interventions, as a combination of the 
private and the public; as riven with conflicts and 
inequalities; as continually in a process of struggle 
for voice and representation (Garnham, 1992; Mouffe, 
1992). Yet, as Angela McRobbie points out, if being 
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attentive to the assumptions of social theory and 
boundary making is indeed challenging some of the 
foundations of Western scholarship, this does not then 
mean the end of history, politics or society 
(McRobbie, 1994: 5). Rather, it is an act of public 
truth telling, which, as Herman reminds us is, 'the 
common denominator of all social action" (Herman, 
1994: 208). 
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Dr Teresa Sasinska-Kias, Head of Journalism, 
Jagiellonian University, Kracow (23.5.1994). 
Krystyna Sienkiewicz, Minister for Health, Polish 
Sejm (13.7.90). 
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Joanna Sobczak, 4th Year Student, Department of 
English and American Studies, Lodz (3.2.91). 
Krystyna Sienkiewicz, Minister for Health, 
(13.7.90). 
Marta Suchodolska, Head of International Relations, 
Polish Television (23.9.1992). 
Anna Szymanska-Kwiatkowska, Member of Parliament 
(Polish Seym) and Editor in Chief of Kobietv i Zycie 
(Women and LIfe) (13.7.90). 
Ewa Szczepanik-Mazurska, Textile Weaver, Poltex 
Textile Factory, Lodz (6.7.90). - 
Janina Suska-Jankowska, Chairpersont Liga Kobiet 
Polskich (Polish Women's League) Lodz (11.7.90). 
Krystyna Stachowiak, Director, Poznan Solidarity 
Women's Unit; founder RobMy SWOye (Do Your Duty); 
founding member Poznan Polish Socialist Party (PPS); 
member Citizen Committee (28.8.90). 
Maciej Strzembosz, Independent media consultant, 
lawyer and journalist, Warsaw (September, 1992). 
Malgorzata Taraszewicz, Co-ordinator of the National 
Solidarity Women's Unit, Gdansk. (7.8.90). 
David Thomas, Director of Coopers and Lybrand, 
Warsaw (September, 1992). 
I 
Tomasz Trabic, Editor, Media Section, Nowe EurgjM 
(22.9.92). 
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Leszek Wasiuta, Head of Channel one, Polish 
Television (28.9.92). 
Andrzej Wojnach, Head of Staff Training, Polish 
Television (23.10.92). 
Joanna Wiszniewska, Artist, Member of Association of 
Polish Artists, Lodz (8.8.90). 
Danuta Zatay, Solidarity Secretary, Solidarity 
Headquarters, Gdansk, (17.8.90). 
Personal Communication (Written Statements) 
Secondary School girls, Fourth Year, School 164, 
Lodz. February, 1991 
Agata Kaczan, Secondary School Teacher of Polish, 
Lodz, February 1991. 
Bozenna Kaminska, Secondary School Teacher of 
History and Social Science, Lodz, February 1991. 
Anna Lis, Deputy Head Teacher, Lodz, February 1991. 
Participant Observation 
Journals 1988,1989,1990,1991, 
Want Project Video, Lodz Feminist Workshop, Part 
Two, 1990. 
